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Abstract 
 
Entrepreneurship has become one of the most researched areas in 
recent years. Its importance has increased further by the emergence of the 
‘transition countries’, the countries of Eastern Europe and the Former 
Soviet Union. As the transition countries strived to overhaul their economic 
and political systems in order to bring them in line with the rest of the 
market based economies, entrepreneurship and private sector development 
became the focus of the transition debate among the scholars and policy 
makers.  
A major part of the scholarly interest centred on the factors that 
hindered the development of the entrepreneurial sector. Numerous surveys 
of entrepreneurs and business owners have highlighted extensive lists of the 
most common obstacles to the development of enterprises. While the 
international organizations have concentrated on these reported obstacles, 
some members of the scholarship community have identified much more 
fundamental issues that both stifle the entrepreneurship development and 
encourage rent seeking behaviour.  
This study has used the theory of the allocation of entrepreneurial 
talents to explore the roots of the most commonly reported obstacles that 
the entrepreneurs face in the context of economic and political transition in 
Uzbekistan. We use historical evidence in conjunction with the 
 iv 
contemporary survey data and our own interview results to establish the 
relationship between the ‘rules of the game’ that determine the system of 
talent allocation and entrepreneurship development. Our conclusions 
support earlier claims made by Baumol (1990) regarding the importance of 
the system of incentives and punishments in the development of 
entrepreneurship.    
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 The first recognition of entrepreneurship as a phenomenon in the 
literature is still hotly debated. Most of the Western scholarship community 
tends to credit Cantillon as the economist to give the first serious attention 
to entrepreneurship in his analysis in a 1755 essay.   
 However, it was not until Schumpeter (1934) that a comprehensive 
theory of entrepreneurship outlining its role in economic development was 
put forward. Not only did he explain the term of entrepreneurship in a 
greater detail than anyone else before, but he also developed a dynamic 
equilibrium model of economic development centred on entrepreneurship.  
 His theory of ‘creative destruction’ puts the entrepreneur at the centre 
of economic progress by introducing innovations and challenging the 
existing order of things by bringing about ‘new combinations’.  In 
particular, he described five types of activity as being entrepreneurial: 
introducing a new product; introducing a new method of production; 
opening of a new market; securing a new source of raw material or half-
manufactured product; introducing a new organization of industry.  
 Later contributors have greatly expanded Schumpeter’s theory since 
then, one of the most notable contributors being Drucker (1985) who put 
significant emphasis on the innovation side of entrepreneurship.   
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 Baumol (1990), on the other hand, pointed to the weakness in 
Schumpeter’s general definition of entrepreneurship. He claimed that that 
definition could easily be used to describe some activities which are equally 
new and innovative but unproductive or often counterproductive and 
illegal. He offered a theory of allocation of entrepreneurial talent between 
productive and unproductive entrepreneurship, with the countries managing 
to channel their entrepreneurs into productive activities achieving much 
higher growth levels. He effectively incorporated the existing theories of 
rent seeking behaviour into entrepreneurship theory.  
 Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991) follow Baumol’s logic but 
propose to extend the theory to all activities and develop the theory of 
‘allocation of talent’ rather then just entrepreneurship. Their main argument 
is that all activities and sectors compete for the same group of talented 
people in every given country, and the attractiveness of any given activity 
and sector is determined by its payoff, prestige and costs (these may 
include also include punishments in cases of illegal activities that offer very 
high payoffs) relative to the rest of them.  
 They argued that the countries where productive activities were most 
attractive to the most talented achieved higher growth levels compared to 
the countries where rent seeking sectors dominated and consequently their 
economies stagnated. The rent seeking sectors, having attracted the most 
talented people, will start expanding and consuming more of every other 
resource and squeezing the productive sectors in the process.  
 In this study we will apply these theories to the Uzbek economy under 
three different political and social contexts. First we will look at the Uzbek 
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economy and society before the October Revolution and discuss the 
validity and implications of the talent allocation theory in the context of a 
backward, feudal society dominated by the religious institutions.  
 Then we will analyze the effects of the changes in the ‘Rules of The 
Game’ and social upheaval resulting from the October Revolution and the 
emergence of USSR.  
 Finally we will discuss entrepreneurship, talent allocation and the 
‘Rules of the Game’ in the independent Uzbekistan focusing on the 
negative effects of the suboptimal allocation of entrepreneurial talent.  
 
 The territory where present day Uzbekistan is located belonged to 
three different khanates (kingdoms). Although the ruling elite in all three of 
them were ethnic Uzbeks, the population was very diverse in both the 
language and culture. The society was dominated by a minority of feudal 
aristocracy, the Begs 1 (Lords) and a large body of Muslim clergy.  
 The economy was backward and agriculture – based, with a large 
trading sector, the heritage of being an important part of the Silk Road. The 
political system centred on the monarch and his close associates as well as 
the clergy whom monarch regularly consulted and gave enormous support.  
The educational system consisted of religious schools and colleges 
which taught a little bit of general knowledge within their Islamic 
curriculum. It was a society where people largely inherited their parents’ 
                                                  
1
 Beg is the word used in most of the Turkic nations to refer to aristocrats (roughly 
comparable to the lord in English) who were masters of regions, towns etc. They either 
inherited their status or were appointed by the monarch in charge. Different pronunciations 
such as Bek, Bey also exist.   
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status and jobs. Children of aristocrats that held official positions expected 
to be succeeded by their children (except for daughters).  
  The business community consisted mainly of merchants, some 
aristocrat – industrialists, and Non-Muslims (mainly Jews and Indians) who 
dealt with businesses like alcohol, gambling, and banking, all of which 
were prohibited for locals by religion. Smaller businesses were 
predominantly self-sustaining farmers and craftsmen. For the talented 
youth, who were not born into an aristocratic family, the routes to upward 
social and economic mobility were limited to the religious schools. 
Therefore, it is not entirely surprising that the kind of people who 
would fit into the descriptions actively promoted by the disciples of 
Schumpeter, emerged predominantly among the graduates of religious 
schools and independent merchants who regularly travelled around the 
world.  
Those pioneers, who are often referred to as Jadids (after an Arabic 
term meaning ‘new method’) opened new style schools, introduced new 
ideas, technologies, published books, opened newspapers, theatres and 
called for modernization in every other aspect of the everyday life in 
Central Asia.  
Most of the things that they introduced and the things that they 
aspired to achieve were inspired by their sense of inferiority in the wake of 
the Russian Invasion which exposed the large gap in the level of 
development between Russia and the occupied lands.  
Being devout Muslims, educated at religious schools, they 
continued to believe that any progress should be achieved within the 
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framework of Islam.  Another reason for upholding Islamic ideology might 
have been the hope of attracting the support of fellow Muslim countries in 
their struggle against the Russians. This explanation seems to be more 
valid, given the fact that most of the Jadids have decided to join the 
communist ranks after it became clear that they could not get any help from 
outside. 
The October Revolution and subsequent establishment of the 
Communist rule in Uzbekistan changed the Rules of Game dramatically. 
The criteria for success and opportunities for the talented were significantly 
different from what they were before the revolution.  
The Soviet authority nationalized all sectors of economy and set out 
to remove the existing elite from all positions of power and prestige, as 
opposed to the previous administration which supported the existing elites 
and empowered them to keep them in control of the local population.  
Members of the local elite had a tough choice of either leaving the 
country or undergoing an incredible regeneration by denouncing their 
religious affiliations and joining the Communist Party.  
  Some of them did decide to stay and join the party organs and 
made good progress until Stalin came to power and started his 
collectivization drive in the late 1920s.  
 The Soviet authorities had somehow tolerated having some members 
of the old elite whom they considered as class enemies during the first 
decade in power while training new generations of party activists selected 
almost exclusively from poor workers and peasants.  
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 In 1937, Stalin ordered a major purge of the party cadre and replaced 
everybody with smallest of the ties with the old elites with a new 
generation of ‘yes men’.  
   This system, established and perfected by Stalin until his death 1953, 
functioned virtually unchanged until the 1980s.  
 The system was centred on the Communist Party which was in charge 
of every aspect economic, political and social life in the country. In every 
region, local party leader was made directly in charge of and responsible 
for the results of the regions economy.  
 The Soviet system was supposed to have encouraged entrepreneurial 
and creative activities greatly by removing the financial risks of starting 
new ventures as all the companies were started and owned by the state. But 
in fact the system discouraged entrepreneurship by removing the financial 
benefits of starting a successful venture.  
 Unlike the previous systems in Central Asia, the Soviet rule made the 
career paths for talented people very clear and straightforward. It was clear 
what was required to get promoted and to stay at top positions and what 
rewards could be expected.  
 The Standard career path for talented youth started at school with the 
children’s communist organization, called the ‘children of October’ 
referring to the October Revolution. Then they would join Komsomol, the 
youth branch of the Communist Party. The most distinguished activists of 
those organizations would be recruited to Party administration after 
graduating from one the top universities. After gaining a few years of 
experience working at lower levels of the party branches they would be 
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sent back to specialized party schools. The graduates of the party schools 
would be appointed to high level party posts.  
 The rewards for reaching such heights would include much better 
living standards compared to the rest of the population, in addition to the 
power and prestige attached to running high level party posts. While their 
main salaries were much higher than the national average, their luxurious 
life style was maintained by a network of special stores and discount 
housing, leisure facilities.  
 All of those rewards were tied to the posts the officials held and they 
only enjoyed them as long as they stayed in their positions. They were not 
allowed to accumulate and get rich in the same way the successful people 
in the market economies were allowed to. This system of rewards had 
important implications for the way the elites approached their jobs.  
 They would go to extraordinary lengths in order to keep their 
positions. Such high costs associated with losing important position 
coupled with the unrealistically ambitious plan targets unlocked amazing 
levels of creativity in the Soviet politicians and managers. Unfortunately, 
very little of that creativity was directed into productive activities.  
 Besides, because the Soviet enterprises were all owned by the state and 
did not have to be profitable, most of them were operating at unsustainable 
levels.  
When it became clear that the system had failed, Gorbachev, the then 
head of the Communist party of USSR, decided to abandon the whole 
system and introduce a market based system with private ownership and 
open markets.  
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 At first he was met with strong opposition, as the members of the 
Soviet elite were more worried about preserving their privileges than the 
greater good of the country.  
 But the momentum shifted in favour of the reforms as the bureaucrats 
realized the opportunities which the reforms would open for their own 
personal enrichment. The subsequent state capturing campaign saw some of 
the top party officials, enterprise managers, and high - ranking army and 
security service officers emerging as multi millionaires as the Soviet Union 
collapsed as a political and economic entity.  
 Uzbekistan’s leadership, which has obediently followed Moscow’s 
lead in everything since Stalin times, watched quietly until the time when it 
became very obvious that the Union collapsed before declaring 
independence in August, 1991.  
 But, Uzbekistan still stuck with Russia in terms of economic and 
monetary arrangements until the introduction of a new currency in 1994. 
Initially, the Uzbek government did much better than any other transition 
country in terms of halting the economic crisis and stabilizing both political 
and economic situations.   
 This was achieved by preserving most of the economic and political 
structure largely unchanged. First the disgraced communist party was 
renamed as the People’s Democratic Party, and the administrative structure 
was kept unchanged with the new party inheriting the commanding position 
of the old one. Then the party rule was abolished altogether in favour of the 
revived pre-revolutionary administrative system of regional mayors that 
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replaced regional party secretaries. However, most of the former party 
secretaries stayed on in the new position.  
 The government even tried to replace communist ideology with the 
newly created ‘Ideology of Independence’, where developing and 
preserving Uzbekistan as an independent nation became the new 
overarching goal of the nation.  
 The President, who was the leader of the old communist party, became 
the symbol of nation and protector of its independence. Hence, loyalty to 
the President became synonymous with the loyalty to the nation.  
 The rules of the Game changed dramatically again. The brightest 
students no longer could expect a straightforward rise to the top by the 
traditional routes. Under the new system based on strong presidential rule, 
closeness to the ‘centre of power gravity’ became the new main criteria for 
success. The system was replicated in every region where power was 
concentrated in the hands of regional mayors.  
 Although the command economy was formally abolished and market 
based institutions were established, most of the Uzbek economy still 
remained under state control and the mayors are still in charge of both 
economic and political administrations of their respective regions.  
 As a result, there is no significant economic and political power 
outside of the control of the administrative apparatus. The success of those 
that do exist outside depends on the level of their closeness to the 
administrative apparatus.  
 Hence, the highest position in every region is the position of the mayor 
and the highest payoff in terms of material well being, prestige and power 
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can also be achieved only by the mayor. The mayors not only manage the 
public assets but also can interfere, at will, into any private enterprise’s 
affairs.  
 The success and rewards of the others then are closely linked to their 
closeness to the mayor and his administration2.  
 For aspiring young talent therefore, the primary goal should be to join 
the ranks of the administrative officials and try to go as high up as they 
possibly can. The way into the ranks of the administrative officials goes 
through the top institutions of higher education (IHEs). Going to the top of 
IHEs is not as easy as it used to be during the Soviet time. Higher education 
is not free for all in the independent Uzbekistan and the increasing living 
expenses in the big cities, where the most of the top IHEs are located, add 
to the costs of education.  
 However, the large number of applications per placement at those top 
IHEs indicates that the population of Uzbekistan still considers education 
as a good investment. The admission process is administered centrally and 
the multiple choice questions selected from pre-published study manuals 
give the talented youth from even disadvantaged families enough chance to 
get through.  
 While at university aspiring individuals should strive to forge useful 
connections to get promising job placements with the headquarters of the 
big state enterprises and ministries.  
                                                  
2
 They are, of course, a large number of proprietors who operate at self a sustaining level 
without much interference from the authorities. However, they are not considered to be 
truly entrepreneurial, as their primary aim in business is to sustain their consumption level 
not reinvest and expand. Therefore, they are often referred to as proprietorships rather than 
the all important entrepreneurship. 
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 Working at these big institutions not only gives them valuable 
experience but also important connections. The Rules of the Game in 
Uzbekistan favour those who are skilful in forging useful connections and 
winning favours of their superiors.  
 Those who manage to get promoted to the levels of middle 
management can apply to study for a postgraduate degree at the Academy 
for State and Social Construction under the President of Uzbekistan. This is 
an institution that was created ‘to educate future leaders’ similarly to the 
old party schools. Graduates of the Academy often get appointed to high 
ranking administrative posts. Although the academy plays an important role 
in the elite regeneration, it is not the only way to the top. 
 At the highest level, the role of powerful interest groups seems to be 
all important. The interest groups are a loosely defined network of 
likeminded top officials who support each other in their common push for 
power and influence (See also Alesina and Tabellini (1988) on the 
involvement of bureaucrats and politicians in these power struggles). (The 
power groups are often formed based on the regional allegiances, although 
that is not strictly always the case.)  
 The power groups lobby for political and economic power and strive 
to get ‘their guy’ appointed to every important position when it becomes 
vacant. Therefore, in order for anyone to get appointed to those positions 
they have to enlist the support of one of the powerful interest groups.  
 Administrative elites in Uzbekistan depend on rent seeking income 
even more then the Soviet elites did due to the fact that the Uzbek elites do 
not have any of the extra privileges their Soviet predecessors enjoyed. They 
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also have a lot more freedom to extract rents from their positions given the 
Uzbek political system is not as strict as the Soviet system was. On the 
other hand, they now have freedom to accumulate and expand their 
earnings and build up business interests so they could carry on as private 
business owners should they loose their positions or in some cases, they can 
hide their earnings abroad.  
 But it is their dependence on rent seeking that is the main aspect of the 
system that is important for the purposes of our study. The reason for that is 
the fact that the authorities’ reliance on rent seeking activities makes the 
life of smaller, independent entrepreneurs very difficult. Administrative 
officials competing for the same rent income in the same territory try 
various creative ways of extracting more rents in spite of the Central 
Government’s efforts to improve the business climate for the smaller 
businesses.  
 The business landscape in every given region of Uzbekistan is 
dominated by the firms directly related to the top officials in the region and 
their close associates. The situation changes every time when there is 
change in the personnel of the top government offices. 
 
In this study we analyze the Rules of the Game in Uzbekistan under 
three different political and economic systems and the implications of the 
changes in the Rules and regulation on talent allocation and 
entrepreneurship over time. 
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  The next chapter will present a detailed overview of the theoretical 
foundations of the study, taking a closer at the evolution of 
entrepreneurship theories over time.  
  Chapter three takes us back to the pre-revolution times in Uzbekistan, 
describing the economic, social, and political situations during the period 
preceding the Russian Invasion. We will also discuss the implications of 
the Russian Invasion of the region and the main characteristics of the 
system that the Russians established in Central Asia. We will then shift our 
focus on to the events that followed the October Revolution giving a 
special attention to the Central Asia’s own Enlightenment movement, the 
Jadids.  Finally, we will dedicate the remainder of the chapter to the 
discussion of the Soviet political, economic, and social systems and their 
role in shaping the managerial practices and choices.  
Chapter four presents the overview of the performance of the Uzbek 
economy since independence, discussing the main policy directions and 
their results in terms of economics stabilization and growth.  
 Chapter five focuses on the state of entrepreneurship and small 
businesses in the independent Uzbekistan. This chapter includes the 
detailed discussion of talent allocation and the Rules of the Game, 
highlighting the role of the higher educational institutions.  
 Chapter six discusses selected obstacles perceived as problematic by 
local small business owners and managers. This chapter also presents the 
results of our interviews with the Uzbek business owners and managers 
conducted during the field trip in the summer of 2005. 
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 The last chapter concludes the thesis by highlighting the main findings 
and offering our recommendation on the issue.  
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Chapter Two: Theories of Entrepreneurship  
 
 2.1 Introduction 
 Entrepreneurship is the new ‘gold rush’. Just like the original gold 
rush, entrepreneurship fever conquered hearts and minds of people in the 
20th century. 
 With the success of the companies like Microsoft, IBM, Wal-Mart, 
Dell in the USA and Sony, Panasonic, Honda, Toyota in Japan, 
entrepreneurs topped the league of the richest people on the planet luring a 
lot more people into taking the risk of starting a new business. The 
phenomenal growth of American and Japanese economies after the Second 
World War was also largely the result of the emergence and rapid growth 
of new businesses.  
Drucker (1985, p5) argues that the main reason behind the unprecedented 
success of the American economy during 1965-85 is the shift from a 
traditional ‘managerial’ to an ‘entrepreneurial’ economy. During that 
period SMEs in the US created about 40 million new jobs, while big 
institutions lost about 5-6million. 
 The contribution of entrepreneurs to the development of the American 
and Japanese economies was in fact much more than just creating jobs and 
increasing output. Their innovative efforts created whole new industries 
transforming the entire world economy. There are thousands of inventions 
and innovations made through private as well as government funded 
projects every year.  Probably the best way of getting the greatest possible 
benefit, for the general public, from those discoveries, is to put them into 
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commercial use. In this sense, entrepreneurship can play an important role 
as a bridge between science and consumers. 
 In addition, entrepreneurship tends to increase the efficiency of 
economy by increasing competition.  
 There is a lot of discussion in the economic literature as to what 
entrepreneurship is and who the entrepreneurs are. Most of the arguments 
centre on the different ways in which different cultures treat 
entrepreneurship. Some have argued that entrepreneurship developed most 
in those countries where entrepreneurship is regarded as a desired 
occupation and success stories are well publicized. On the contrary, in the 
countries where entrepreneurship is not well respected, most of the 
entrepreneurial initiatives are likely to be misplaced and more businesses 
operate underground. 
 As for the motives of entrepreneurs to start new ventures, the literature 
tends to offer a broad classification:  
1) ‘Push’ entrepreneurs – those who were forced into entrepreneurship by 
circumstances. These include those who lost their jobs or were laid off by 
their companies, people who had to find an extra source of income, even in 
some cases people who are excluded from the official labour market. 
2) ‘Pull’ entrepreneurs – those who are lured into entrepreneurship by exciting 
business ideas, profitable opportunities etc. 
 Similarly, issues regarding the role and importance of Small and 
Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) attract considerable attention in 
economic policy discussions. 
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  SMEs, as the end products of the entrepreneurial process, are usually 
viewed as agents of change in the economy. They carry innovations into 
economic activities, increase competition and create new jobs. 
 In most developing countries, SMEs constitute most of the private 
sector and play an important role in reducing poverty. 
 Since the economic literature mostly agrees on the importance of 
SMEs, the real bone of contention between researchers recently became the 
issue of public support for SMEs and national as well as international 
cooperation in nurturing SMEs. 
 One of the main concerns in designing such support policies, then, 
becomes the question of definition of SMEs. The reason for this is that, 
depending on the criteria used in defining SMEs, the size and content of the 
SME sector can be completely different.  
 The criteria commonly used include such aspects as the number of 
employees, size of assets, annual sales, capital etc. The purpose of this 
chapter is to discuss the entrepreneurship theories and their relevance to our 
analysis. The chapter is organized as follows:  
- First we discuss the role and importance of entrepreneurship, looking back to 
the historical development of the concept of entrepreneurship in the 
economic literature and its different interpretation across countries and 
cultures. In addition we review the literature on entrepreneurship qualities 
and the motives of economic agents who take on all the risks and 
challenges of going into new businesses.  
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- Then, we move on to the discussion of governmental support programs for 
entrepreneurship in different countries paying special attention to the 
circumstances that arguably make those efforts successful. 
- In addition, we will also discuss ‘the Rules of the Game’, i.e. the set of legal 
and social norms in the society, and their role in shaping the country’s 
entrepreneurial landscape.  
At the end we will try to draw some conclusions and specify the details of 
our theoretical frame for analyzing entrepreneurship in Uzbekistan.   
 
2.2 The Evolution of the Term and the Concept of 
Entrepreneurship 
 
 Entrepreneurship is a multidimensional phenomenon. Therefore, it 
attracted the attentions of scholars from various disciplines.  While all the 
researchers tend to agree on the importance of entrepreneurship in 
economic, social and political aspects of life, they vary a great deal in 
defining its essence and emergence.  
 The term first appeared in English as early as 1475, according to the 
Oxford English Dictionary, in its old spelling as ‘entreprennoure’ ,   and 
was used to refer someone ‘who undertakes, manages, controls’ projects 
and events and ‘champions troops in battles’.  
However, Cantillon is the one who is credited to have used it first in 
economic analysis in his famous 1755 essay (Casson, 1990). He was first to 
associate the term entrepreneur with the elements of risk and uncertainty. 
He maintained that the amount of risk and uncertainty involved in 
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entrepreneurial activities should be acknowledged and entrepreneurs be 
given due credit. 
   Jean Baptiste Say (1803) then clarified the concept of entrepreneurship 
further by separating the profits of capitalists from those of entrepreneurs 
(Hisrich and Peters, 1998).  
   Adam Smith(1776), although he did not use the term entrepreneur 
explicitly, was one of the earliest scholars to point out the importance of 
private entrepreneurial activity in economic development when he wrote 
about the merchant who promotes  the interests of the society by pursuing 
his own interest.  
Later Schumpeter (1934) developed a more comprehensive theory 
of entrepreneurship, putting it at the heart of economic development. He 
explained the role of Entrepreneurship in the context of innovation and 
change. He described economic growth as a dynamic equilibrium 
systematically disturbed and pushed forward by innovative efforts of 
entrepreneurs. They, having recognized opportunities for profitable 
business, bring about ‘new combinations’ that creatively dismantle the 
existing economic processes and push the equilibrium to a new level where 
it will stay until the new wave of entrepreneurial activities come along.  
 
‘Development in our sense is then defined by carrying out of new combinations. 
This concept covers the following cases: (1) The introduction of a new good – that is one 
with which consumers are not yet familiar – or of a new quality of a good.  (2) The 
introduction of a new method of production, that is one not yet tested by experience in the 
branch of manufacture concerned, which need by no means be founded upon discovery 
scientifically new, and can also exist in a new way of handling a commodity 
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commercially. (3) The opening of a new market, that is a market into which the particular 
branch of manufacture of the country in question has not previously entered, whether or 
not this market existed before. (4) The conquest of a new source of supply of raw materials 
or half-manufactured goods, again irrespective of whether this source already exists or 
whether it has first to be created . (5) The carrying out of the new organization of any 
industry, like the creation of a monopoly position. (Schumpeter, 1934, p66)   
 
So, in his view, entrepreneurs create new products, change the way 
existing products are produced or open a new market for existing products. 
In addition, entrepreneurs may discover a new source of raw material and 
reorganize industries and create monopolies. They could be business 
managers, traders, farmers or craftsmen. The emphasis, however, was on 
carrying out the ‘new combinations’ no matter where they were being 
carried out and by whom they were being carried out.  
 
‘But what ever the type, everyone is an entrepreneur only when he actually 
‘‘carries out new combinations,’’ and loses that character as soon as he has built up his 
business, when he settles down to running it as other people run their businesses.’ (ibid. 
p78)  
Later contributors to the entrepreneurship literature also continued 
along a similar line i.e. emphasizing innovation, creative characteristics of 
entrepreneurship and how important those characteristics were for 
economic development (McClelland, 1961, Shapero, 1975,  Drucker , 1985, 
Hisrich, 1986,  Morrison, 1998).  
However, Schumpeter, as well as most of his followers, seemed to 
have assumed that all the innovation and creativity would be carried out in 
the productive sector, within the accepted legal and social norms. They did 
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not address the cases when creative drive, with the magnitude the 
entrepreneurial drive of Schumpeterian entrepreneur, directed at illegal or 
quasi legal activities, generated as much profit as it would in the productive 
sector albeit with catastrophic side effects. One striking example was given 
in a recent book by Levitt and Dabner (2005), who compare the 
introduction of nylon stockings and crack cocaine in the US market. At face 
value, the invention of crack cocaine instead of regular cocaine would fit 
perfectly well into Schumpeter’s definition of entrepreneurship, just as 
much as the introduction of nylon stockings instead of silk ones previously 
used. In both cases, it was a new product of superior or equal quality, but 
with much lower cost. In both cases, the resulting product was available 
and affordable for mass consumption. They both generated millions of 
dollars in profits. There was only one problem with crack cocaine though. 
It was immensely destructive for society, especially for the poorest 
members of it. 
  
‘Crack was so dramatically destructive that if its effect is averaged out for all 
black Americans, not just crack users and their families, you will see that the group’s 
postwar progress was not only stopped cold but was often knocked as much as ten years 
backward. Black Americans were hurt more by crack cocaine that by any other single 
cause since Jim Crow’ (Levitt and Dabner, 2005, p113) 
 
 
Would it be right to call activities of this nature entrepreneurship? Baumol 
(1990), says ‘yes’, as it fits perfectly well with all the descriptions of the 
classic concept of it as invented by Schumpeter and as understood by just 
about everybody else. But, he (Baumol) introduces a new term for those 
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activities; he calls them ‘unproductive entrepreneurship’. His arguments 
rest on the assumption that entrepreneurial efforts have a strong bias 
towards wealth generation, power and prestige rather than innovation per 
se.  
Therefore, if profitable opportunities are plenty and easily 
exploitable in formal sectors of the economy then entrepreneurship will 
thrive in these sectors and economic development will follow. On the other 
hand, if opportunities present themselves in the informal sector or even in 
illegal activities, and penalties are small and easily avoidable, then the bulk 
of entrepreneurial activity will be directed towards that sector.  
In that sense, Baumol extends Schumpeter’s original theory to cover 
rent seeking activities.  
 
‘If entrepreneurs are defined, simply, to be persons who are ingenious and 
creative in finding ways that add to their own wealth, power, and prestige, then it is to be 
expected that not all of them will be overly concerned with whether an activity that 
achieves these goals adds much or little to the social product or, for that matter, even 
whether it is an actual impediment to production. (Baumol, 1990, p898) 
 
In other words entrepreneurs will be pursuing the activities that 
deliver most rent and that will add most to their influence and reputation. 
The attractiveness of individual activities will then depend on the ‘rules of 
the game’ i.e. the political and legal framework, social values and personal 
convictions.  Therefore, when the rules change, so will the attraction of 
certain activities. He gives examples from the Roman Empire and Medieval 
China, where political offices were much sought after and the economic 
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system was subsequently shaped around that framework. He contrasted that 
with Europe in the Early Middle ages when a military career was more 
attractive.  
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991) have taken it a step further to 
focus on the allocation of talent rather than entrepreneurship. Their 
argument is that talented people in every country have a variety of career 
options open to them and they will choose the ones which offer the best 
payoff for their abilities.  
And the story does not stop there. The distribution of talent across 
various sectors will shape the economy determining its rate of growth and 
technological progress. 
 
‘Which activities the most talented people choose can have significant effects on 
the allocation of resources. When talented people become entrepreneurs, they improve the 
technology in the line of business they pursue, and as a result, productivity and income 
grow. In contrast, when they become rent seekers, most of their private returns come from 
redistribution of wealth from others and not from wealth creation. As a result, talented 
people do not improve technological opportunities, and the economy stagnates. (Murphy, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1991, p505)  
 
The effect of a rent seeking sector getting the best of the talent will 
result in the expansion of the sector which will consequently absorb more 
of every type of resource and the taxes imposed on the productive sector 
will discourage productive activities. Furthermore, because less talented 
people are left to work in the productive sector the rate of growth of that 
sector and technological change will be lower. The end result of all this will 
be a vicious cycle with rent seeking and corruption spiralling upwards, 
while the growth of the productive sector stagnating or growing very 
slowly. The following figure depicts this cycle.  
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Figure 2.1 The cycle of talent allocation, rent seeking and 
economic development   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Countries with a considerable amount of natural wealth and a small 
goods market are especially known to be a fertile ground for rent seeking, 
the phenomenon known as ‘the curse of natural resources’ where countries 
sitting on a large amount of natural resources delay reforming their 
economies as the rents received from the sales of those raw material enable 
them to do so (see Kronenberg, 2004, for example for the effect of natural 
resources in transition countries). 
The amount of wealth available for redistribution attracts a lot of 
talent and the development of productive sectors subsequently slows down. 
Winners in this case may then deliberately aim to weaken the property 
rights system in order to maximize rent extraction (Sonin, 2003).  
Frye and Shleifer (2001) named the resulting system as a ‘grabbing 
hand’ as opposed to Adam Smith’s invisible hand. The main characteristics 
of the ‘grabbing hand’ model are the prevalence of corruption, weak 
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property rights and excessive intervention by governments which are often 
above the law.    
The resulting system will discourage genuine entrepreneurship and 
progressive economic reforms as the changes may compromise the 
privileged status of the existing elite. Countries thus will end up with 
‘partial-reforms equilibrium’ with weak property rights and high levels of 
capital flight3.  
The following figure illustrates the ‘partial reform equilibrium 
where the elite will support the initial stage of limited reforms, just enough 
to allow them to capture state assets, and will freeze the reform process at 
the point that maximizes their welfare gains.  
 
 
Figure 2.2.1 Welfare gains from reforms in Transition.  
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Source: World Bank, (2002: 93) 
   
 
                                                  
3
 Speaking at the EBRD’s 2006 annual meeting Joseph Stiglitz claimed that the existing 
elite in former Soviet Union Republics got ‘the best of both worlds’ as they enjoyed 
‘protected property rights abroad’ where they could keep the assets they captured due to 
the ‘weak rule of law at home’ (EBRD website, accessed on May 22, 2006).  
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The resulting equilibrium might not be an optimal one for the 
economy as a whole as the new entrants including entrepreneurs and Fixed 
Income earners like pensioners, teachers etc will loose out in the absence of 
full scale reforms.  
 
2.3 Entrepreneurial Traits and Characteristics  
 A lot of attention in entrepreneurship research is given to the question 
of ‘what makes someone become an entrepreneur?’ or ‘how different are 
entrepreneurs from other people?’  
The early studies on the ‘nature versus nurture’ issue emphasized 
the ‘inborn’ characteristics of entrepreneurs that helped them or rather 
drove them into entrepreneurial activities (Casson, 1990). 
 However, others argue that entrepreneurship is something that can be 
mastered by learning and practice. The proponents of this approach claim 
that anyone, who has the desire and determination, can become an 
entrepreneur.  
 ‘It is not a personality trait; … anyone who can face up to decision making can learn 
to be an entrepreneur and to behave entrepreneurially’ (Drucker, 1985: 23) 
Shapero and Sokol (1982) classify entrepreneurs, based on their motives to 
become an entrepreneur, into two groups4: 
  ‘Push’ entrepreneurs are those whose dissatisfaction with their current position, for 
various reasons unrelated to their entrepreneurial characteristics, pushes them to start a 
                                                  
4
 Djankov et al., also classified entrepreneurs along similar lines but the terms they used 
were ‘entrepreneurs by necessity’ instead of ‘Push entrepreneurs’ and ‘entrepreneurs by 
opportunity’ instead of ‘Pull entrepreneurs’.   
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venture. The second type of entrepreneurs are ‘Pull’ entrepreneurs who are lured by their 
new venture idea and initiate venture activity because of attractiveness of the business idea 
and its personal implications.’ Amit and Muller (1994: 28) 
 
In other words, ‘Push’ entrepreneurs are those who are desperate to 
find a new source of income because, for example, they have lost their job.  
 This category also includes those who do not have access to the formal 
labour market because of legal, language or cultural barriers, or were 
simply discriminated against, and therefore have to resort to 
entrepreneurship in order to support their livelihoods (Putz, 2003, Lerner 
and Hendeles, 1993) 
 Putz (2003) discusses entrepreneurial motivations in the context of the 
so – called ‘immigrant business’ phenomenon. He argues that the limited 
employment opportunities available for immigrants in Germany due to the 
language barrier and discrimination ‘impelled them to self employment in 
order to secure their livelihood. He also points out that emergence of 
immigrant communities in itself may create other entrepreneurial 
opportunities in areas such as ethnic food and clothing. As a result, 
immigrant communities develop a unique sub-culture that encourages and 
supports self employment. It is this sub-culture that often makes some 
ethnic groups more entrepreneurial and inspires the stereotypes such as 
‘having business in their blood’ (Putz, 2003: 555) 
 As for the ‘Pull’ type of entrepreneurs, they are rather driven by their 
new ideas and ambitions to become independent, wealthy and influential. 
This category also includes insiders such as members of the existing elite, 
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their families and friends, i.e. those with privilege, social networks and 
insider information, creating lucrative opportunities for business.   
A 2003 Survey of Entrepreneurs in 41 countries conducted by the 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) showed that 93% of 
Entrepreneurs could be classified in one of the two categories, which they 
named as opportunity entrepreneurs (Pull) and necessity entrepreneurs 
(Push).  80% of all entrepreneurs categorized themselves as the opportunity 
entrepreneurs and 20% said they would consider themselves as necessity 
entrepreneurs. The majority of the entrepreneurs were 25 – 34 years old at 
the time they started their businesses and 80% of all entrepreneurs had a job 
when they started up their own businesses.  
Those findings were supported by Djankov et al (2005) who found 
that the majority of Russian entrepreneurs came from relatively well – off 
families with around 20% of them being the children of company 
directors5. 
Surveys have also shown that the ‘Pull’ (opportunity entrepreneurs) 
were more successful than the ‘Push’ (necessity) entrepreneurs (Amit and 
Muller, 1994). This is hardly surprising, given the fact that they are likely 
to be better educated and well connected.  
   Scase (2003) argues that it is the intentions for the future that are 
more important than the motives for starting. He distinguishes 
entrepreneurship from a mere ‘ownership of property and other assets 
which may be used for personal enjoyment, consumption or trading’ (p67). 
                                                  
5
 The survey conducted by McCarthy et al (1992) had found that the fathers of 37.5% of 
their respondents were executives.   
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The economic surpluses from such activities, which he calls proprietorship, 
will be used to maintain a certain lifestyle and will be consumed rather than 
being accumulated and re-invested in the business.  
As a result the businesses owned and run by proprietors remain 
small and often employ very few people from outside their families. In later 
chapters, we will discuss proprietorship and the reasons that cause the 
business owners to remain proprietors rather than pursing expansive 
business policies in the context of transition.   
 
2.4 Creating Entrepreneurial Environment  
   
 In the previous section, we discussed the essence and importance of 
entrepreneurship in economic development. As we have seen, there seems 
to be a general consensus among scholars and policy makers that the 
development of entrepreneurship should be encouraged and proactively 
promoted.  
 However, the conventional definitions of entrepreneurship are too 
general to use for policy purposes and therefore policy makers around the 
world, as well as international organizations, use various definitions of 
Small and Medium Sized Businesses (SMEs) as a proxy for 
entrepreneurship.  
 Besides, due to the nature of transition economies, SMEs make up 
most of the new private sector and consequently when they talk about 
‘private sector support’ initiatives, in a transition context, they often refer to 
SMEs and entrepreneurship.  
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The argument in favour of deliberate intervention to support 
entrepreneurship is often justified by the fact that different countries, with 
otherwise comparable characteristics, seem to have different numbers of 
entrepreneurial start – ups (GEM 2003).  The reason for those differences is 
that entrepreneurs face different obstacles in different countries. (See for 
example Pfeffermann and Kisunko1999, World Bank 2001, UNECE 2003). 
Staley at al. (1971), in one of the pioneering studies in 
entrepreneurship and SME support, developed a new venture creation 
model which emphasized four key aspects of new business creation. 
The first aspect was creating opportunities for entrepreneurs to 
exploit. This would entail, among other things, allocating at least some of 
the government purchase orders to the new smaller businesses, inviting big 
international corporations to build new production facilities that create 
more business for local suppliers and distributors, and giving various 
privileges for smaller businesses and new start ups in certain sectors. 
Governments also should try to keep the administrative and legal barriers to 
minimum. 
The second aspect concerns the ability to enterprise i.e. the ability 
of those, who spotted an opportunity for a business, to exploit the 
opportunity. This includes the general level of entrepreneurial and 
managerial expertise. Transition countries especially lack in this area as 
people in those countries did not have prior experience in running private 
businesses. Offering specialized management training may mitigate the 
problem. 
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The third aspect concerns the factors which we discussed earlier 
such as the propensity of a certain age group, ethnic group etc to get 
involved in new business start – ups. Traditionally in every society, certain 
groups, depending on income levels, cultural upbringing etc, tend to choose 
certain occupations. (Later we will discuss this issue in the context of the 
Soviet elite regeneration.) In order to increase the propensity of the general 
population to get involved in entrepreneurship, it is often recommended 
that successful entrepreneurs should be promoted as role models. 
The final aspect of the enterprise creation process concerns the 
likelihood of those who are capable of it to become entrepreneurs. This 
includes the kind of infrastructure that gives an initial helping hand to the 
aspiring entrepreneurs. Governments establish business advisory bodies 
offering practical advice on legal and administrative matters related to 
starting new ventures.  (Examples of such institutions include business 
incubators and business gateways which are quite commonly established by 
local authorities in the UK. In Uzbekistan, the system is administered by 
the Chamber of Commerce and Entrepreneurship which has branches all 
over the country.)  
As most of the studies on the obstacles to entrepreneurship, found 
the financing to be one of the most important obstacles (Sarder 2000, 
Klapper et al. 2002, Pissarides 1998), SME support programs in almost 
every country include financial support as an essential ingredient.  
Major forms of financial support have been in the form of 
preferential loans, credits, and grants.  
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 All major international organizations including World Bank, IFC, 
EBRD and ADB, have SME support programs that extend financial support 
to SMEs in member countries. 
  In addition to financial support, support programs offer a wide range 
of non-financial support which includes management training, 
entrepreneurship education, technical assistance, marketing help, 
information, counselling, and infrastructural facilities (Sarder 2000). 
2.5 Conclusion   
In this Chapter we discussed the theories of entrepreneurship. Both 
the term and concept of entrepreneurship took a long journey from the 15th 
century, when it simply referred to a ‘go-between’, to the modern definition 
that embraces such multidimensional aspects as innovation, calculated risk 
taking, hard work and attention to detail, among other things.     
However, it is since Schumpeter that entrepreneurship has been at 
the heart of the development policy agenda. Scholarly discussions 
thereafter often concentrated on the ways of encouraging entrepreneurial 
activities and removing any obstacles which might hinder their 
development.  
Recent studies have extended the entrepreneurship theories to 
overall talent allocation processes and argued that the ultimate development 
of entrepreneurial activities and hence the development of societies are 
determined by the overall ‘Rules of the Game’ in every society.  
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These theories of entrepreneurship, considered against the 
background in Uzbekistan set out in the first chapter, enable us to suggest 
the following propositions which will be discussed in the remaining part of 
the thesis.  
The First Proposition: Rules of the Game both in the Former 
USSR and Uzbekistan encouraged rent seeking activities rather than 
productive entrepreneurship. 
The Second Proposition: The best of entrepreneurial talent in the 
former USSR and Uzbekistan chose to enter the rent seeking sector rather 
than productive sector. 
The Third Proposition: The resulting system in Uzbekistan 
resembled the ‘grabbing hand’ model and therefore most of the problems 
faced by the entrepreneurs in the country spring from the nature of the 
system.  
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Chapter Three 
Historical Evolution of the Rules of the Game in Uzbekistan 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
We discussed the theory of entrepreneurship and its role in 
economic development in the previous chapter. In this chapter, we will 
discuss entrepreneurship and business in Central Asia in historical 
perspective in order to establish ‘Rules of the Game’ that governed the 
allocation of the talent in the pre-revolution Uzbekistan and construct the 
evolutionary track of these rules over time.  
First we will talk about the history of the region going back to the 
time of Khanates in early 19th century, before the Russian invasion of the 
region in 1864. The reason for that is that it was the only time when there 
was a market based system. Although underdeveloped and far from perfect, 
it was the last experience of the people of Central Asia with markets before 
the introduction of the planned economy.  
The period in question is also important for a number of other 
reasons. A crucial one is that the decisions made and institutions 
established during that period had a lasting impact on the development of 
the region for more than a century to come.  It is the time when there 
started a surge in scholarly interest in the region owing to the intense 
competition between Russia and Britain for the dominant position in the 
region (Surucu, 2004). It is also from that time on that one can find any 
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statistical data about economic activity in the region, good enough for 
research purposes. 
 In addition, we will concentrate on the factors that made certain 
activities and sectors of the economy more attractive for the best talent. We 
will also discuss the influence of the ‘rules of the game’ in shaping the 
society and the economy.  
 This chapter will explore the behaviour of traditional creative 
entrepreneurship and the striving of the most talented people to get to the 
top in the wake of major external shocks in the form of foreign invasion 
and then the Communist Revolution.  
 
 
3.2 Entrepreneurship and Business in the 18th Century Central 
Asia before the Revolution  
 
Defining the boundaries of Central Asia is not as straightforward in 
economic and political literature as it is in geography. Traditionally, the 
term was used to refer to the area which included the current territories of 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan6.  Contemporary 
transition literature tends to add Kazakhstan to the area, mainly because of 
the historical and cultural heritage that the other countries share with 
Kazakhstan. The following map shows the boundaries of different 
definitions of Central Asia. 
                                                  
6
 Kazakhstan, part of which is geographically located in Europe was not considered to be 
part of Central Asia according to the official Soviet definition. The exact term used in the 
Russian literature is Srednya Asia, meaning Middle Asia to refer to the former Soviet 
Republics in Central Asia and Tsentral’naya Azia meaning Central Asia to refer to general 
area which included areas outside of the Former USSR however modern literature uses the 
same term Central Asia for both translations (www.wikipedia.org) 
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Considering the similarities in history, cultural and ethnic 
background, we will include Kazakhstan to the group of other Central 
Asian countries and thus adopt the common modern definition of Central 
Asia for the purpose of our study. 
 
Figure 3.2.1 Map of Central Asia 
 
 
 
 
Historical Perspective  
 
Central Asia has historically been one of the most volatile and 
dynamic regions of the world. It was invaded by almost every major empire 
in the past and thus accumulated a very rich mixture of races and cultures 
over time. The region played a key role in connecting the West with the 
East as a part of the Silk Road for many centuries. The focus of our study 
is, however, the period that immediately preceded the Russian invasion of 
the region in mid-19th century.  
Since about the 16th century, when the last big empire, the Temurid 
Empire, uniting the whole area collapsed, there existed three independent 
kingdoms (khanates), namely The Khanate of Kokand, The Emirate of 
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Bukhara and The Khanate of Khiva. All the major cities of those kingdoms, 
including the capital cities were located within present day Uzbekistan.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Figure 3.2.2 Central Asia prior to the Russian Invasion 
           
 
Source:Soucek(2000) 
 
 
The population of Central Asia consisted of nomadic tribes of 
mainly Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Turkmen, and the settled population of Tajiks 
and Uzbeks. The population in Khiva included a large number of Iranian 
and Russian slaves, while Bukhara had a considerable amount of Jewish 
population. The ruling royal families in all three kingdoms were from 
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Uzbek7 tribes, thus the ruling elite were also dominated by the Uzbeks.  As 
the population of the area was predominantly Muslim, Islamic law 
prevailed albeit with some peculiarities.  
The exact number of population, living in the area around the end of 
19th century is questionable due to the lack of any reliable records. 
However, Allworth (1994) estimated it to be in the region of 5 million, 
quoting some contemporary authors who visited the region immediately 
after the Russian conquest8.   
   The Head of State and absolute monarch was called the Khan who was 
‘nominally absolute master of his realm and the lives and fortunes of his 
subjects’ (Skrine and Ross, 1899, p379). His prime minister, Qushbegi, was 
the official guardian of the state jewels and the keys of the capital city. He 
was also responsible for the collection of taxes and customs duties. Next to 
his in the rank were a large number of executive and court officials.  
The regional governors were called the Begs. They exercised 
considerable authority in the areas under their control and were responsible 
for the collection of revenues and the execution of judicial decrees. But in 
practice they had much more freedom to run their own domains as they 
pleased, introducing new taxes, creating their own rules and sentencing 
their subjects to any punishment they fancied, including death, at will. This 
degree of discretion in regional government was due to the week central 
                                                  
7
 Uzbeks are part of the greater Turkish family. Although the name Uzbek is associated 
with the name of the King who was first among the Turkish tribes to accept Islam, 
contemporary Uzbeks represent a wide range different Turkish tribes who settled in the 
region over centuries.  
8
 Francis Skrine, who visited the region in late 18th century, estimated the population of 
Bukhara at 2.5 million 
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governments and the clan structure of the society typical of Central Asian 
kingdoms of the time.  
 
3.2.1 Agriculture  
 
Economic activity reflected the cultural background of the 
population, with the nomadic tribes of mainly Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and 
Turkmen moving around the region breeding their cattle with the settled 
population of Uzbeks and Tajiks employed in agriculture in more or less 
the same way they had been doing for centuries.  
In theory, all of the land belonged to the state and the head of state 
was considered its owner. The state derived most of its revenue from land 
taxes. Much of the uncultivated land was under the communal use of 
nomads and the cultivated part of the land was divided into several 
categories for tax purposes. The most common type of land in the 
cultivated part was the so called mulk ( property) which was held under 
some form of private ownership (according to Skrine and Ross, 1899, this 
category included the land given to successful generals as a gift for the 
services to the king and to other members of the elite for various favours). 
This type land was divided into further three categories: the first category 
(mulk hurr) was exempt from tax, the second category (mulk ushri) paid a 
tenth of their harvest in tax and the third category (mulk khiraj) paid 
somewhere between a seventh to half of their harvest in tax. The last 
category was the land held by non-muslims and according to tradition, 
inherited from Arabic rules of the 8th century, those lands were taxed at 
higher rates. Another type of land tenure was called waqf, which in general 
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referred to any land owned or used by religious organizations and such 
lands were completely exempt from taxes.  
The general rule was that if anyone cultivated and irrigated an 
uncultivated, unused piece of land then it could be claimed as private 
property and would be taxed under the category of mulk. According to 
Matley (1994), about 90% of all irrigated land belonged to the mulk 
category, and therefore were in private hands.  
The actual amount of land cultivated compared to the total area of the 
region was very small. Lyashchenko (1970) reported that the irrigated area 
amounted to only 2.6 % of the total area at the time of the Russian 
Invasion. Hence, the proportion of land per household was very small and 
the price of land was very high.   
Agriculture was quite well developed as the following quote from 
Skrine and Ross suggests:  
 
‘The cultivation of fruits is well understood. The melons have a more delicate 
aroma than those of any Eastern country. Dried apricots are known in India as the ‘Alu-i-
Bokhara’; and every variety of fruit familiar to the European palate is to be had in a 
perfection and at prices which would excite wonder in Covent Gardens.’ (Skrine and Ross, 
1899, p363). 
  
However, nearly all of the fruits and vegetables were produced for 
local consumption as the transportation problem made it unprofitable to 
export most of them. The only few agricultural products suitable for 
transportation over long distances were cotton and dried fruits.  
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3.2.2 Cotton Industry 
 
‘The cultivation of cotton existed in the territory of Central Asia since ancient 
times, having been introduced there from India. It was mentioned by Herodotus as early as 
the fifth century B.C. as a crop of the local population. For many centuries the cultivation 
of cotton in this region was no more than another local industry, since neither the cotton in 
itself nor its products could find a wide outside market in the face of poor transportation 
facilities, especially the variety raised there were mostly common local types intended for 
manufacturing of wadding, and the finished home-woven articles were of poor quality 
goods’ (Lyashchenko, 1970,p609) 
 
The situation in the world cotton market changed enormously 
during the 1860s due to the American civil war. The Southern States of 
America, where most of Europe’s cotton supply came from, reduced 
production of cotton dramatically. The following figure demonstrates the 
extent of the fall in cotton production in America during the civil war.  
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Figure 3.2.3 Cotton production 
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Source: www.civilwar.com accesses on February 15, 2006. 
 
As a result textile industries in most European countries, including Russia, 
suffered badly. This in turn made cotton exports from Central Asia very 
profitable. The following figure shows the trade flow between Central Asia 
and Russia during 1840-1867.  
Figure 3.2.4 Trade between Russia and Central Asia 
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Source:Alworth (1994) 
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3.2.3 Other industries  
 
Although the cotton industry dominated the economic scene in 
Central Asia, there were some other smaller industries flourishing in the 
region. The nomadic Turkmen tribes were famous for their carpets made of 
wool, as were the craftsmen of the people of Bukhara and Samarkand for 
their products.  
 
 ‘Carpets and rugs of harmonious tone, piles of gaudy shawls and dress pieces, snuff-
boxes of polished gourd to hold the pungent green powder affected by the Bokharans, and 
cutlery and trinkets of every description.’ Skrine and Ross, 1899, p370) 
 
 In spite of the fact that the Islamic laws prohibited usury and lending 
activities, money exchange activities and lending (largely unofficial) were 
widespread.  
 
 ‘Money-changers’ stalls are frequent, with tempting heaps of silver and copper discs 
for exchange against Russian money. … The Hindu shares with the Jew the immense 
profits derived from money-lending, which is forbidden to true believers, and they are 
eager and rapacious traders. The large commerce in tea is in the hands of some wealthy 
Peshawar Mohammedians’ (Skrine and Ross, 1899, p367) 
 
  
The main wonder of the Central Asian cities of the time was their 
bazaars. Having been the central points on the Silk Road for hundreds of 
years those cities served as main transfer points for European goods going 
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towards the East and vice versa. After the British conquest of India a large 
proportion of English goods started coming through Central Asian bazaars 
to Russia.  
The Central Asians, who mastered their intermediary role between 
Asia and Europe and Middle East for centuries, were controlling most of 
the trade flow and therefore were considered extremely difficult to compete 
against by their Russian counterparts. 
 
Especially after they switched from the practice of barter to cash 
trade in 1830s, the Central Asian merchants caused a considerable flight of 
gold and silver from Russia to Central Asian markets. Allworth (1994) 
estimated it to be around 4 million rubles in 1863. 
 
‘Czarist authorities, who had been coveting Central Asia’s natural gold since 
Peter the Great’s time, felt strong pressure from Russian merchants to ban these exports of 
money, for the traders believed that such outflows to Bukhara and Khiva represented a 
single greatest obstacle to the development of Russian trade in that area. These czarist 
businessmen felt that the greater liquidity acquired with Russian metallic rubles permitted 
Central Asians to deal actively with Russia’s most feared competition – Iranian and Indian 
merchants selling English manufactures who demanded cash payments for their wares. In 
sum, Russian merchants seemed to be unable to succeed in Central Asia’s open market, 
whereas the Bukharans, Khivans and to a lesser extent Khokandians, so long as Central 
Asia remained independent, thrived on the rivalry they met in Nizhni Novgorod and other 
cities’ (Allworth, 1994, p30) 
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This and the situation in the world cotton market, together with the 
pressing demands of the ‘Great Game’9 between Russia and Britain for 
dominance in Central Asia, prompted Russia to invade Central Asian 
Khanates. The process of systematic conquest which started with the 
invasion of Oqmachit in 1864 lasted until the1880s when last groups of 
Turkmen were defeated. The joint delimitation of the Afghan border with 
the British finally put an end to the Russian expansion in Central Asia in 
1895.  
 
The Russian conquest and subsequent colonization of Central Asia 
was by all accounts similar to the other colonial expansions of major 
European powers of the time. In contrast to the earlier expansions of the 
Russian Empire towards Siberia and the Kazakh steppes, the conquest of 
Central Asia was not followed by mass migration of civilians and the area 
remained under military administration even after the final defeat of the 
local armies.  
  
Clem (1992) defines the typical characteristic of colonial rule in the 
context of the common practices throughout the other European colonies 
around the world. According to his observation typical colonial 
                                                  
9
 The term Great Game was originally coined by British officer Connolly who was sent to 
Bukhara before the Russian Invasion but was caught and publicly executed. He used the 
term to refer to the competition between Russia and Britain for dominance in Central Asia. 
The term later became very popular in the literature on the history of Central Asia and 
used to describe a wide range of things including the diplomatic and scholarly exchanges 
that to a considerable extent represented biased views of both sides. To this Great Game 
we owe much of the scholarly work on Central Asia produced during that time. For an 
intriguing account of the Great Game politics and the biases reflected in the contemporary 
literature see Surucu (2004).     
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arrangements involve a small number of intruders ruling over a large 
number of indigenous population using superior technology or military 
power, and they run the occupied country as an economic complementary 
to the mother country. The control under those arrangements normally 
exercised through military authorities and the intruders’ presence is 
concentrated in highly segregated urban settlements. The occupied are 
normally allowed to maintain their own culture and way of life although 
socioeconomic stratification along ethnic lines prevails (Clem, 1992:25).   
 
In Central Asia, Russians used very similar arrangements. The 
occupied territories of Kokand Khanate and part of the Bukhara Kingdom 
up to the town of Katta-Kurgan were annexed. The rest of Bukhara and the 
Khanate of Khiva became protectorates in 1868 and 1876 respectively. The 
territory of Kokand including Samarkand included into Governor 
Generalship of Turkistan which also included part of the Kazakh steppe. 
 
3.2.4 Economy and Infrastructure under the Czar’s Russia  
 
Due to its landlocked location and desert climate Central Asia 
presented a formidable challenge in terms of transportation. The following 
quote from   Skrine and Ross (1899), about an earlier Russian raid into 
Central Asia, helps us to understand the scale of the transportation problem:  
 
‘He equipped an army of 3.5 battalions of Orenburg Cossacks, and 22 guns with a 
rocket train. Transport was effected by nearly 2000 horses and 10000 camels, tended by 
2000 Kirghiz, and the utmost care was lavished on every detail of the equipment. … The 
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expedition struggled on as far as Ak Bulak, about half-way to the Khivan frontier, and was 
there fain to retreat, leaving the bones of 10000 men and 8000 camels whitening the 
pitiless sands.’ Skrine and Ross, 1899, p244)  
 
Having learned bitter lessons during their military expeditions, the 
Russians sought ways to ease this enormous transportation problem as soon 
as they got the control of the entire area. The advisers to the Tsar 
considered a few available options:  
 
‘ A strong party favoured the canalisation of the Amu Darya, and an attempt to 
divert its stream to its ancient channel, which entered the Caspian at Krasnovodsk. 
Another faction pointed to the vast results achieved in India by the network of railways, 
which enables a European military force barely 60,000 strong to dominate 250,000,000 
Asiatics; and urged the necessity of providing the means of rapid transport of troops and 
material between Caucasus and the new strategic bases. (ibid. p307)  
 
Thus, the decision was made in favour of railway construction and 
by an imperial ukase in April, 1884 General Annenkoff was appointed to 
take charge of the project. The construction of the railway was carried out 
by the military in such intensity that the distance of 879 miles (including 
building a bridge over Amudarya) up to Samarkand was completed by May 
188810. The railway was extended up to Andijan a few years later and the 
completion of Tashkent – Orenburg line in 1906 finally connected all the 
major cities of Central Asia with the rest of the world through Russia.  
                                                  
10
 Skrine and Ross also point out that the railways built in Cenral Asia cost  almost three 
times less per mile  than the railways built by the British in India (Skrine and Ross 1899, 
p313) 
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Although the railway project was planned with military purposes in 
mind, it was probably the biggest single contribution to the development of 
the Central Asia by the Russians.  
 
‘The impact of rail transport on the economy was thus considerable. There is a 
significant correlation between construction of the railroads, the extension of the area 
sown to cotton, the export of cotton from Central Asia, cotton imports into Russia from 
abroad, the price of cotton on Central Asian, Moscow, and world markets, and the 
construction of industrial enterprises for the period 1880-1915.( Matley, 994, p328)   
 
For the first time in the history of Central Asia, the traditional routes 
of the Silk Road faced real competition from the trade routes coming 
through by sea up to the Caspian and by the railways thereon.  
By 1897 the total exports through railways reached 109,000 tons of 
which 81,000 tons was raw cotton and 8000 tons was wool. The main 
import articles included manufactures, sugar, tea, metals, oil and other 
goods produced in Russia as well as in Western Europe. Tea and spices 
produced in China and India also found their way through the new trade 
routes.  
But one of the main aims of the Russians in Central Asia was to 
increase cotton production in order to ease the Empire’s textile industry 
from reliance on outside supply of cotton. At the time of the invasion, the 
percentage of land sown to cotton only amounted to about 10% of the total 
agricultural area. The following table shows the increase in the acreage 
under cotton before the revolution. 
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             Figure 3.2.5 Increase of the acreage under cotton (in thousand 
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Source: Lyashchenko (1970) 
 
 
The local type of cotton was called g’uza, which 
  
‘had to be picked in the boll and the bolls had to be labouriously removed by 
hand – a job mainly performed at home by women. Fiber and seeds were then separated by 
pair of rough wooden rollers, an inefficient device known as chighiriq. In twelve hours 
only seventy pounds of cotton could be handled by this method. The cotton was then 
cleaned by being placed on the floor and beaten with sticks.  
This badly processed raw material was then packed into large sacks, each of 
which held about 300 pound, and loaded on the caravans for Russia. By the time the cotton 
reached its destination the outer layer had been ruined by damp, sand, and dirt, and often 
some had been stolen by porters. At that time the loss of cotton was said never to be less 
than 25 percent, often was 50 percent, and averaged about 35 percent’ (Matley, 1994, 
p309)   
 
Thus if Central Asia was to replace America as the main supplier 
for the Russian textile industry, some major reforms had to be carried out. 
The local type of cotton was gradually replaced by the American type 
which was of a better quality and higher yield.  
During the period between 1884 and 1890 the area sown under the 
American type of cotton increased nearly 200 times to ‘no less than 158992 
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acres’ and by 1990-01, 93.4 percent of the total area of Ferghana oblast 
grew American cotton. As a result the average yield increased dramatically, 
from just 160 lbs per acre in 1875 to 1136 lbs per acre in 1915. (Matley, 
1994, p275)  
Due to the dry nature of the Central Asian climate, irrigation played 
a major role in the agricultural processes. Sophisticated irrigation systems 
have existed in the area since the ancient times. Although most of the 
original system was destroyed during the Mongol invasion, the traces of 
those irrigation routes were discovered by the Russians even in the 
unpopulated regions. The administration and maintenance of the irrigation 
system was very important for the livelihoods of the local people.   
The administration of the irrigation system was conducted on a 
popular basis. The elders of local communities elected water managers 
called mirobs who were in charge of rationing water for irrigation of 
private plots. Water was generally distributed free of charge and farmers 
were required to contribute man-power for cleaning and maintenance of the 
irrigation system.  
 
‘In theory, water was distributed evenly to all; for example, those owning land at 
the head of the canal had no right to use more than they were entitled to, so that those 
living farther along the canal should not suffer. In practice a well-placed bribe insured 
supplementary supplies of water, a situation clearly favouring the well-to-do farmer. In 
addition, landowners at the heads of the canals often diverted more than their fair share of 
water for the growing of rice.’  (ibid., 1994, p280)  
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The administration of the irrigation system was left in local hands 
after the invasion by the Russians. However they made it a priority to 
increase the overall irrigated area in order to increase cotton production. 
Several new canals were built. Matley (1994) reported that the irrigated 
area in Central Asia increased from 7.5 million acres to over 13.8 million 
acres between 1903 and 1814.  
 
3.2.5 Industrial development  
 
 The economy became even more dependent on cotton after the 
trade routes to the East and South were cut by the Russians. Therefore, not 
surprisingly, industrial development in the region was also closely linked 
the cotton processing and textile sectors. Industrial production in pre – 
Russian Central Asia was almost non – existent except for those small 
craftsmanships and workshops mentioned above. The earlier pockets of 
industrial production were scattered around the railway stations and along 
the newly built railways. First workshops were related to the support and 
maintenance of the railways and the army. As for the cotton processing 
industry:  
 
 ‘The first two cotton gins in Central Asia were installed in Khokand by private 
individuals in 1880 and their number in Ferghana oblast had reached 21 by 1890, 
increased to 100 by 1901. In 1914 the oblast had 159 ginning plants, which represented the 
greatest concentration of cotton ginning in pre-1917 Central Asia.  In the same year 
Samarkand oblast ran 33 ginning plants and Sir Darya oblast 28. (Matley in 1994, p319) 
 
The following figures demonstrate the relative share of different sectors in 
industrial production.  
 53 
 
Figure 3.2.6 Allocation of Industrial Enterprises in Central Asia  
Allocation of Idustiral Enterprises across Sectors 
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(Lyashchenko (1970,p615) 
 
Cotton gins along with cottonseed-oil production companies 
dominated in terms of sheer numbers. The dominance was, however, even 
more significant in terms of production volume. The cotton industry 
produced well over 82% of output. Therefore for the local economy of 
Central Asia it was the first and only industry in its modern sense. The 
cotton processing companies were considerably larger but relatively less 
labour intensive than the companies in other industries. They only 
employed about 45% of the industrial labour force while other more labour 
intensive industries like cocoon drying employed more people relative to 
their share in production.   
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Figure 3.2.7 Industrial Production 
Share of different sectors in Total Industrial 
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Figure 3.2.8 Industrial Employment 
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3.3 Entrepreneurship and the Rules of the Game under the USSR 
 
3.3.1 Central Asian Enlightenment and Revolution 
 
Employees of the industrial sectors in Central Asia attracted a lot 
more scholarly attention from Sovietologists and historians than their mere 
economic importance deserved. The reason for that to some extent was the 
central role given to the proletariat in the Marxist/Leninist ideology and 
also the peculiarity of Central Asian proletariat that played an important 
role during the October Revolution.  
The proletariat was the ideological centrepiece in Marx’s analysis. 
He predicted that the industrial workers, oppressed and exploited by the 
profit maximizing capitalist bosses, would unite and rise up to overthrow 
the whole social structure made to suit the bourgeois elites.    
In the late 19th century and early 20th century up to the October 
Revolution, liberal views of all sorts flourished in Russia. Led by the 
intelligentsia and students, those liberal and socialist movements started 
attracting a lot of industrial workers whose appalling living and working 
conditions continued to deteriorate during the political and economic 
turmoil of the 1990s.  
The Russian authorities then had a habit of exiling such trouble 
makers to remote parts of the Empire, and Central Asia was one of the 
common dumping grounds for liberal heretics. Many of the activists among 
students of leading Russian universities as well as activists among workers 
and even among soldiers ended up being exiled to Central Asia. They 
continued to do what they were doing now in major c
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They organized various societies and published liberally minded 
newsletters in Samarkand and Tashkent.  
But the irony of the situation was that the proletariat in Central Asia 
was far from the oppressed masses described by Marx.  
Most of the industrial workers in Central Asia were Russians. Local 
people were only employed to do low skilled, low paid manual jobs which 
often were seasonal.  
 
‘In the mining industries where the Central Asians worked all year, 45.6 percent 
of the personnel were Russians, 34.4 percent Muslims from outside the country (Persian, 
Afghan, or Tatar), and only 18.9 percent were local labourers. Here again, the Muslims 
held the most menial jobs at trifling wages. Among the railway employees, who alone 
represented nearly half the labour pool, for security reasons there were mainly Russians. 
Finally, certain military railway battalions in charge of guarding the rail lines livid with the 
employees and not in barracks. These battalions were now filled with Russian students 
guilty of having liberal views, suspects, and soldiers deemed undesirable in Russia because 
of ‘poor spirit’. (d’Encausse,1994, p181) 
 
Thus the proletariat in Central Asia was essentially Russian and was 
not an oppressed class struggling to survive with long working hours and 
low wages. In fact, by any standards they were privileged people with 
better income and better housing. In the eyes of the local population, they 
were the representatives of the occupying country and therefore did not 
enjoy any popular support.  
The revolutionary views among the local population were inspired 
and influenced by the reformist movements of other Muslim minorities of 
 57 
the Empire, especially by Tatar writers and to some extent by the Turkish 
reformist movements. Therefore, those new schools of thought developed 
in Central Asia followed Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkish routes rather than 
joining in with the Russian liberal, revolutionary movements. This was 
partly because of the deliberate Russian policy of excluding local people 
from modern educational institutions and supporting the existing orthodox 
social order run by narrow – minded ultra – conservative religious leaders. 
As a result the growing discontent with the existing order of things turned 
the new generation of intellectuals not only against the colonial masters but 
also against the local religious leaders who were desperately clinging on to 
their fast abating powers.  
 Those reformist groups, known as Jadids because of the new 
method (usooli jadid11) of instruction at schools that they pioneered, 
initially advocated reforms in the education system and criticized the 
religious leaders for obstructing progress. Although they are generally 
referred to as a reformist movement or political group, Jadidism was more 
like an ideology than a political movement. The term is used to refer to the 
group of well educated young people who represented the middle classes, 
the kind of people often called the petty bourgeoisie by communist authors. 
Most of them came from merchant families and therefore travelled 
extensively between Central Asia, Russia and other European countries. It 
was during those travels they encountered different ideas and were inspired 
                                                  
11
 The new method of teaching mentioned here refers to the new way of teaching the old 
Arabic alphabet that is in use among Muslim population of the Russia Empire. The method 
was pioneered by a Crimean Tatar called Gasprinsky 1880s. He travelled extensively 
around the Russian Empire to teach his method and also published a newspaper call 
Terjuman (Interpreter) which he used to spread his progressive ideas throughout the 
region.     
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by the advancements in every area of life in European countries and the 
desperate state of things in their own country. They saw the root of the 
problems in inadequate education and corruption of religious leaders. They, 
like similar reformist movements of other Muslim nations, blamed the ills 
of society on people not following the teachings of their religion properly 
rather than criticizing the role of the religion itself. They believe that:  
‘the clerics had replaced the dynamic faith of the Prophet with a deceased 
religion, hostile to any progress, and they had killed the Islamic education that created 
Bukhara’s glory’ (d’Encausse, 1994, p205). 
 
They also stressed the ideas of freedom to which every person was 
entitled by birth, universal equality of mankind and continuous progress. 
Thus the Jadids were at the forefront of the Central Asian enlightenment of 
late 19th and early 20th centuries. In addition to their contribution to 
education and literature, they were also actively involved in politics. They 
published various newspapers. The first of them, called Taraqqiy (progress) 
was founded in Tashkent in 1906 by Ismael Abidiy. The others called 
Khurshid, Shohrat were published later in the same year in Tashkent by 
Munawwar Qari, who was one of the most prominent Jadids. In 
Samarkand, Behbudiy published Ayina and Samarkand, while in Bukhara 
they established Turan and Bukhara-i-Sharif, and in Ferghana Sada-i-
Ferghana . The interests of the local business people were voiced in the 
newspaper called Tujjor (Businessmen or Merchants) established Said 
Azimbay, one the richest people in Tashkent at that time.  
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Jadids also established secret societies with thorough and rigorous 
checks on new members. They discussed ways of achieving freedom for 
their country and organizing resistance against the colonial masters.    
In October 11, 1906, the above mentioned paper ‘Kurshid’ published  
‘a genuine program for Jadids of Central Asia, and preached adherence to the 
Muslim Union (Ittifaq ul-Muslimin), the eventual mainstay of the Constitutional 
Democratic Party.’ (ibid. p191).   
This program was signed by Behbudiy, who himself came from a 
family of influential Muslim clerics, and became one of the fierce critics of 
established Muslim elite and one of the best known Jadids.  
Thus, the revolutionary movements of the local population of 
Central Asia developed quite independently, of and sometimes in tacit 
hostility towards, the Russian revolutionary movements of the same region. 
The Russian revolutionary groups also treated the local intelligentsia with a 
lot of suspicion if not with open contempt.  
As a result the local population did not take any part in both the 
February and October revolutions and subsequent change of power in the 
Russian administration of Central Asia following the changes in Moscow. 
In the aftermath of revolution the Central Government sought to involve all 
the ethnic groups of the Empire in the revolutionary cause but the idea was 
rejected by local Russian revolutionaries of Central Asia.  
‘It is impossible to let the Muslims into the revolutionary government at this time, 
because the attitude of the local population toward the authority of the is Soviets doubtful, 
and because the indigenous population has no proletarian organizations which the 
(Bolshevik) group could welcome into the highest organs of the regional government’ 
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(attributed to Kolesov, one of the leaders of Russian communists in Central Asia, quoted in 
d’Encausse, 1994, p225) 
The local activists instead tried to take advantage of the turbulent 
situation to achieve the independence of the region. There were records of 
the representative of Jadids approaching the Government of Turkey asking 
them to invade the region on their behalf and they even approached the 
British representatives in India about possible military assistance. After 
being rejected by both sides, they tried to appeal for popular support. In 
November 1917 they organized a congress in Khokand, the central city in 
the Ferghana valley at that time, and elected a council of 36 Muslims 
(mainly Jadids) and 18 Russians. This council then declared autonomy for 
southern Central Asia and selected the 12-member government to lead the 
new Autonomous Turkistan. Meanwhile the Russian communists held 
power in the Russian quarter of Tashkent and claimed to be the legitimate 
government of Turkistan. The supporters of the Khokand government held 
public protests against the Russian government in Tashkent but the protests 
were put down quickly by force. In January, the Khokand government then 
wrote to Moscow explaining the situation and asking for the support of the 
central government referring to the resolution, signed by Lenin in the 
aftermath of the revolution, giving the different nationalities of the Empire 
the right to determine their own fate. However, to the misfortune of the 
Khokand government, the person in charge of the Commissariat for 
Nationalities was a certain Stalin who had different plans for Central Asia.  
His reply refused to recognize the rival government made up of 
representatives of ‘petty bourgeoisie’ reminding them that the legitimacy of 
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the Tashkent government was based on the popular support of proletariat 
whom they represented. Without external support, the Khokand 
government was bound to fail. Their vision for Autonomous Turkistan, 
independent of colonial masters, was not shared by the majority of the 
population which remained politically ignorant throughout the whole 
revolutionary period.  
Backed by Stalin’s blessing, the Tashkent government asked for 
military support against the ‘counter-revolutionary forces of Khokand’ and 
in February, 1918 the Red Army captured Khokand and practically 
destroyed most of the city, massacring the inhabitants. However most of the 
leaders of Jadids, including Mustafa Chuqay, the head of the government, 
managed to escape.  
This bitter experience taught the Central Asian Jadids an important 
lesson.  
‘The main political strategy of the Jadids came to focus instead on struggle for 
participation in the regime and its fledging institutions. ‘Knowing that struggle in 
Turkistan was useless and could lead only to the ruin of the land, ‘ Choqay wrote in 1923, 
‘the core of the autonomists remaining after the defeat at Khokand called upon its 
supporters to work with the existing authorities in order to weaken the hostility directed at 
the indigenous population by the frontier Soviet regime’ (Khalid 1998, p286). 
 
They argued quite successfully that ‘in a colonial environment where no 
conscious and organized proletariat existed, priority be granted to the national struggle 
rather than to social liberation, and that the local bourgeoisie be given the opportunity to 
assume leadership of liberation movement’ (d’Encausse 1994, p235).  
 
 62 
The Central Government, which was already struggling with civil 
war and internal problems, as these events coincided with the infamous 
years of war communism, decided to give in trying to stabilize the situation 
and sent new members for the Communist Government of Central Asia, the 
Turkic Commission. This new group came with a specific mission of 
cleansing the local communist party of the remnants of the old regime 
especially those with an out and out chauvinist and colonial attitude. The 
Jadids started joining the Communist Party en masse. This new strategy 
was hugely successful for them, because as they now mastered the 
communist ‘new speak’, they were able to push their own agenda much 
more efficiently. They successfully argued for equal representation of 
locals in all government bodies and the name of the local branch of the 
Communist party was changed to ‘the Communist Party of Turkic Peoples’. 
Turor Risqulov, the newly elected head of this party argued, in his speech 
in front of the Central Committee in Moscow, that ‘there were only two basic 
groups in Turkistan, ‘the oppressed and exploited colonial natives and European capital’. 
(Khalid 1998, p297).  
 
Using this kind of Marxist language he demanded more autonomy 
and authority for local people including the establishment of a native army 
subordinated to the autonomous government of Turkistan. Thus for much 
of the 1920s the Jadids enjoyed a great deal of freedom to express 
themselves and influence the political and cultural life in Central Asia.  
 
‘Fayzullah Khojaev was prime minister of the Bukharan People’s Republic and 
then the President of newly established Uzbekistan, while Fitrat served minister for 
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education in Bukhara. Cholpan, Qadiri, Hamza, Munawwar Qari, Awlani, Ayni, Ajzi and 
Haji Muin, to name only a few of the most important figures, were all central figures in the 
world of letters, arts, and education all through the decade. They saw themselves creating a 
new civilization – modern, Soviet, Central Asian, Turkic, and Muslim all at once. (Khalid 
1998, p299) 
 
3.3.2 Economy during the early Soviet years.  
  
This relatively good era in intellectual and cultural development in 
Central Asia coincided with the period generally known as the ‘NEP’ era, 
so named because of Lenin’s New Economic Policy.  In the aftermath of 
the Revolution, the Communists were in limbo because Marx had not told 
them how to build communism.  
 
There was little in Marx’s voluminous writings for his followers to learn about 
“building” a socialist economy. From his teaching, however, they thought they knew what 
was wrong with a modern economy, and they had no doubts that it was above all the 
market mechanism of resource allocation. The market economy was to Marx synonymous 
with capitalism, it was an exploitative, anarchic and wasteful type of economy, and so his 
followers were adamant in their resolve to eliminate it. As capitalism and socialism were 
viewed as antipodes, the latter was supposed to be a market-less, money-less economy. 
(Gabriel Temkin, 1998, p313) 
 
Because Marx only told what was wrong with capitalism, the 
communists started to get rid of the things that Marx had said were wrong. 
Private ownership of any means of production, except in agriculture, had to 
go, so they nationalized the economy. The supreme Council of National 
Economy (SCNE) was set up on 15 December 1917 in order to organize the 
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National Economy. This process of nationalization was as chaotic as the 
revolution itself as the local revolutionary groups started taking control of 
the enterprises with their neighbourhoods. The problem of chaotic 
nationalization was so serious that the SCNE had to issue two consecutive 
decrees outlawing unauthorized nationalization.  
The industrial workers living in cities suffered during the food 
shortage that followed the revolution and many of them started moving to 
the countryside where it was easier to survive. In response to this Lenin 
started applying stricter measures for workers’ control, effectively 
introducing semi-military management of the work force and found himself 
in opposition to the more liberal communists.  It did not, however, deter 
him from dismissing all the criticism in his enlighteningly titled article 
‘Left-wing Childishness’.  
In it he defended his reforms, asserting the need for strong 
discipline and one man management system for industrial organizations.   
 
In Central Asia, the local Council of People’s Commissars also 
acted swiftly to confiscate first the cotton mills and soon after other major 
industrial enterprises. Even the foreign owned companies did not escape the 
zealous nationalization drive of the proletariat, the Belgian owned 
‘Tashkent Tram, and the American ‘Zinger Company’ were taken over by 
the end of 1918. By the end of the following year more than 700 enterprises 
in Turkistan were nationalized (Ozerova, 2004).  
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 In agriculture they allowed the peasants to claim the lands they 
were working on, from landlords. This policy made the communists 
popular with the rural population initially, but the peasants did not like the 
idea of giving away their produce in exchange for industrial goods in times 
of food shortage. Therefore the communists forcefully requisitioned most 
of the agricultural output. The immediate response of the peasants was to 
cut the sowing of grain products as the products in excess of their own need 
would be taken away from them anyway. This reduction in sowings 
combined with the severe draught resulted in unprecedented famine in most 
parts of the country.  
 
‘The 1920 grain harvest, only 54 per cent of the 1909-1913 average, was bad 
enough. In 1921 the harvest was only 37.6 million tons, only 43 per cent of the pre-war 
average overall, but far worse in affected areas. Uncounted millions died.’ (Nove, 1992, 
p81) 
 
In Central Asia, the crisis started even earlier and lasted longer than 
it did in European parts of Russia as the peoples of colonies were given 
lower priority and hardly any relief effort was directed at them. The civil 
war that broke out in the immediate aftermath of the revolution cut the 
railway links between Central Asia and other parts of Russia towards the 
end of 1917. As a result undelivered cotton piled up and the supply of grain 
on which the population Central Asia had relied was seized. Hence, the 
food crisis in Central Asia started even before the War Communism 
measures of forceful requisitioning began and people started supplanting 
cotton fields with grain. Later the requisitioning and looting forced the 
 66 
peasants to cut even further the sowings that were already well short of pre-
Revolutionary levels due to extensive damages to the irrigation systems 
because of civil war.  
 
‘… by 1921 cotton covered only 200,000 acres (80,000 hectares) compared with 
the 1,058,000 acres (423500 hectares) in 1913. In spite of these belated attempts to 
substitute food crops for cotton, southern Central Asia experienced severe famines from 
1919 to 1923, well over a million people died. Such starvation, along with the general 
chaos prevailing in the region, reduced the agrarian economy to a state of collapse’ 
(Matley, 1994, p286)    
 
Under the new arrangements trade and the market also had to go, so 
they abolished money, banned trade and introduced central distribution. As 
a result black markets flourished in spite of harsh punishments up to instant 
execution by shooting for anyone caught engaged in illegal trade. Nove 
(1992) reported that as much as 60% of consumption in cities went through 
the black market.   
Overall, War Communism as a system failed miserably, popular 
discontent with the new government was reaching boiling point. The 
economy was on the verge of collapse and the protests of outraged peasants 
threatened to turn into a countrywide revolt. Under real danger of losing 
power Lenin decided to reverse the course of his reforms and introduced 
what later became known as the ‘New Economic Policy (NEP).  
From 1921, requisitioning was replaced with a proportional tax on 
the output that was in excess of consumption needs. Smaller enterprises 
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were denationalized and trade and markets were legalized again. After two 
devaluations, a more – or – less stable currency was introduced in 1923.  
The results were very impressive. The economy started to recover at 
a great pace and by 1926, the peak year under NEP, most production 
returned to pre-Revolutionary levels. A new class of traders, called 
‘Nepmen’, emerged to fill the gaps that existed between large scale state 
owned production and retail markets.  Unfortunately, by that time Lenin 
was already gone and struggle for political power among his followers was 
heating up. Lenin’s speeches and articles regarding the future direction of 
economic reforms left them with more questions than answers. Although 
the NEP was successful in restoring the economy, the communists believed 
that they should be working towards building a socialist economy 
somewhat reflecting their Marxist ideology. 
 
‘They were bound to regard the ultimate achievement of socialism as the one 
possible justification for their being in power. But when was the advance to be resumed? 
At what speed? In what directions? Above all, what was to be done to convert or transform 
the peasant majority of the population, and how was the industrialization of Russia to be 
pursued after the period of reconstruction had come to an end?’ (Nove (1992), p117) 
 
 Thus the real core of the problem was the fact that the Communists 
came to power under the flag of Marxism and were now trying to establish 
‘the dictatorship of proletariat’ in an overwhelmingly peasant country.  
For most of them, the NEP represented a necessary set back in the 
face of the hardship of civil war and they saw irreconcilable class enemies 
in both Nepmen and wealthier peasants whom they called kulaks. The most 
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ideologically committed of them joined together in the united left wing 
opposition led by Leon Trotsky, firmly opposed to all the concessions 
given to private traders and peasants during NEP. They wanted to see a full 
scale industrialization led by the state. Nikolai Bukharin, one of the most 
prominent Marxists and leaders of the Revolution, was also part of the left 
opposition but he was won over by the successes of NEP and became a 
strong defender of the new arrangements12.  He argued for a balanced, 
harmonious growth with investments in both industrial and agricultural 
development.  Preobrazhensky, an outspoken member of the left wing, 
proposed an unbalanced growth strategy in favour of industry. He 
 
 ‘… took up where Marxian expanded reproduction left off, arguing that it was 
necessary to focus on investment goods to support rapid industrialization. Thus he argued 
against half measures and for a ‘big push’, a position supported by several considerations.’ 
(Gregory and Stuart, 1998, p65) 
 
Stalin first aligned himself with the right wing and launched a 
ruthless purge against the left opposition. All of them were expelled from 
the party and either arrested or left the country. After eliminating the left 
wing opposition he turned against the moderates. Bukharin and his so 
called followers, the ‘Bukharinites’ were turned into villains towards the 
end of 1928. Stalin then adopted an industrialization strategy that was even 
more ambitious than anything the pro-big – push leftists ever dreamt about.  
                                                  
12
 Bukharin was impressed by the contribution of the private sector to the economic 
recovery during the NEP so much that he became convinced that ‘… greater prosperity 
among peasants, more commercial production, was not only essential but also not 
dangerous. In the process of time these peasants too would ‘grow into socialism’. 
Following his own logic, he launched in April 1925 the slogan get rich.’ (Nove 1992, 
p119)   
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‘The first Five Year Plan adopted in 1928 and formally approved in 1929 
staggered the imagination of even the superindustrialists. The Soviet capital stock was to 
double in five years, and even light industry was to expand by 70 percent’. (ibid., p67) 
   
So the decision was made to establish a command economy that 
would exploit peasants by making them work in collective farms in order to 
achieve socialist accumulation. Private traders vanished gradually. The 
share of the private sector in trade and national income decreased from 
42.3% and 54.1% in 1925-26 to 5.5% and 27.8% in 1930 respectively. By 
1932, the share of the private sector in National Income stood at mere 9.3% 
(Nove, 1992). 
 
 
3.3.3 The Making of Uzbekistan  
 
 
As mentioned above, Stalin always had his suspicions regarding the 
loyalty of Central Asians towards the Soviet regime and as soon as he took 
over power after Lenin’s death he initiated the reorganization of Central 
Asia. Applying the principle of divide and rule he decided to separate the 
Turkic populations of the region into arbitrarily defined republics creating 
Uzbek, Kazakh, Kirgyz, and Tajik Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs), in 
1924. The Jadids, however, still remained actively involved in the process 
with Fayzullah Khujayev, the leader of ‘Young Bukharans’ becoming the 
first President of the Uzbek SSR. The territory of the Uzbek SSR, on which 
we will be concentrating from here on, stayed largely unchanged until 1963 
when a large piece of Kazakh SSR was transferred to Uzbek SSR and some 
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part of it taken back in 1971. The final result was and still is an area of 
approximately 447.4 thousand square kilometres which is bigger than the 
UK, Republic of Ireland and Iceland put together.  
The territory of Uzbek SSR included some strategically important 
areas of Central Asia. It covered most of the cotton growing lands and the 
capitals of all three khanates that existed before Russian invasion. In 
addition, this area was more densely populated than any other new Central 
Asian SSRs. Because of these important factors Uzbek SSR was treated as 
the regional centre and all the regional headquarters of party, economic and 
military authorities were located in Uzbek SSR.  
 After Stalin took over power, he continued the colonial policies 
with great intensity.  As the Czarist regime had intended, he decided that 
Central Asia should remain as a resource base for the rest of the Empire.  
 
‘Study of the revival in agriculture of settled areas in Central Asia up to 1927 has 
shown clearly that the Soviet authorities in the 1920s pursued exactly the same agricultural 
policy as had the czarist administration. The southern part of Central Asia became still 
more firmly tied to Russia as a one-crop colony. (Matley ,1994, p288) 
 
 Stalin was determined not only to achieve what the Czarist 
authorities had failed to achieve i.e. cotton independence, he was planning 
to turn the country into a net exporter of cotton in order to finance his 
industrialization plans.  Thus soon after the territorial reorganization 
another wave of social and economic upheaval started with a mass 
collectivization drive. In Central Asia, people saw collectivization as an 
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attempt by the Russian invaders to take away the lands that belonged to 
them and armed resistance broke out throughout the region. 
The local politicians were caught between the two fires. On the one 
hand they knew all too well that any resistance to Stalin’s campaigns would 
not only be futile but also could have fatal consequences. On the other 
hand, they could not possibly convince the local population, who were 
largely unaware of Marxist ideology and therefore did not realize they were 
being freed from exploitation, that collectivization was the best way 
forward. 
Besides, given their Jadidist background, the Central Asian leaders 
had completely different dreams for their homeland. While the certain 
degree of freedom they enjoyed during the NEP years had given them some 
hope for their future within the Soviet Union, Stalin’s reforms, especially 
the style and pace at which they were carried out, shuttered their dreams. 
Any attempts to mediate between Moscow and local insurgents were bound 
to fail. 
In a recent interview with the radio ‘Voice of America’ historian 
Qahramon Rajabov quoted a short conversation that took place between 
Akmal Ikromov, who was one of the leaders of Central Asian Communists 
and a prominent Jadidist himself. They were attending a meeting of the 
Russian  Communist Party in Moscow in 1923, where Stalin strongly 
criticized  Central Asian leaders. In response to the criticism Ikromov tried 
to suggest, as diplomatically as possible given the sensitivity of the issue 
and occasion, that some of the Soviet polices could have been more 
successful had they taken into account the local peculiarities. Stalin’s reply 
 72 
summed up his stance towards the local leadership and the Central Asia as 
a whole. He said: So you are saying that at the moment, the Soviet 
government is pursuing the wrong policy and the insurgents are doing the 
right thing. Then why don’t you go and join them?’13 This also 
demonstrates the amount of trust Stalin had in the local leadership, which 
was almost entirely wiped out during the series of purges that followed. 
They were replaced with the so called class of ’38, the new generation of 
‘yes’ men with predominantly working class and peasant background and 
very little education except for what they got from the new Soviet 
propaganda schools established after the Revolution (Khalid 1998). 
After collectivization was finalized in mid ‘30s and the all 
independent minded local leadership eliminated, the production of cotton 
was given a big push and reached new highs in the years preceding the 
Second World War. The area sown under cotton in 1940 was 75% larger 
compared to the level in 1928 and the amount of cotton produced reached 
1648800 metric tons, a 331% increase over 1928’s crop. This was achieved 
partly by extensive use of mineral fertilizers, the production of which 
increased 8.75 times between 1932 and 1937.  
The other significant factor in this expansion in cotton production was the 
new irrigation projects.  
 
‘During the first Five Year Plan, work began on extending irrigation of such areas 
as the Farghana Valley and Mirzachol Sahra, and land along the Zarafshan, Surkhan 
Darya, Chirchiq, and Ahangaran rivers. In all, about 500,000 acres (200,000 hectares) of 
                                                  
13
 Reported on www.voanews.com, accessed on 15.10.2006, Author’s 
translation. 
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new land was irrigated between 1929and 1932. The Second Five Year Plan made little 
progress in extending the irrigated area, an not until 1939 did the first large scale irrigation 
projects since the pre-1917 period begin.  
 The first of these was the construction of the 19-mile long Lagan Canal in the 
Farghana Valley, which was said to have been built in seventeen days by 14000 labourers. 
In the spring of 1939 forty-five more canals were built, all of them by ‘people’s 
construction’, in other words the traditional Central Asian system of using unpaid 
labourers. The greatest such feat of this period was the digging of the Great Farghana 
Canal (Katta Farghana Kanali) in the summer of 1939 by 160000 Uzbeks, 20000 Tajiks, 
and about 1000 supervising engineering and technicians, presumably Russian, who 
finished the construction of this 168-mile-long canal in forty-five days. (Matley, 1994, 
p295) 
 
Thus the foundations for the new Soviet economic system were set 
and the role given to Uzbekistan within that system was that of an 
agricultural ‘one crop colony’ specializing in production of raw cotton. 
This pattern was only disturbed by the German Invasion of the 
Soviet Union in 1941 when most of the Industrial base, as well as wheat 
growing fields, located in the European part of the country were destroyed. 
In order to save what they could of that industrial base the Soviet 
government started evacuating the equipment from those factories away 
from the war zone and to Central Asia and Siberia.  
 
‘The equipment from more than 100 industrial plants (in toto or in part) was 
shipped to Uzbekistan alone: metallurgy, coal industry, machine building and others. In 
Uzbekistan, this equipment provided the basis for 47 new industrial enterprises established 
during the war, more than half of which were located in Tashkent or its environs. (Rumer, 
1989, p54)  
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This resulted in a great surge in industrial production which grew by 
11.1% during the 5-year period following the end of the war. On the other 
hand, the sharp reduction in the supply of wheat from war damaged regions 
meant that a bigger proportion of land in Uzbekistan had to be sown under 
wheat and thus freed from cotton. Cotton production fell from the pre-war 
level of 1.65 million tons in 1940 to just 0.83 in 1943. So it was only after 
the war when the Soviet economy took the shape that was later known as 
the ‘classic soviet type’ economy and started functioning as it was intended 
by design. 
Ideological foundations aside, one of the main features of the Soviet 
economy, for the purpose of our analysis, was the government ownership of 
the means of production. The roots of such organization for the Soviet 
economy can be found in the writings of Marx and Engels. Their view of 
capitalist production was based on the labour theory of value. Hence, they 
maintained that the capitalists used the ‘forces’ of production (which 
included labour) to produce goods in order to make profit. Since labour was 
the only source generating value, the capitalist would try to increase the 
productivity of labour by innovation and mechanization. 
The capitalist does not, however, do it by his own free will. He is 
dictated to by the ‘sanctions’ i.e. the rules and norms of the society, the 
incentives and penalties offered by the social and economic system. In 
order to keep up with competition the capitalist has to make a profit and 
accumulate it into Capital, which is the overarching driving force and 
therefore ‘the source of all evils’ in the capitalist society. (Marx and 
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Engels, ‘The Communist Manifesto’ , in Angernon Lee, Essentials of 
Marx, New York, Rand School, 1946). The Capital or rather competition to 
accumulate it, restricts the producer from being truly adventurous.  
 
‘The abolition of capitalism and the profit motive removes these restrictions on 
the creative energies of the people, and entrepreneurship should be expected to flourish 
under socialism at a higher level than had been possible under the increasingly restrictive 
regime of capitalism’ (Berliner, 1983, p191)  
 
 
The idea was that, if entrepreneurs did not have to bear the risk of 
failure (which would have been the punishment for not being profitable) 
and the costs associated with it, they would have been more willing to 
enterprise and innovate. Bringing the means of production under public 
ownership should therefore have encouraged entrepreneurial activity as 
those risks would be taken by the state.  
As we discussed earlier, Communists had far from ideal conditions 
to start with and Marx’s theory, which was developed in the context of 
Western European capitalism, was not directly applicable in the largely 
agrarian, backward country that Russia was then.    
The system they built instead incorporated some key features of 
Marx’s theory such as the abolition of private ownership of businesses, 
dictatorship of proletariat. But more than that, it was a system that best 
suited the local conditions. The excessively centralized nature of the system 
and planning were more driven by the backwardness of the country and the 
necessities of the war than ideological considerations. When Stalin came to 
power he decided to industrialize the country fast in order to catch up with 
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the rest of major developed countries. To do that, he needed to mobilize the 
population and resources en masse and with military discipline. The system 
he built was designed for that purpose and it did deliver impressive results 
albeit with enormous human and material costs. National income rose from 
24.4 billion rubles in 1927-8 to 45.5 billion rubles at the end first five year 
plan in 1932. Gross Industrial Production and Consumer goods increased 
from 18.3 and 6.0 billions to 43.3 and 23.1 billions respectively for the 
same period (Nove, 1992, p194).  
At the centre of the system was the Communist Party which was in 
charge of running the country at all levels. At the highest level it decided 
the policy issues, gave instructions to the planning agency Gosplan and at 
the regional level the regional head of the party was directly responsible for 
overseeing the fulfilment of the plan. Thus, at each level economic activity 
was under the direct control of party officials. Besides, every enterprise had 
its own primary party unit and the leader of this unit was very influential in 
running of the enterprise.  
The following figure shows the administrative structure of the 
Soviet economic system. (Adapted from Gregory and Stuart, 1998).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 77 
Figure 3.3.1 Soviet economic administration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The production process started with planning. At the initial step, the 
Politburo, the Governing body of the Party, would decide on the control 
figures i.e. the targets for the whole economy to work towards. Then 
Gosplan would work out the details of how those targets could be achieved 
and allocated the tasks among sectors, committees, trusts, ministries and 
enterprises. These in turn would give their own estimates of what they 
could achieve and how much of everything they needed to achieve it. As 
this was the preliminary stage of planning, there were a lot of bargaining 
and negotiations between planners and producers as everyone was trying to 
make the plan as easy as possible for themselves. 
 After the plan was finalized and approved, they all would have 
been evaluated on their fulfilment of the plan. Given the sheer scale of 
planning, it was impossible to get everything perfectly right. Shortages and 
misallocations of scarce resources were common. Due to the lack of 
flexibility in the system, managers of enterprises would have to find their 
own solutions for the shortcomings of the planning.  
Ministries 
Trusts 
Enterprises 
Gosplan 
The Communist Party 
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In addition, one of the most acute problems of the post revolution 
economic reforms was the lack of skilled specialists and managers. The 
essence of the problem, termed as the ‘Red Expert’ in the literature,  was 
that although the Communist Party held the political power those who were 
key experts and managers of major industries were not loyal to the new 
regime. Therefore, they generally resisted the reforms introduced by the 
Communists. This conflict, although it considerably eased during the NEP 
period due to the concession given to the experts of old regime and private 
businesses, existed until the late 1930’s.  
 
‘During the period roughly from the Shakhty trial of 1928 to the Piatkov trial in 
1937 the battle continued, but the Party apparatus, with the General Secretary in the lead, 
had already decided that Soviet Russia would be liberated from the hands of the non-Party 
specialists who could hoodwink their technically unskilled Communist  bosses by a newly 
created class of Red-experts, who were presumably more loyal to the Soviet regime and 
who had adequate technical training to deal with the issues of the economy themselves’ 
(Guroff, 1983:202) 
   
 Besides, Communists maintained (based on Marx’s theory of the 
perfectly social individual, who would put society’s interests ahead of his 
own personal interests) that these new experts would be more motivated by 
moral incentives of being part of great Communist project as opposed to 
their materially minded capitalist predecessors. Apparently this did not turn 
out to be the case as Stalin himself called for a change of course by 
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attacking the ‘equality-mongers’ and a whole new system of material 
incentives was introduced14 (Berliner, 1983).  
 The new system allowed for substantial differences in the level of 
rewards for people depending on their position and profession. The rewards 
for being part of the Soviet elite consisted of various components.  
 
‘First, the official salary itself was several times higher than the average wage. 
Second, there were many important fringe benefits, including chauffeurs and automobiles, 
specialized health treatment, special luxury stores, and summer homes in the countryside. 
Third, there were large additional, secret sums of money’ (Sherman, 1994, p10).  
 
The data from the early 1970s show that the elite’s share in total 
income in USSR was even higher than that of some western European 
countries (Table 3.3.1).   
 
Table 3.3.1 The share of the elite in the total income in selected countries  
Countries Top 10%  earner’s share in total 
income   
USSR (urban households,                       
(1972-74) 
24.1 
UK (1973) 22.7 
US (1972) 26.8 
Sweden (1972) 20.5 
 
 
The elite in the Former Soviet Union were not allowed to get rich in 
the same way as the capitalist entrepreneurs could. However, they lived in 
relative luxury compared to the rest of the population. They were carefully 
                                                  
14
 This perceived irony in the Soviet system was famously ridiculed by George 
Orwell in his ‘Animal Farm’ (1945) as: ‘All Animals are equal but some Animals are more 
equal than others’ 
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isolated from the rest and given exclusive access to highly subsidized 
stores, housing, leisure facilities etc. Since those benefits were only 
available for the elite, the system needed a clear definition of who the elite 
were and rules defining the criteria for becoming a member of these elite.  
The lists of those positions considered to be important were 
maintained at the Central Committee of the Communist Party, hence the 
people holding those positions were regarded as members of the Soviet 
elite often called ‘nomenklatura’. The appointments to every one of those 
positions had to be confirmed by the appropriate party organ.  
 
‘All nomenklatura positions, as early as the Stalin era, were divided into 14 ranks. 
At the highest level was the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, followed 
by members of the Politburo, candidate Politburo members and the Central Committee 
Secretaries. The next rank in the hierarchy consisted of the nomenklatura of the Politburo 
– that is, the list of positions to which appointments were made or approved at Politburo 
level. This list included the first and (sometimes) second secretaries of republican party 
organizations, the first secretaries of regional party committees and of largest towns, all-
union ministers, the military hierarchy, ambassadors to all the socialist countries and to the 
largest capitalist countries, directors of the largest military-industrial enterprises, the 
leading officials of the creative unions, and the editors of central newspapers and journals. 
The level below this was the nomenklatura of the Central Committee Secretariat, including 
a more junior list of positions: deputy ministers, the second secretaries of regional party 
committees, the heads of regional soviet executes, and forth. Then came positions that 
required the approval of the relevant Central Committee department, and after it positions 
that required the approval of regional, urban and district party committees, and even (at the 
lowest level) of local party branches. (Kryshtanovskaya, White, 1996, p715)  
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 Just like any other system of organization and management, the 
nomenklatura had its own written and unwritten rules for evaluation and 
promotion. The rules reflected the ideology of 
Marxism/Leninism/Stalinism and to some extent Russian traditions. As a 
rule, party leaders had to adhere to communist ideology and had to quote 
Marx, Engels and Lenin as much as possible, and they had to denounce 
religion and fight zealously against any rituals, events, and activities 
deemed to be religious.  
The career of a future communist leader would often start from high 
school where he or she would join the youth wing of the CP, Komsomol. 
Active involvement in Komsomol organizations not only looked good on 
the CV, but it also provided valuable experience and access to a social 
network of party personnel who maintained a close working relationship 
with Komsomol. Komsomol activists were elected on the basis of merit i.e. 
achievements in studies, exemplary behaviour etc.  
The best of high school graduates would then go to top universities 
in the capital and continue their work with the Komsomol organization 
there until they joined the Party.  The selection into the membership was on 
merit basis, where exceptional performers in Party initiatives were 
nominated for membership.  
Once becoming a member, promising youngsters would be sent, 
after graduating, to a lower level (usually district level party organs) for a 
few years. Then they could go back to the capital for special party schools, 
followed by a year or two at the Party headquarters before taking a high 
level post in the provinces (Kryshtanovskaya, White, 1996).   
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 For Central Asian party leaders, there were additional 
requirements, such as loyalty to the Russian cause and independence of 
from local communal influences or even open disapproval of national 
traditions and culture. Fluency in written and spoken Russian, a degree 
from a Russian university and imitation of the Russian life style (this often 
included the hard drinking ‘vodka culture’) were seen as the signs of 
dedication and loyalty. Allworth (1994) described a typical Central Asian 
party leader during Soviet times:  
 
… he, usually not she, spoke and wrote Russian fluently and actively promoted 
the universal employment of that foreign language in Central Asia; he obtained some 
higher education, if possible at an institute or university in Russia; he enunciated fulsome 
panegyrics to Russians and CP orally and in writing on state occasions, frequently at other 
times as well; he strove to maintain for himself a noticeably general, ethically neutral 
public exterior and avoided any overt expression of localism… ‘(Allworth, 1994, p554)  
 
 The results are evident in the fact that, three of the five last leaders of 
the CP in Central Asian countries had degrees from Russian universities, 
they all spoke Russian and two of them came from orphanages thus had 
virtually no ties of kinship with local communities15.   
Even with the all those strict criteria for promotion, the Soviet 
authorities did not have enough trust in the Central Asian leadership, as 
they appointed non-Central Asian second secretaries to the republican and 
                                                  
15
 In addition, the marriage choices also seem to have had a significant effect on promotion 
chances. The Presidents of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kirgizstan and Azerbaijan were 
married to Russian ladies when they were promoted during Soviet times. It would be 
interesting to see the effect of foreign wives on the foreign policies of smaller countries 
considering the fact that the two breakaway members of post Soviet camp the Ukraine and 
Georgia have American and Dutch first ladies.  
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regional party organizations. Those second secretaries had authority to 
direct and countermand the decisions made by the local first secretaries, 
practically relegating them to ‘superficially prestigious token’ positions 
(ibid. p553). 
In Uzbekistan, every one of the 13 regions had such Slavic second 
secretaries. In addition:  
 
‘Members of the nomenklatura, those in position of power, have been more heavily drawn 
from the non-Central Asian peoples (primarily Russian and Ukrainian) population since 
World War II. Slavs continue to occupy a disproportionate number of the key positions 
within the party apparatus, the government structure, the security and armed forces, key 
economic enterprises. (Lee Schwartz, 1992: 53) 
 
The de facto role assigned to the local cadre was to act as ‘gate 
keepers’ for their own ethnic groups in order to control mobilization 
opportunities for political entrepreneurship (Roeder, 1991).  In addition, to 
the ‘second secretaries’ most of the middle level bureaucrats in the party 
hierarchy were drawn from ethnic Russians:  
‘… in most national territories nativization succeeded only at the lowest level, that of the 
village soviet. The higher the administrative level of the territorial unit, the lower the 
percentage of nationals allowed in the government agency. While the most prominent 
functionaries often belonged to the titular nationality, the apparatus would be 
predominantly Russian.’ (Cohen, 1996: 81) 
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Figure 3.3.2 Share of ethnic Uzbeks in CPUz membership 
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                    Sources: Lee Schwartz (1992) and Robert Kaiser(1992) 
 
  
Besides, the Soviet Authorities kept the number ethnic Uzbek party 
members within an unofficially set limit which was just below their 
proportion in the total population of Uzbek Republic (see the figure 
above).The limits were enforced by arbitrary quotas and frequent purges of 
local party members.  
 Therefore, although a party career offered significant rewards, it was 
by no means a safe and stable career path with many prominent party 
leaders falling from grace every time a new wave of purges came along. 
The turnover of managerial positions was quite high by any 
standards as can be seen in the following table16. 
 
                                                  
16
 Gleason (1991) observed that during Brezhnev years the stability of executive positions 
improved dramatically as the ‘regional officials were offered the expectation of long 
tenure in office if they avoided political embarrassment to Moscow ‘(Gleason (1991: 616). 
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Table 3.3.2: Tenure of kolkhoz chairmen in the USSR (%) 
 1953 1956 1959 1965 1971 
Less than 3 years 59.4 63.6 43.5 42 34 
3 years and longer 40.6 36.4 56.5 58 66 
Source: Roy D., and Betty A. Laird (1983) 
  
In the Soviet system as opposed to capitalist system, losing one’s 
executive position meant a lot more than loosing a job. 
 
‘If a US capitalist loses or gives up an executive job, he or she retains wealth and status. In 
the Soviet Union, on the other hand, power and wealth adhered to a particular position. If 
you lost the position, then you lost all your power. If your power was lost, then your 
income disappeared’ (Sherman, 1994: 12) 
 
 This unique nature of the system gave the Soviet elite a great incentive 
to fight for their positions.  The system’s inbuilt bias towards the physical 
production targets meant that, in order to keep their position, the party 
leaders as well as other members of the nomenklatura had to fulfil their 
share of the plan at any cost.  Strategies used by Soviet managers to achieve 
that ranged from straightforward bargaining and pleas to reduce the plan, 
all the way to illegal activities like bribing their superiors in order to over 
report production results.  
 Those strategies emerged as a response to the combination of rigidity 
and inefficiency of the planning system. The system was rigid in the sense 
that the fulfilment of the plan was compulsory and excuses were seen as 
weakness of the managers. Inefficiency of the system meant that there were 
significant shortages and wastefulness of resources at the same time. The 
managers were required to fulfil the plan without adequate supplies of 
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resources to do so. Whoever managed to secure the supply of those scarce 
resources could get ahead of other competitors and could over fulfill the 
plan, thereby paving way for promotion. According to Litwack (1991), 
almost every Soviet enterprise had a specialist ‘expeditor’ whose job it was 
to build relationships with important people to secure the supply of scarce 
resources. The enterprise managers had to set aside a special fund to buy 
‘gifts’ for those important people. Roy and Laird (1983) explored the 
Soviet manager’s dilemma in the context of farm management:  
 
 ‘Indeed, there may be nowhere else in the world where farm managers in general 
face a great need to break the rules just to avoid failure as in the Soviet Union. As in 
Soviet industry, Soviet farm managers who may avoid cheating for personal gain are 
forced to employ tolkach (an expediter) and blat (the practice of manipulation) in order to 
keep an enterprise going. For example, with chronic shortage of fertilizer, if a farm 
manager can arrange for a shipment of fertilizer destined for another farm to be diverted to 
his own, he may be able to increase his yield enough to meet his plan. Or if he can 
negotiate on the side with a construction brigade to acquire their off-schedule services for 
constructing a sorely needed storage bin, he may save a large proportion of the farm’s 
grain from rotting on the ground. Or if he supplies speculators with fruit or vegetables 
from an overabundance that is spoiling for lack of transportation to the city, he can 
increase the farm’s income and transfer the badly needed produce to the consumer as 
well’. (Roy and Laird, 1983:270) 
 
 Another one of the common strategies used by the Soviet managers 
was concealing production capacity. Since the plans were set according the 
recorded production capacity, unreported extra capacity would certainly 
help to meet the plan. It was quite normal for agricultural farms for 
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example to cultivate extra land and conceal it from the authorities (Rumer, 
1989). As the bonus payment of every employee depended on the 
fulfilment and over fulfilment of the plan, it was not in anybody’s interest 
to report the managers over the concealed production capacity.  
 There is also a lot of evidence of inflated reporting of production 
figures. As the end products of the state – owned enterprises and collective 
farms were not directly marketed, it was up to the managers of the state 
warehouses to verify that the amounts reported were actually delivered. 
With the plan obligations pressing hard, this situation opened the door for 
corruption and abuse of power. Kobori and Glantz (1998) reported that an 
average of 0.5-1 million tons of raw cotton per year was only produced on 
paper in such a way during the 1970’s until 1983, when it was finally 
exposed. 
As a result, thousands of people were expelled from the party and 
hundreds arrested, not only in Uzbekistan but throughout the Union. The 
case highlighted a range of serious problems in the Soviet system and was 
looking to bring far reaching consequences when the Soviet leadership 
suddenly decided to stop it.  
 
‘When leading officials in the Kremlin were to be investigated, the prosecutors were 
ordered to stop. Some of the prosecutors had political ambitions and were standing for 
elections. In the end, the investigation, which gave priority to confession, disintegrated 
completely. (Kobori and Glantz 1998:215)  
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 The people arrested were released (except for those who had already 
been executed or had committed suicide) and cleared of the charges. The 
scandal, however, proved the fact that not only was corruption rife and 
widespread, but is also an integral part of the Soviet system. The root of the 
problem with such practices lay in the economic policy of the Soviet 
leadership (Rumer, 1989).  
 In other words, the set of arrangements that made up the Soviet 
economic system created an environment which encouraged such 
behaviour from the Soviet elite. While such kind of practices might have 
seemed optimal for the individuals operating within the environment, they 
were disastrously harmful for the system as a whole and have contributed 
greatly to the eventual downfall of the system.   
 
‘… prolonged attempts to break up the objective laws of economic life, to suppress the age 
long natural stimuli for human labour, brought about results quite different from what was 
intended. Today we have an economy characterized by shortage, imbalances, in many 
respects unmanageable, and, if we were honest, an economy almost unplannable.’ 
(Shmelev, N., Novy mir, N6, 1987, quoted at length in Nove, 1987: 396)  
 
 As it became more and more obvious that the economy was already 
‘unmanageable and unplannable’, various attempts were made by the 
Soviet economists and the Party authorities to reform the system.  The first 
of those attempts were made immediately after Stalin’s death by his 
successor Khrushchev and later by Kosygin. Although those reforms 
brought about a welcome air of stability and common sense after Stalin’s 
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tyranny, they still were, at best, variations to the theme, attempts to 
redecorate a house suffering from serious structural damage.   
 Hence, when Gorbachev took power in 1985, GDP per worker in 
USSR was only approximately 37 percent of that in the US (Gregory and 
Stuart, 1998) and GNP had almost stopped growing at per capita level 
(Noren and Kurtzweg 1993). It was obvious that much more radical 
changes were required in order to steer the country out of that deep 
economic mess. There were, however, some formidable obstacles to the 
reform initiatives with the system. First of all, the members of the 
Communist Party were not yet ready to publicly denounce their faith in 
Marxism, and anything related to markets, capitalism was still considered 
taboo17.  
 Secondly, members of nomenklatura did not want to give up their 
positions of privilege and the power to allocate the State’s resources. 
 Besides, the majority of the population was already accustomed to 
getting the essentials like food, housing and education at subsidized prices 
and did not approve of the idea of having to pay market prices for those 
things, the access to which they considered as their rights.  
 In order to break the resistance and to change the mindset of the 
population, Gorbachev started the campaign of glastnost, calling for open 
discussion of problems and more freedom of speech (Gorbachev, 1987). 
His initial economic reforms package, however, was a product of 
compromise between the urgent need for reform and the stubborn 
                                                  
17
 Nove (1992) notes that as late as 1990 the Soviet Supreme Council voted, with a big 
majority, to omit the word ‘market’ from the name of the economic reform commission 
appointed by Party’s 28th Congress.  
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resistance of the Party machine to changes. In his early years in office he 
called for rapid industrial re-equipment, acceleration in growth and 
investment. As this was all financed by the state, the budget deficit 
increased by approximately 10 times between 1985 and 1989 (Nove, 1992), 
and foreign debt more than doubled from just over $25 billion when 
Gorbachev came to power to $70 billion in December, 1991 (Aslund, 
1993).    
By the time the 12th and last five year (86-90) plan neared its end it 
was clear (as can be seen from the table below) that the Soviet economy 
had failed to recover and very few people now still believed in the viability 
of socialist system. 
 
Table 3.3.3: Economic Performance of the USSR During Perestroika  
1984-85 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
GNP Growth 1.1 4.6 1.3 2.1 1.5 -2.4 
Industrial Growth 2.3 2.4 3.0 2.7 -0.6 -2.8 
Source: Noren and Kurtzweg (1993) 
 
 
The tipping point, in the shift of attitude towards the reforms and 
hence the support for them, came as the members of the Nomenklatura 
(especially the younger members) started to realize the opportunities the 
changes presented. They formed the backbone of the ‘Komsomol 
economy’, the group of newly formed commercial enterprises opened 
under the auspices of the Communist Party’s youth movement.  
 
‘The Komsomol economy’ took its origin from a resolution adopted by the CPSU 
Central Committee on 25 July 1986 in which it approved a proposal from the Komsomol 
that it establish a network of scientific and technical centres for the benefit of its members. 
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The new centres were supposed to operate on commercial principles, basing themselves on 
agreements with enterprises and providing services that were not otherwise available. … 
The scope of the new centres was extended considerably during 1988, allowing them to 
engage in the manufacturing of consumer goods and to establish economic relations with 
foreign firms and organizations; they could set their own prices for the goods they 
imported from abroad, and were relieved of all customs duties. The Law on Cooperatives, 
adopted in May 1988, was modified as a result of pressure from Komsomol to cover ‘other 
pubic organizations’ and this allowed the new youth centres to broaden the basis for their 
activity. Complaints soon began to reach government that youth organizations had been 
buying and reselling video recorders, computers and other forms of technology at inflated 
prices, and with ‘crude violations of the law’; Gorbachev, addressing the 21st Komsomol 
Congress in April 1990, warned that it was not appropriate for the party’s youth movement 
to become involved in ‘middleman activity’ of this kind. But by then the system was 
developing under its own momentum; there was already a youth commercial bank, an 
import – export centre and a network of fashion shops, and by 1990 more than 17000 
youth cooperatives were in operation employing about a million staff’ (Kryshtanovskaya 
and White, 1996: 716) 
 
 In fact, they were doing what Schumpeter’s entrepreneur would be 
doing under the circumstances. Having realized the great potential for profit 
for importing consumer electronics and new technologies and taking 
advantage of their influential position within the Soviet elite they created a 
monopoly for themselves.  
 In addition to importing highly demanded goods they also took 
advantage of preferential loans at symbolic interest rates, benefited from 
the large amounts of monetary overhang in the economy by obtaining 
exclusive rights to convert financial assets into cash.  
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Once they felt ready to take over the state owned enterprises, the 
new ‘entrepreneur turned communists’ pushed for more reforms and 
privatized the Soviet economy for themselves.  
 
3.4 Uzbekistan during Perestroika 
 
3.4.1Uzbekistan’s Economic Record under the Soviet Union  
 
 
Uzbekistan is achievements under the Soviet Union were, at best, a 
mixed success and scholarly opinion on the matter has subsequently been 
largely divided. William Mandel published one of the earliest reports on the 
economic and social progress of the Soviet Central Asia in the early 1940s. 
His article, (Mandel, 1942), was full of praise for the Soviet authorities’ 
achievements in successfully incorporating the Central Asian people in the 
background of economic, political and social backwardness, in some cases 
even pre-feudal, i.e., patriarchal, in character, of civil war and intervention, 
of mistrust on the part of the native and ‘Great –Russian chauvinism on the 
part of some Soviet authorities as well as their sheer ignorance of the 
customs and languages of the native peoples.  
He highlighted the fact that: 
 
‘Seventeen years of Soviet rule in Uzbekistan saw the creation from ground up, of 
large-scale industry, the value output of which in 1937 was 5.6 times as large as in 1913. 
The number of tractors employed on its 6500000 acres of sown land was 21500, more than 
in all of Germany and the acreage under crop had increased 22.5 per cent since 1913.’ 
(Mandel, 1942: 408) 
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Besides, political and social reforms, including eradication of all 
religious institutions and emancipation of women, had been completed 
(albeit at extraordinary human costs18) by then.  
Medlin and Cave (1964) were also impressed by the role of progress 
in science and education in Uzbekistan in bringing about such a massive 
‘Cultural Revolution’.  
It was those dramatic changes in social and cultural aspects of the 
Central Asian societies that encouraged Spechler (1979) to describe the 
Soviet policy as ‘Welfare Colonialism’. He compared the results achieved 
in the Soviet Central Asia with other fellow Central Asians who were not 
part of the Soviet Union like Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. Those 
countries, which shared a lot more than just religion and common history 
with Soviet Central Asia for many centuries prior to the Russian Invasion, 
still lag behind the Former Soviet Republics in terms of literacy, public 
health, and women’s rights issues.  
 
Table 3.4.1 Adult literacy ratios (% aged 15 and over, 2002)  
Afghanistan Pakistan Iran Uzbekistan 
Male 28.7 41.5 77.1 99.3 
Female 14 35.2 70.4 98.9 
Source: UNDP (2005), 2003 figures for Afghanistan  
 
Besides, The Central Asian republics enjoyed much higher 
standards of living than their per capita income afforded under the USSR 
due to the budgetary subsidies from Moscow19.  Consequently, Uzbeks 
                                                  
18
 Of all 6 people who worked as a head of Uzbek branch of the Communist Party at some 
point before 1937, 5 were executed by firing squad and 1 died in a car accident.    
19
 In 1990, the share of such grants in the UzSSR budget was 26.7% ( IMF et al., 1991) 
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achieved the same level of life expectancy as the USSR average, although 
they had a below – average allocation of doctors and hospital beds. Much 
higher - than – average population growth, in UzSSR resulted in a much 
higher - than –average dependency ratio, despite high infant mortality rates.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4.1Social indicators in Soviet Uzbekistan  
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Source: Kaufman and Hardt (1993) 
 
However, after seven decades of central planning and distribution, 
massive gaps still existed between different union republics in terms of 
economic development. As the table below shows, the per capita Gross 
National Income in Uzbekistan was only a third of the Russian Republic 
and consumption was nearly half of that of Estonia.  
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Table 3.4.2 Some Key Economic Development figures for Soviet Republics 
(Per capita) 
  GNI (89) Consumption (88) 
RSFSR 100 100 
Ukraine 71 88 
Belarus 89 93 
Moldova 66 90 
Estonia 103 118 
Latvia 103 103 
Lithuania 88 103 
Georgia 63 94 
Armenia 64 76 
Azerbaijan 52 64 
Kazakhstan 64 80 
Uzbekistan 34 68 
Kyrgyzstan 45 67 
Tajikistan 32 55 
Turkmenistan 50 68 
Schroeder (1993) 
 
The million-dollar question here is that, given the centrally planned 
nature of the Soviet system, how such a difference in income distribution 
had emerged. How can such inequality be explained in a country where 
every investment decision was taken by the government bureaucrats and 
every enterprise was allocated according to a carefully considered long 
term plan? 
Soviet specialists pointed to Central Asia’s ‘legacy of extreme 
backwardness’ and the fast rate of population growth in those republics 
(Rumer, 1989).  
However, there is a long list of Western scholars, who question the 
validity of those explanations (Hugh Seton-Watson, 1967, Dienes, 1987, 
Clem, 1992, Schroeder, 1993, Carey and Raciborski, 2004, to name a few). 
Hugh Seton-Watson (1967) was one of the earliest scholars to 
question the role of the Russian and Soviet rule in Central Asia as a 
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civilising factor. He puts the Central Asian question into a broader context 
of European colonialism:  
 
‘The conquest of Central Asia by the armies of the Tsars has been retrospectively 
justified (by the Soviets) as a progressive phenomenon, since it not only preserved the area 
from the danger of coming under the control of the British Empire, but had the positive 
merits of expediting the social evolution of its inhabitants from feudalism to socialism, 
bypassing capitalism, and of bringing them into contact with the advanced culture of the 
“great Russian people.” This argument is fundamentally the argument for justification of 
all colonial empires’. (Hugh Seton-Watson, 1967: 158) 
 
He further argues that ‘Russian colonialism had effects only similar 
to Western colonialism in raising levels of education and health’.  
Dienes (1987) also criticized the ‘Quasi-colonial’ nature of the 
Central Asian economy and labels the region as the ‘plantation province’ 
specializing in supplying the European parts of the Soviet Union with 
cheap raw materials.  
Rumer (1989) went so far as to call it a ‘tragic experiment’ that 
turned the whole region into a ‘one crop colony’ where everything else was 
geared up towards ‘one overarching goal’, which was cotton production.  In 
his 1989 book with a revealing title ‘Tragic Experiment’, he strongly 
claimed that the deliberate, colonial minded Soviet policy in Central Asia 
created some serious distortions with enormous economic, environmental 
and social costs.  
One of the aspects of that policy, which attracted a lot of criticism, 
was Moscow’s investment policy in Central Asia. The investments 
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allocated to UzSSR were significantly below the all union average on a per 
capita basis (see the table below).  
 
   Table 3.4.3 Per Capita Investment (USSR=100) 
  1956-60 1961-5 1966-70 1971-5 1976-80 1981-5 
RUSSIA 112 108 110 113 118 119 
UZSSR 69 78 89 75 71 68 
   Source:Liebowitz 1992 
 
 
Similar to the Czarist regime before, the Soviet government also 
concentrated most of their industrial investment in Uzbekistan in cotton 
related sectors. In 1984, 75% of the industry in Uzbekistan was cotton 
related (Sacks, 1992: 186) and it was a deliberate exercise by the authorities 
as they did not want any new industries to attack the ‘cotton base of the 
regional economy’ by creating new large scale employment opportunities20 
(Hodnett, 1974).  
                                                  
20
 This lack of employment opportunities outside the cotton sector created high 
unemployment in Uzbekistan. Craumer (1992) reported that about 600 thousand (or 12 % 
of rural work force) in rural areas were not involved in the state sector in 1987. In an 
economy wholly owned by the state, it meant that they were either unemployed or were 
involved in some sort of ‘shadow economy’. Pomfret (2000) argues that, because of that 
excess labour force, the local authorities in UzSSR actively resisted Moscow’s initiatives 
of mechanization in cotton harvesting. As a result in spite of large stock of cotton 
harvesting machines, most of the cotton in UzSSR was harvested by hand. (see the table 
3.4.4)  
 
Table 3.4.4 Mechanization of Cotton harvesting in UzSSR 
 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1986 
A - 23 33 46 63 42 
B 48 38 37 36 35 39 
C 8300 21800 26100 28700 36600 37900 
A - Percentage of Cotton harvested by machines, B – Labour Expenditure per centner of 
raw cotton in kolkhozes in UzSSR (person-hours) C- Number of Cotton Harvesting 
Machines  Source: Craumer (1992) 
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This highly concentrated investment policy also resulted in a lack of 
investment in other areas such as housing and other social projects (Rumer, 
1989).  
The second important consequence of being a ‘one crop colony’ 
was that, due to the dry climate of Central Asia, an increase in the area 
under cotton required a massive increase in irrigation. The total irrigated 
area in UzSSR increased from 1361 thousand hectares in 1928 (Matlet, 
1994: 288) to 4149 thousand hectares in 1988 (Craumer, 1992: 136).  This, 
combined with an over fourfold increase in population in the same period 
(Kingkade, 1993), put an enormous strain on the region’s water resources. 
The drying up of the Aral Sea, which is now one of the internationally 
recognized environmental disasters, was a direct result of this expansion in 
the irrigated area (Sinnott, 1992). In addition, the extensive use of mineral 
fertilizers, pesticides and other chemicals resulted in heavy salinization of 
the soil. In 1986, 61% of all irrigated land in Uzbekistan had a moderate to 
severe levels of salinization (Craumer, 1992).  
Another side effect of the cotton monoculture was the reduction in 
the production of food and other consumer goods in general. As a result 
Uzbekistan depended heavily on the rest of the Union republics (in 
particular on Russia) for supplies of food.  
As a result of the unbalanced economic structure, Uzbekistan was 
running big trade deficits in a number of areas as show in the table below.  
 
 
 
 99 
Table 3.4.5 Uzbekistan’s Interrepublican Trade Balance (In millions of Domestic Rubles) 
 1988 1989 
Total -1667 -3504.4 
Electric Power -11 26 
Oil and gas -349 -405.3 
Coal & other fuel -23 -34 
Ferrous metals -541 -544.2 
Non-ferrous metals 104 51 
Chemicals -163 -140.3 
Machine building -1949 -2219.5 
Wood and paper -483 -631.6 
Building materials -105 -147.2 
Light Industry 1786 1444.6 
Food processing -649 -907.1 
Other industry -133 -185.6 
Agriculture 469 289.9 
Other material  381 -101.1 
Source: IMF et al., (1991) 
 
 
With the exception only of cotton and related products (i.e. light 
industry), fresh fruits and vegetables (under agriculture), gold, copper, and 
uranium (under non-ferrous metals) and electric power, Uzbekistan was 
importing more of everything else than it was exporting. This dependency 
coupled with the in built ‘followers’ mentality’ of the Republic’s leadership 
who were trained to follow their masters in Moscow, meant that Uzbekistan 
stubbornly refused to leave the collapsing Union and stuck with Russia 
longer than most of the other former republics and followed Russian 
initiatives rather than ‘adopting proactive reforms’ (Pomfret and Anderson, 
1997)21.  
 
                                                  
21
 On March 17, 1990, in an independence referendum, in the wake of which government 
actively campaigned against independence, the population of Uzbekistan voted with a 
majority of 93% against independence. The country’s Parliament declared independence 
on August 31, 1991, after the Union’s collapse became obvious following a failed coupe 
on 19-21 August of the same year. However, Uzbekistan remained within the ‘rouble 
zone’ until November 1993, when Russia introduced its new currency and offer 
humiliating terms for other republics that wanted to continue to use the roubles (Akramov 
and Tairov (1998)  
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3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter we looked at the evolution of Uzbek economy and 
society over three different political systems: the feudal kingdoms, Russian 
empire, and the Soviet Union. We gave particular attention to the career 
paths of the elites i.e. the most talented people and the circumstances that 
determined their career options.  
Economy under the feudal system was very backward, compared to 
Russia and other European countries. Agriculture was the main sector of 
the economy with cotton being the main crop. The agricultural products 
were exported to Russia and to the East along the ancient Silk Road. The 
transportation means were very primitive and inefficient, making the export 
processes very long and costly. In spite of these difficulties, the cotton 
export business became very lucrative in the wake of American civil war in 
the middle of the nineteenth century as the cotton supplies to Russia were 
disrupted and the prices went up.  
Russia decided to invade the region to take control of the cotton 
producing areas, in order to increase the supplies and reduce the costs. In 
addition, they wanted to limit the expansion of the British Empire into the 
region and gain the control the big Central Asian markets.  
They occupied the region without much resistance from the weak 
local kingdoms that had been far inferior to Russia militarily. They 
established the political control and started implementing the reforms that 
would increase the supply of the raw materials from the region, stop the 
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products of other European countries from getting into the local markets, 
and ultimately strengthen their rule over the region. They also started 
building a railway connecting the region with the rest of the Empire.  
They also brought the American type of cotton which was of a 
superior quality and gave higher yields. Irrigation system was also 
improved in order to extend the areas sown under cotton. All these reforms 
made cotton even more lucrative especially because the railways brought 
cheap wheat from Russia.  
Although the Russian invasion improved the lives of some the poor 
farmers, it did not change the political and social system of the region very 
much as the Russians chose to keep the existing elites in power and let 
them rule the locals in the same way that they were ruling before. In other 
words they built a system whereby they could extract most of the economic 
resources without assuming the responsibility for the wellbeing of the 
citizens and addressing the social tension between the old feudal lords and 
poor peasants.  
Furthermore, annexation of Central Asia, gave the local 
intelligentsia an opportunity to meet and communicate with the 
enlightenment movements from other parts of the Empire and Europe. 
Middle and upper classes could now easily send their children to the 
educational institutions in Moscow, Saint – Petersburg and in other big 
European cities. This exposure to new ideas gave birth to the Central Asia’s 
own enlightenment movement which was largely inspired by the similar 
movements of Muslims in other parts of Russia and Turkey.  
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These enlightenment movements were independent of the Russian 
socialist movements like communists and were ideologically opposed to the 
establishment of the communist government. However, they lost their 
struggle for the independence of the region and some of them had to join 
the communist party in order to play a part in the political processes. They 
later became the victims of Stalin’s purges.  
Stalin then started a massive project of social engineering in Central 
Asia, trying to eliminate all of the religious institutions and activists and 
promoting young, soviet educated people to important posts. He created the 
system, which later became known as the classic Soviet-type economy. 
This system also included a set of rules and regulations which determined 
the aspiring young talents’ career paths to the top of the communist party.  
In this chapter, we argued that these rules and regulations governing 
the allocation talent in the Soviet Union encouraged illegal activities and 
contributed to the downfall of the economy. We also conclude that the main 
elements of the system remained in place in some of the former republics 
and played an important part in building the market economies in these 
republics.  
In the next chapter we will discuss the developments in Uzbekistan 
during the immediate aftermath of the independence and the implications of 
the initial reforms for the future of the country. We will also look at the 
main aspects of the new political and economic system focusing on the 
allocation of entrepreneurship and talent in general.  
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Chapter Four  
 
Uzbekistan’s economic performance since independence  
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter we discussed Uzbekistan’s record under the 
Soviet Union and its legacy. In this chapter we will discuss Uzbekistan’s 
economic performance after gaining independence. Although Uzbekistan 
gained its political independence in 1991, it remained dependent on Russia 
economically for a few more years more. It was since 1994, when the new 
currency was introduced, that Uzbek government could start the 
stabilization process in earnest. Uzbekistan made economic and political 
stability a priority from early on, opting for a slow step by step transition as 
opposed to a ‘shock therapy’ which would include wholesale privatization 
and liberalization.  
Uzbekistan’s self-sufficiency in energy and specialization in raw 
materials also helped in re-orienting the directions of trade away from 
traditional partners and towards the new partners. The pattern of economic 
reforms started with initial period of accelerated reforms and subsequent 
period of protectionism in the wake of worsening terms of trade and 
regional instability. 
We will also give special attention to the new system of economic 
and political administration which included some elements of the Soviet 
system as well as some new institutions established after independence. 
The cotton industry will also be the focus a special attention in this chapter, 
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given the fact that the sector remained to play a central role in the countries 
economic system. 
 
  
4.1 Initial Reform and Stabilization  
 
After eventually leaving the ‘Rouble Zone’ in 1993, Uzbekistan had 
to speed up market reforms in order to establish a somewhat workable 
model of a ‘market economy’. It was a monumental task given the 
immediate challenges faced by the Uzbek government. In addition to the 
usual catalogue of problems associated with post communist transition 
economies, Uzbekistan had a range of peculiar challenges.  
Some of these problems were direct results of being a ‘one crop 
colony’ as we discussed above. At the onset of perestroika Uzbekistan had 
just emerged from the latest of the high profile purges which regularly 
wiped out the cream of the local political elite and ‘condemned people of 
the area to an indefinite period of elementary self-discovery’ (Allworth, 
1994). As a result Uzbekistan had virtually no political elite outside its 
administrative elite at the time of independence (Abdullaev, 2002). As we 
mentioned earlier, the bulk of the administrative elite was drawn from the 
Russians and other Slavic nationalities and because those Slavic groups 
never assimilated into the local communities in any practical sense, they 
suddenly found themselves in a predicament in the face of the fast changing 
environment around them. A large number of them started leaving Central 
Asia while they still qualified for citizenship back in Russia.  
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The situation presented the Uzbek government with a unique 
problem similar to the ‘Red Expert’ problem we discussed earlier. Alimov 
(1995), for example, noted that as much as 85% of the army officers in 
Uzbekistan were Russian at the time of independence. The state of affairs 
in other ‘sensitive’ sectors was not much better.  
 Besides, the sudden collapse of the state – imposed ideology left the 
people of the Soviet Union in general and Uzbekistan in particular deeply 
demoralized. The freedom afforded during the glasnost campaign often 
brought radical nationalistic and sometimes religious movements to the 
forefront of the battle for the hearts and minds of the population (Gleason, 
2002, McGlinchey, 2003, Allworth, 1994). Given the number of conflicts 
that resulted in other countries of the post communist camp from similar 
movements, the government of Uzbekistan was understandably wary of 
such movements. 
The collapse of the Soviet state also weakened law and order in the 
years preceding independence and increased the problem of organized 
crime which was already quite rife before perestroika (Pomfret and 
Anderson, 1997). Given the fact that the all – powerful Soviet government 
failed to eradicate organized crime, few believed the new republics could 
successfully deal with the problem, which was fuelled by the drug 
trafficking from Afghanistan which produces most of world’s heroine.   
In addition to the problems mentioned above, Karimov (1998) 
highlighted the threat of interventionist foreign policy on the part of major 
world super-powers run by ‘chauvinistic’ nationalists who treat Central 
Asia as their ‘back yard’. He also criticised the ‘regionalist clan politics’ 
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that was prevalent within Uzbekistan. This manifested itself in 
discrimination by the people in positions of power in favour of their fellow 
clansmen or people from the same region. At the highest level people 
formed strong interest groups along those lines and had a potential to 
mount a serious challenge for leadership (Abdullaev, 2002).  
   Amid all those mitigating circumstances it was only logical that 
Uzbekistan would choose an ultra cautious approach to the transition 
process in order to avoid the possibility of plunging into a political crisis or, 
even worse, into a civil war like Tajikistan did immediately after gaining 
independence. 
     Uzbek government developed a carefully structured gradualist 
transition plan based on the following five principles (Karimov, 1995):  
1. Reforms led by a strong state 
2. Priority of economics over politics 
3. Strong social security 
4. Rule of Law 
5. Step by step transformation into a market economy 
First, the strong state principle was based on the argument that, 
given the threat of all the outside influences outlined above, the country 
needed a strong state to represent the interests of the nation and defend the 
values that the nation presumably stands for.  Towards that end, the 
government developed a whole new propaganda machine to promote what 
they called ‘the Ideology of Independence’ to replace Marxism and most 
importantly to keep out ‘alien’ ideologies like Islamic fundamentalism, 
Pan-Turkism and Westernisation (March, 2003). In practice, it meant that 
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all the reforms in sensitive areas like religious institutions, education sector, 
media and literary and cultural establishments could only be carried out 
under government supervision and initiative.  
In the economy, a strong state meant near total governmental 
control over key sectors, attracting criticism from various observers 
dubbing the new system ‘Stalinist’ (Allworth, 1994) or ‘Neo-Stalinist 
(Spechler, 2000).  
The second principle especially refers to the Soviet past when a lot 
of big investment decisions were taken without much consideration of their 
economic viability as long as they met the political aspirations of the 
leadership. Therefore, the government of independent Uzbekistan made it a 
priority that politics would be put into the service of economic prosperity of 
the nation (Karimov, 1992).  
Jensen (2003) argued that the transition countries with a large 
number of their population living near the poverty line would find strong 
resistance to reforms as the majority of citizens would fear poverty if they 
lost the subsidies they were getting under the command economy. The 
argument could be directly relevant to Uzbekistan’s case considering the 
country was one of the poorest Soviet Republics and the living standards in 
Soviet Uzbekistan were quite high relative to per capita income. Logically, 
the Uzbek government chose to maintain price control for most necessities 
in order to avoid popular discontent against sharp rises in living expenses. 
Although pensions, salaries and other fixed payments fell substantially 
behind inflation rates over the years following independence, subsidised 
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prices for energy, housing and some food items somehow lessened the 
impact of price liberalization.  
Although organized crime always played an important role in Soviet 
society by providing goods and services drawn underground by the 
restrictive nature of the system (Oleinik, 2002), the collapse of the state 
during the last years of the Union bred all sorts of organized criminal 
activity. Some Uzbek criminal groups had also grown to international 
prominence by the time of independence (Jannings and Sambrook, 2002). 
The fourth principle in that sense summarises the Uzbek government’s 
‘zero tolerance’ policy towards any kind of activity the authorities defined 
as illegal.  
 The last principle is the Uzbek government’s verdict on the long 
standing ‘shock therapy’ versus gradual transition argument and Uzbek 
press was full of criticism of Russia’s chaotic ‘shock therapy’ during the 
early years of independence (Akromov and Taipov, 1998).   
Based on those clear principles, Uzbekistan’s national program for 
economic transition assumed a three – stage transformation towards a 
market economy with the first stage involving emergency measures for the 
initial stabilizing of the economy following the exit of the Soviet economic 
structure of which the Uzbek economy was an integral part. The first stage, 
which was planned to last until 1990-91, involved creating the 
administrative and institutional infrastructures needed to run an 
independent country. The second stage, lasting between 1992 and 1993, 
would involve the establishment of the institutional and legal base of the 
market economy. The third and last stage then would take place during 
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1994 and 1996, involving fully fledged reforms to finally complete the 
transition into a market economy (ibid. p35).  
Along with adopting a new constitution, establishing diplomatic 
relationships with most countries of the world, Uzbekistan created a new 
system of administrative control in 1993, finally officially ending one – 
party rule by converting the positions of regional party secretaries to the 
newly formed position of Hokims (Governors) directly appointed by the 
President. While most of the former party secretaries stayed on in the new 
role, their job definition and responsibilities changed slightly, taking away 
from their job description the colourful, highflying words related to the 
moral high ground the party secretaries were claimed to hold and giving 
them the administrative tasks that they have been doing in practice.  
Gosplan was re-organized into the Ministry of Macroeconomics and 
Statistics, Gossnab (the state body for distribution of output under USSR) 
was converted into an Association for Wholesale and Auction trade, 
Gostsen (the price control body) was abolished and the responsibility for 
administering price control over the remaining subsidised products was 
handed over to the Ministry of Finance.   
In terms of privatisation, Uzbekistan chose a gradual approach with 
housing and smaller enterprises being privatised first and then medium and 
bigger enterprises. The country’s first major foreign direct investment 
project, a joint venture with Korea’s Daewoo, was agreed upon in 1992. 
The following table summarizes major events in Uzbekistan till 1996.   
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Table 4.1.1 Timeline of major events in Uzbekistan 1991 – 1996 
 Laws Presidential 
decrees  
Cabinet 
Resolutions 
Major events  
50 (Including Laws 
on land use, 
property, 
enterprises, 
cooperatives,  
entrepreneurship 
and banking 
system) 
- - Two-tier banking  
system set up,  
privatization of  
housing and small 
 enterprises started.  
Private businesses  
and cooperatives  
allowed 
1991 4 7 2 Independence  
declared,  
First Nationwide  
Presidential election 
1992 4 42 11 New constitution, 
 IBRD and EBRD  
membership,  
Daewoo plant agreed  
1993 12 11 7 Transitional currency 
 introduced, IFC 
membership  
1994 6 22 10 New currency at the rate of  
1000:1 introduced, BAT  
agrees to take over  
Uzbekistan’s Entire 
 Tobacco Industry  
1995 7 20 25 ADB membership,  
Production started  
at ‘Zarafshan-Newmont’  
Gold Mining JV 
1996 13 36 80 Exchange restrictions  
introduced 
Total 96 138 135  
Source: Prepared from the materials selected from Uzbek press.  
 
During the period leading up to 1996, Uzbekistan adopted 96 new 
laws and 138 Presidential decrees along with 135 Cabinet Resolutions to 
facilitate the transition of the economy. Three major investment projects 
were carried out involving big foreign companies, with Korea’s Daewoo 
investing $658 million in a car plant, BAT investing $200 million in the 
country’s tobacco industry, and the in mining company ‘Newmont’ joining 
in on the country’s already sizeable gold production.    
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As a result of such a successful reorientation of the economy from 
being an integral part the ‘USSR Inc.’ to an outward looking, stable 
economy, coupled with relatively abundant natural resources, the country’s 
transition crises was much milder compared to its fellow ‘comrades’ (See 
the Table below). 
 
Table 4.1.2 GDP Growth during the years immediately following the collapse of 
the USSR (%)   
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
CIS -14.1 -9.3 -13.6 -5.0 -3.6 
Uzbekistan -11.1 -2.3 -4.2 -0.9 1.6 
Kazakhstan -5.3 -9.3 -12.6 -8.2 0.5 
Russia -14.8 -8.7 -12.7 -4.0 -3.6 
Source: EBRD (2004) 
   
The budget deficit remained moderate too, by transition standards, 
after a difficult couple of years in the face of losing the subsidies from the 
collapsed Soviet Government and inflation was also brought down to 
manageable levels, although seignorage remained high at 8% of the GDP 
and just under 20% of Budget revenues in 1996 (IMF, WEO 1997).  
 
Table 4.1.3 Budget Deficit and Inflation in Uzbekistan (1992- 96) (%) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Budget Deficit -16.0 -16.3 -8.3 -5.8 -5.2 
Inflation 645.2 5342 1568.3 304.6 43.1 
Source: Uzbekistan National Statistics 
 
The main achievements of the initial years were the reduction of the 
country’s dependence on outside supply of key energy and food item in 
which Uzbekistan had large trade deficits during the Soviet era. After 
independence, Uzbekistan managed to reverse the socialist ways of 
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wasteful use of resources and cut the consumption of electricity and oil 
products to bring them down to the sustainable levels.    
 
 Figure 4.1.1 Production and Consumption in Uzbekistan (Mln KWH)  
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Source: ADB Key Indicators 2006  
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Figure 4.1.2 Production and Consumption of Oil in Uzbekistan (in 
thousand barrels)  
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Source: BP World Energy Review 2006 
 
Uzbekistan has increased oil production from 60 thousand barrels 
per day in 1989 to 172 thousand barrels per day in 1994 and reduced 
consumption from 274 to 138 thousand barrels per day in the same period 
in order to achieve energy independence.   
In agriculture, the areas sown to cotton was cut back in order to 
increase food production and as a result the production of wheat increased 
sharply allowing the country to claim ‘wheat independence’ by 1996.   
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 Figure 4.1.3 Production of Cotton and Wheat in Uzbekistan (000 
tons) 
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Source: National Statistics 
 
 
Domestic consumption of gas remained high and kept on increasing 
as Uzbekistan produced a lot more gas than was needed for domestic 
consumption and had only one major pipeline going out of the country, to 
Siberia through Kazakhstan. Thus export facilities for gas were limited 
until recently when to government built new facilities for producing 
liquefied gas for export.   
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Figure 4.1.4 Production and Consumption of Gas in Uzbekistan 
Gaz Production and Consumption(BP data) (in billion cubic metres)
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 Source: BP World Energy Review 2006 and ADB Key Indicators 2006 
 
 
            4.2 External Shock and Restrictive Policies 
  As we mentioned earlier, Uzbekistan’s original plan was to have a 
fully functional market economy by 1996. Instead 1996 became the year 
when things started go wrong for the country. First, unfavourable weather 
conditions resulted in a disastrous cotton harvest. The average yield of 
seeded cotton in 1996 was down to 2.25 from 2.63 tons per hectare in 1995 
producing 123 thousand tons less of lint, the main product for export.  
 Falling commodity prices in international markets worsened 
Uzbekistan’s terms of trade, putting the country’s precarious trade balance 
under even more pressure and thereby threatening to derail the Uzbek 
governments economic policy, which was built on the ‘principle of import 
substitution and export promotion’.  Prices for cotton, which accounted for 
over 41.5 % of total export revenues, fell by 16.5% in 1996 over 1995. The 
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price of gold, another major export item, also fell by 14.7 percent in 1997 
(see the Figure below). 
 
Figure 4.2.1: Export Revenue, Cotton and Gold prices year on year 
change 1996-99 
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 Source: TACIS 1999 
 
On the international front, in neighbouring Afghanistan the religious 
extremist group, the Taliban, which had members of the Islamic Movement 
of Uzbekistan in their ranks, took the capital Kabul (overthrowing the 
Afghan government) in September, 1996. The group had ambitious plans 
for building an Islamic Caliphate that would extend over most of Central 
Asia including Uzbekistan. Worried about the threat of the Taliban, the 
Uzbek Government sought to establish closer ties with Russia, despite 
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having had various differences since independence, mainly over the trade 
and economic policies of Russian government.  
In 1997, Uzbekistan signed an Agreement with Russia on Border 
Guard cooperation to help protect only non-CIS part of the border, the 137 
km border line with troubled Afghanistan.   
Domestically, Uzbekistan introduced import restrictions for most 
import items, with tariffs ranging from 5 to 50%, and imposed mandatory 
surrender requirements for export revenues (Devereux and Roberts, 1997).  
Under those arrangements exporters were required to sell their export 
revenues at the official exchange rate, which was artificially overvalued.  
(For an elabourate assessment of Uzbekistan’s exchange rate regime see 
Rosenberg and Zeeuw, 2000). The so called ‘centralized export’ of 
strategically important items like cotton, gold and the like were subject to 
100% surrender requirements. Similarly, strategic imports like important 
food stuffs and technology items were eligible for hard currency purchases 
at the official rate. This system of multiple exchange rates and tight trade 
controls worked as a system of de facto wealth redistribution, taxing the 
export sector while subsidising importers.  
Tarr (1997) suggested a number of plausible explanations for the 
Uzbek authorities’ response to the deterioration of the country’s terms of 
trade and consequently balance of payments.  
First of all, as we have discussed above, the design of the Soviet 
economy did not reflect the true cost of the goods and services supplied to 
final customers and the population were not only accustomed to, but also 
heavily dependent on getting the essentials at low prices. Adjusting 
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domestic prices for the items of essential consumption to international price 
levels would significantly worsen the living standards of the majority of the 
population22. Therefore subsidising essential items of consumption was one 
of the main policy objectives of the Uzbek authorities since independence 
while trying to promote domestic production of those essential import items 
(an import substitution policy).  
Secondly, contrary to the observations of some ‘western scholars23’, 
Uzbekistan had a considerable industrial base inherited from the USSR and 
actively pursued the preservation and development of industrial base, albeit 
at the expense of other sectors (especially agriculture). Old Soviet 
Industrial Enterprises were converted into joint stock companies with the 
state as the majority shareholder, and they were given access to cheap hard 
currency for upgrading aging machinery24.  
Thirdly, the Soviet policy makers’ bias against the production of 
consumer goods had resulted in a permanent shortage of basic consumer 
goods and created profitable opportunities for private importers. However, 
the Uzbek authorities sought to control the imports of ‘frivolous’ goods like 
                                                  
22
 Jensen (2003) also found that the transition countries ‘with large spans of the population 
hovering above poverty were less like to achieve high levels of economic reforms’ due to 
the fear that high adjustment costs might generate a popular discontent. 
23
 See for example Zettlemeyer (2003) who claimed to have solved a self created ‘Uzbek 
puzzle’ by suggesting that Uzbekistan’s quick recovery from a milder than average 
transition recession was the result of ‘low levels of industrialization’.  Spechler (2004) on 
the other hand credited Uzbekistan’s strong resistance of ‘neoliberal polices’ and ‘neo-
Stalinist’ approach of Uzbek authorities  for achieving better performance during the early 
years of transition.  
24
 Uzbekistan was one of the first Former Soviet Republics to establish major join ventures 
with multinational companies, South Korea’s Daewoo Group invested in a $658 million 
car factory capable of producing 200 thousand vehicles a year creating thereby over 10000 
jobs including during construction, dealerships and  local suppliers. In addition, the 
tobacco company BAT bought the entire tobacco industry of the country in a $200 million 
deal in 1995 and increased the production of cigarettes from 2742 million units in 1995 to 
10668 million units in 1999 (Tacis, 1999).    
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fizzy drinks, chewing gum and the like in the times of severe hard currency 
shortages.  
The last reason for the introduction of highly restrictive trade and 
exchange rate policies is directly relevant to our analysis. Tarr (1997) 
argues that the restrictions were the result of ‘the desire of government 
officials to either yield power or get rich through extracting rents (bribes)’ 
(ibid. p10)   
As is well documented in the literature, rent – seeking authorities do 
not take a lot of convincing when it comes to introducing potentially 
profitable restrictions. In fact, the preferential access to hard currency and 
lucrative import licences were some of the main activities through which 
some of the infamous ‘Russian Oligarchs’ accumulated their initial wealth 
before pushing for a large scale state capture (Kryshtanovskaya and White, 
1996).  We will discuss the common practices used by rent seekers further 
in the following chapters.  
 The following table shows the actual rates of transfer between the 
export and import sectors.  
 
Table 4.2.1 Transfers between Import and Export sectors 1997-99 
(in percent) 
 
1997 1998 1999 
Implicit Tax Rates:    
Centralized imports 26 37 56 
Other imports 5 9 21 
Implicit subsidy rates:    
Centralized imports 26 37 56 
Other imports 17 30 43 
Source: Rosenberg and Zeeuw (2000: 11) 
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Thus, in 1999, the peak of exchange rate distortions, the rate of 
implicit tax on centralized exports was 56% and the centralized imports 
were also subsidised at the same rate. Although in reality the total amount 
of import subsidies must have been much bigger than the export taxes, as 
the Central Bank of Uzbekistan lost part of its foreign reserves during the 
period leading up to 2000, trying to maintain the artificially overvalued 
exchange rate (see the figure below).   
 
Figure 4.2.2. Foreign reserves (EBRD Transition report various 
years, in million USD) 
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Source: EBDR transition reports (various years) 
 
In response to the situation Uzbekistan unified two of the official 
exchange rates on May 1, 2000, thereby reducing the difference between 
the official and curb market rates and eliminating part of the indirect taxes 
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and subsides. (This may have been partially in response to the fierce 
criticism from the international community led by the IMF, which closed 
its country office in Uzbekistan in protest at the exchange rate distortions)  
However, the overall economic situation in Uzbekistan and its standing in 
the international community were both far from ideal as Spechler neatly 
summarized in 2000:  
 ‘The conventional view of Uzbekistan is that it remains unreformed from its 
Communist past and that it has no transition strategy.’ (Spechler (2000: 296) 
 
Then 2001 was a crucial year for Uzbekistan. First, the prices for 
cotton and gold started recovering in 2000 and 2001. Then the infamous 
events of September 2001 in the USA changed the global political and 
economic conditions dramatically. The uncertainty in financial markets, 
created by these events, pushed gold prices even higher as investors turned 
to safer assets.   
Even more important for Uzbekistan was the American 
government’s declaration of war on terror, a global campaign against 
radical Islamic groups, of which Uzbekistan’s exiled Islamic Movement 
and troublesome neighbours Taliban were well known representatives.  
Uzbekistan’s misfortune of having a ‘war torn’ opium plantation for 
a neighbour had suddenly changed into a massive blessing, as the US – led 
coalition invaded Afghanistan, choosing Uzbekistan as the main partner in 
the region. In March, 2002, only a few months after the 9/11 attacks, 
Uzbekistan and the USA signed a joint declaration on strategic partnership. 
Uzbekistan offered the Americans the military facilities built by the USSR 
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for the original invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. In return, USA brought 
military and financial aid, and with it came an increased media and 
scholarly interest in Uzbekistan. Abdullaev (2002) observed  
‘juxtaposition of two different types of representation of Uzbekistan: the 
apologetic (which gives an unequivocally positive assessment of the foreign policy of 
Uzbekistan – viz., as the most reliable regional partner of the United States in its 
operations in Afghanistan), and the hypercritical (which offers an exaggerated portrait of 
Uzbekistan and seeks to demonstrate the ‘incoherence’ of official Washington in its choice 
of partners). (Abdullaev (2002: 214, emphasis in original)      
 
Either way, both sides contributed to increasing Uzbekistan’s 
profile internationally and suddenly a lot of people wanted to do business 
with Uzbekistan. During the 10 month period following the 9/11 events, 4 
delegations of US congressmen visited Uzbekistan to discuss various areas 
of bilateral cooperation. Military and defence chiefs paid countless visits 
during the same period, often bringing a significant amount of important 
equipment for their Uzbek counterparts as gifts, and official military aid 
was increased from $60 million in 2001 to $160 million in 2002 (Plater-
Zyberk, 2003). 
Military and the related aid funds aside, Uzbekistan failed to cash in 
on its new – found popularity. The Uzbek government’s reluctance to let go 
the control of key economic sectors and big state owned enterprises, 
coupled with trade restrictions, discouraged the kind of FDI flow 
neighbouring Kazakhstan attracted (Kazakhstan attracted as much 30 times 
more FDI compared to Uzbekistan in 2001 (EBRD Transition Report 
2001). Although much of it was due to oil boom in Kazakhstan, the 
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country’s liberal approach to business and entrepreneurship made it a 
favourable destination for companies planning to produce their goods for 
sale in the region). The following figure shows the flow of FDI into to 
Uzbek economy. Although the figures for 1997-99 are higher, the true FDI 
amounts are estimated to be lower as the Uzbek national statistics include a 
part of foreign debt in FDI figures (UNCTAD, 1999). 
 
Figure 4.2.3: FDI flows and foreign debt stock of Uzbekistan (in 
million USD) 
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Source: EBRD, Transition Report, various years 
 
 
The limited amount of FDI that Uzbekistan managed to attract went 
predominantly into two industries. Light industry, which mainly consists of 
cottons processing sector, was one the priorities of the Uzbek government. 
As mentioned in previous chapters, very little of Uzbekistan’s cotton was 
actually processed within the country. Uzbekistan’s internal consumption 
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of cotton doubled since independence and stood at 400 thousand tons in 
2005-06 season25.  This was achieved partially through FDI, 40.8 % of 
which went into the textile industry (see the figure below).    
 
 
 
Figure 4.2.4 
Sectoral Distribution of FDI stock 1997 (Percentages)
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 Source: National Statistics 
 
      
The second largest piece of Uzbekistan’s FDI pie went into 
Telecommunications sector (36.1%). The most of those investments were 
used to build up the country’s mobile communications industry which only 
took off in the late 1990s and grew very fast. During the period between 
                                                  
25
 Uzbekistan’s internal consumption is set to rise even further as the ‘Program on 
Attraction of Investments to Textile Industry of Uzbekistan for 2005 – 2008’ adopted on 
January 2005, envisages further investment of 1.22 billion US dollars in 94 projects. To 
encourage foreign companies to participate in the program, Uzbekistan introduced a 
further 5% discount on purchases of cotton fibre on top of the existing 15% discount from 
the Liverpool Cotton exchange quotes, provided all of the fibre bought for hard currency 
and processed within Uzbekistan, and at least 80% of the finished product is exported.   
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2000 and 2006, the number of mobile phone customers per capita increased 
over ten times (UNDP, 2006).  
 Despite the important role that the primary sectors like agriculture and  
energy extraction play in the Uzbek economy, the amounts of FDI attracted 
into those sectors were at mere 0.8 and 0.7% respectively, largely due to 
the government’s reluctance to open those industries to outsiders26.  
 
4.3 The Cotton Industry since Independence 
 
The World market setting for cotton is a peculiar one. While the 
demand for cotton has been stable and growing roughly in line with world 
population growth, the price for cotton has been very volatile, driven by a 
combination of unstable supply (which depends on weather conditions), 
and agricultural subsidies by the USA and EU. The figure below shows 
world consumption and production of cotton (see the figure 4.3.1 below). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
26
  Uzbekistan did attract foreign interest into its other ‘strategic’ industry i.e. gold. 
Newmont Mining established a joint venture in 1995. It was reported that the joint venture, 
in which EBRD also invested, would have a life span of 17 years during which 156 tons of 
gold would be extracted starting at 14 tons a year and decreasing to 7 tons a year towards 
the end of its life span. (Levine (1996)   
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Figure 4.3.1 Cotton price dynamics 
Cotton prices (yearly % change)
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Source: TACIS 1999 
 
 
Although the total world production of cotton is over 20 million 
tons, most of that amount does not make it onto the export markets. 
World’s biggest producer, China, alone produces around a fifth of the total, 
but still is a net importer, consuming nearly a third of the world’s annual 
production. 
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Figure 4.3.2 
World Production and Consumption of Cotton (000 tons)
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Source: ICAC (2007) 
Uzbekistan, the world’s 6th largest producer, is actually the second 
biggest exporter of cotton behind the USA.  In spite of the fact that 
Uzbekistan has reduced production of cotton in favour of wheat since 
independence and encouraging domestic consumption by investing in the 
textile industry, it still has just below a 10% share of the world’s cotton 
export market. It is a big drop from the early 1990s when Uzbekistan was 
supplying nearly a quarter of the world’s cotton export (see Figure 4.3.3 
below).  
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Figure 4.3.3 
Uzbekistan's share of the World's Cotton Market (%)
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Source: ICAC (2007) 
The cotton market is also one of the most distorted markets of the 
world, were 53% of cotton produced in the world is subsidised (ICAC, 
2005). 
The ICAC secretariat estimated that direct support to cotton 
production during 1999/00 through 2001/02 averaged about $5 billion, of 
which $3 billion was provided by OECD member countries (the USA and 
EU).  
The USA, the world’s biggest exporter, alone spent $3.3 billion in 
fiscal year 2002 on its ‘upland cotton program’ (Townsend, 2006) and as a 
result producer prices during the 2001/02 season in the USA was 91% 
higher than world prices (Baffes, 2004). Subsidies in the EU were even 
higher on a per unit of production basis. With EU subsidies of $980 million 
in 2001/02, producer prices in Greece and Spain were 144 and 184 percent 
higher than world prices.  
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Those subsidies allow American and European producers 
comfortably to ignore world market trends and produce to their full 
capacity, resulting in higher production and lower world prices than those 
that would have prevailed without subsidies.  The situation affects 
adversely countries like Uzbekistan which depend on cotton revenues.  
Uzbekistan’s unique procurement system means that Uzbek 
producers suffer even more from unfair price differentials. As cotton is 
classified as a strategic export item, producers are not allowed to export 
directly. They instead sell to the state, represented by Uzpakhtasanoat 
(formerly Khlopkoprom, the new name is a direct translation from 
Russian). Uzpakhtasanoat in turn sells it on to three State trading 
organizations (STOs) which will eventually export it. Uzpakhtasanoat 
administers and oversees the whole collecting, storing, ginning processes 
and deals directly with the growers.  
Although STOs presumably sell the cotton at or near world prices, 
they pay much less to Uzpakhtasanoat and hence the producers. Baffes 
(2004) estimated that Uzbek producers were on average getting only a third 
of the world prices. The net profit then is transferred to the budget and used 
to subsidise industry among other things. 
The following table shows the amount of taxes and subsidies to the 
cotton industry in 2004 when the net amount of money taken out of the 
cotton industry was $203 million. This amounted to about 31% of the 
Uzbek farmers’ gross income in 2004. Although it represents a big drop 
from 66% in 2000, it is still considerably high.  
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Table 4.3.1: Cotton Taxes (+) and Subsidies (-) in 2004 (in million USD) 
Irrigation -161 
Debt write-offs -135 
Interest rate credit -81 
Oil price differentials -28 
Fuel (VAT waiver) -12 
Machinery -12 
Fertilizers (VAT waiver)  -11 
Ammonium nitrate -2 
Foreign exchage rate control 0 
Land tax producers 19 
STO commissions 23 
Ginning taxes 35 
Income tax producers 65 
Taxes on crushing 120 
VAT fiber 170 
Producer price control 213 
Net Transfer  203 
Source: Guadagni et al (2005: 7) 
 
The existence of such a direct and indirect wealth transfer system 
away from the cotton industry created a number of distortions in the 
economy.  
First, there is still a widespread waste of important but subsidised 
inputs. For example, despite the serious water shortages and drying of the 
Aral Sea, Uzbekistan uses more water per capita than anyone else in the 
world. Furthermore, Uzbek farmers use 60-80 kg of seeds to plant one 
hectare of cotton while Australian and American farmers use just 15 kg/ha.   
Secondly, excessive taxation left the cotton industry with 
insufficient funds to invest in infrastructure and technological renovation. 
Ginning equipment in most of the ginning plants is a lot older than the 
Republic itself. As a result ginning outturn ratios, the ratios of obtaining 
exportable cotton lint from seed cotton, have not changed from the early 
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1960s and stand at about 32% as opposed to 39% and 40% in China and 
West Africa respectively. In addition the speed of the old machines is much 
lower by today’s international standards, with Uzbek machines ginning 6 
bales per hour while American ones handle 25-35 bales/h.   Guadagni et al 
(2005) estimated that Uzbekistan might be losing over $200 millions a year 
because of this low outturn ratios.  
Thirdly, as 100% of Uzbekistan’s cotton is now produced by private 
farmers, there are serious incentive problems associates with the current 
system. Farmers see cotton as a burden imposed upon them by the 
government as a payment for letting them use the rest of their land (just as 
serfs worked the landlord’s land as a payment for their share of plots in 
feudal times). It would be highly optimistic if not downright naïve for the 
government to expect farmers to use all of the subsidised fertilizers as 
intended i.e. for cotton. A simple comparison of average yields for cotton 
and wheat, the main profitable crop for most farmers, tells a different story.  
Wheat yields per hectare have almost tripled since 1994 while 
cotton yields have virtually not changed (see Figure 4.3.4 below).  
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Figure 4.3.4 Cotton yields in Uzbekistan (1994-2005) 
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Source: Annual Statistical Summary for 2005, Uzbek State 
Committee for Statistics 
 
  
Even these yield figures are questionable, as there have been 
allegations of widespread over – reporting in order to fulfil the cotton 
production plan by desperate farmers (Murodali, 2006).  Uzbeks, as well-
experienced as they are at over – reporting and plan fixing as we have 
discussed earlier, now have more incentives than ever before to do so, with 
all the profits going directly into the private farmers’ pockets.    
Fourthly, there is the matter of rent seeking and corruption usually 
associated with a centralized allocation of highly subsidised goods and 
handsome revenues accruing from the sale of cotton fibre. As it is an 
integral part of our main analysis of the workings of the greater 
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administration system of Uzbekistan, we will discuss this issue in later 
chapters in greater detail.  
 
The outlook for the cotton industry of Uzbekistan seems to offer 
some consolation. World prices for cotton might be going up in the future, 
as the World Trade Organisation ruling in March, 2005 declared US 
agricultural subsidies illegal. If World Bank economist John Baffes’ 
predictions are anything to go by, world market prices are set to increase by 
an average of 12.7% over the prices that would have prevailed under the 
existing system of subsidies over the next 10 years.  
In addition, increasing investments in the textile sector in 
Uzbekistan should also create an internal market for cotton, making it 
easier for the Uzbek authorities to liberalise should they wish so at some 
point in future. 
 
4.4 Employment and Population since Independence 
 
 
Population growth slowed down significantly since independence 
due to family planning campaigns and general change of attitudes towards 
life styles and family size under the pressures of the market economy (see 
Agadjanian and Makarova, 2003, for example full analysis of marriage and 
fertility dynamics in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan). 
 
The growth of the labour force however remained strong as 
Uzbekistan’s young population started coming of age (Uzbekistan had a 
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large portion of population under 15 due to fast population growth during 
Soviet times).    
 
 
Figure 4.4.1 Growth rate of Population and Labour Force (%) 
 
Source: Annual Statistical Summary for 2005, Uzbek State Committee for 
Statistics 
 
 
A fast growing labour force, the exposure of hidden unemployment 
and underemployment in agriculture by the abolition of kolkhozes, matched 
equally by the inability of the economy to create new job opportunities, 
resulted in a massive unemployment problem, especially in rural areas. 
The Uzbek authorities persistently belittled the magnitude of the 
unemployment problem as the official statistics put unemployment at 3.5% 
for 2005 while EBRD staff estimated it to be 10 times higher27.  
                                                  
27
 Reported by Radio Free Europe on the Radio’s Uzbek service website accessed on 
28/04/06 
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A lack of employment opportunities at home forced many Uzbeks 
to travel abroad to seek jobs. The number of labour migrants leaving 
Uzbekistan nearly doubled in the four years between 2001 and 2004, 
increasing from 640 thousand to 1050 thousand respectively with Russia 
(64.0%) and Kazakhstan (28.1%) being the favourite destinations 
(Ilkhamov, 2006: 4).  
 Labour migration boosted the country’s balance of payments. The 
net transfers from abroad are estimated to have reached USD 1139 million 
in 2006 while the revenues from cotton, country’s traditional main export 
earner, stood at USD 1009 million for the same year (ADB Economic 
Outlook for Asia 2006). The trend is set to continue with the ADB 
projecting the transfers to double by 2010 (ibid.). 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
Uzbekistan’s economic performance since independence has been 
very different from most of the other transition countries.  
The country’s initial recession was much milder compared to other 
former ‘comrades’ and output started recovering much earlier, ‘puzzling’ 
some Western observers.  
A closer look at the transition process in Uzbekistan reveals an 
initial phase of accelerated reforms based on clearly defined principles. The 
now ‘famous’ five principles called for orderly, gradual, and state directed 
transition while mitigating the adjustment costs for the most vulnerable 
members of the society.   
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Uzbekistan’s transition process was soon knocked off track by the 
country’s fragile international terms of trade and peculiar geopolitical 
location as the commodity prices tumbled and international terrorism 
threatened the stability in the region.  
The Uzbek Government introduced trade restrictions in response to 
the worsening trade balance and operated multiple exchange rate regimes, 
forcing exporters to surrender part or in some cases all of their export 
revenues at an artificially overvalued official exchange rate while selling 
the proceeds to the importers of selected ‘strategic items’.  
In fact the multiple exchange rate system, together with the other 
trade restrictions, was part of government’s wealth redistribution scheme 
which was meant to serve the country’s industrialization drive at the 
expense of the primary sectors such as agriculture and mining. However, 
the system failed to deliver amid allegations of misuse and corruption.  
Becoming the USA’s strategic regional partner in the ‘war on 
terror’ seemed to have opened a window of opportunity for Uzbekistan to 
attract significant flow of foreign direct investment and improve trade 
relations with the West.  
Uzbekistan’s reluctance to open its economy up to foreign investors 
and continuing disagreements with international organizations regarding 
democratic reforms and human rights issues eventually cost the country 
dear as the major Western countries withdrew their support amidst several 
reported episodes of internal unrest.  
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Although the recent economic performance looks solid on paper, 
especially as commodity prices continue to rise, significant risks remain 
with the country’s political future still unclear.     
 We will continue to discuss the Uzbek economy in the next chapter, 
looking at the structure of the economic administration and the implications 
of the rewards for being involved in the administrative structure in the 
process of entrepreneurship development.  
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Chapter Five 
Entrepreneurship and Talent Allocation in Uzbekistan and the 
implications for SMEs 
 
 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter we discussed the overall performance of the 
Uzbek Economy since independence. The economic policy pursued during 
this period created a unique environment for the newly emerging 
entrepreneurial class to operate in. In addition, the political regime centred 
on a strong leadership and the so called ‘Ideology of Independence’ created 
an entirely new set of incentives and punishments for those aspiring to get 
ahead.  
In this Chapter, we will discuss entrepreneurship and business under 
transition.    
As we have done in the previous chapters, we will discuss ‘the Rules of the 
Game’ that shaped entrepreneurship and the elite generation processes. We 
will pay special attention to the role of the institutions of higher education 
as a platform for the development of the future members of the elites.  
 We will also present the statistical summary of the current state of 
small businesses in Uzbekistan and discuss the results of the annual surveys 
on perceived obstacles faced by the Uzbek SMEs.  
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This chapter will also include a preliminary, general discussion of 
the main obstacles highlighted in those surveys before we discuss the most 
important of them in more detail in the next chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 The Entrepreneurship and Small Business in Transition 
 
 
 
The importance of entrepreneurship in the transition countries is well 
documented in the literature ( see for example Kolodko, 2000, Radaev, 
2003, Glinkina, 2003, McIntyre, 2003, Kihlgren, 2003, Mitra, Thomakos, 
and Ulubasoglu, 2002, Kornai, 2001, McMillan and Woodruff, 2002, 
Berkowitz and DeJong, 2001). Some even go as far as to claim that: 
 
 ‘… the main purpose for the whole transition exercise is the creation of 
entrepreneurship’ (Kolodko, 2000: 274). 
 
 McMillan and Woodruff (2002) similarly argued that ‘the success or 
failure of a transition economy could be traced in large part to the 
performance of its entrepreneurs’ (p154).  
The reason for entrepreneurship to get so much attention in transition 
discussions was related to the perceived ability of entrepreneurs and small 
businesses to create new jobs, produce much needed goods and services, 
and spur economic growth. Besides entrepreneurship gained an added 
importance in transition, because it represented the newly formed private 
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sector. In addition, transition countries were expected to generate a lot of 
bright entrepreneurial talent as they had achieved very high levels of 
educational and scientific development during the years under the 
command economy.  
 Initially, as expected, new private start ups got off to a flying start. The 
number of Cooperatives in the USSR increased from just 15,000 in 1987 to 
3,100,000 in 1990 (Kornai, 1992: 440). Small firms were well represented 
in every sector of the economy.  
 By the year 2000 the share of SMEs in total GDP in transition 
countries ranged from 12% in Russia to 75% in Albania.  
Many scholars attempted to study the factors behind the differences in 
the performance of entrepreneurial sectors of different transition countries 
(Ganev, 2001, Safavian, Graham and Gonzalez – Vega, 2001, Astrakhan 
and Chepurenko, 2003). Cheikbossian, 2003), for example, argued that the 
failure to establish ‘The Rule of Law’ resulted in an ‘institutional vacuum’, 
which in turn allowed economic agents to engage in rent seeking activities.   
Sonin (2003) on the other hand argued that it is the rent seeking agents 
themselves who actively resisted the establishment of property rights 
because they were best placed to benefit from weak institutions. As a result 
some economies in transition ‘became stuck in a bad equilibrium with low 
growth rates, high inequality of income, and wide-spread rent-seeking’.  
 Stiglitz, also referred to ‘the failure to establish the rule of law and 
botch privatization’, as the two main reasons for the failure of transition in 
the former USSR (EBRD, 2006:5).    
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Oleinik (2002) offered a completely different view on the institutional 
design of the newly emerging Russian Capitalism.  Although the type of 
‘rule of law’ prevalent in the Western countries did not materialize in 
Russia, the business community there had their own unique ‘rules of the 
game’ based on Soviet time prison subculture28. 
The Soviet style prisons, still in use in many of the former USSR 
countries including Russia, had a different system of accommodating 
inmates. As opposed to the cell system used in many Western countries, the 
Soviet system used the barracks system, where most of the inmates spend 
most of their time together with the rest of inmates. Because of the inherent 
distrust of the authorities, the inmates tend to keep the information about 
what happens among the inmates secret, making it very difficult for the 
authorities to intervene in cases of conflict. As a result the inmates develop 
their own systems for dealing with the internal conflicts and dispute 
resolution. Oleinik (2002) argues that the subculture, which developed in 
that environment, is replicated in the Russian business community where 
people have similar degrees of distrust in the state and the courts.  
 The main characteristic of that subculture is a clear separation of 
interest groups defined as ‘us’ and ‘them’.   
 
‘… the two principle conditions necessary to become ‘us’ for the Russian  
businessman consist either of affiliation with his family in both the direct and figurative 
(reminiscent of the Peruvian ‘uncles’) senses, or of affiliation with the circle of his close 
                                                  
28
 This argument supports the earlier claim by Peng (2001) that the entrepreneurial sector 
in the Soviet Union had close ties with ‘grey individuals’, representing the criminal 
underworld.    
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friends. Third, the fact of affiliation with the circle of managers that took shape during the 
Soviet period (its members were sometimes called the ‘Red directors’), requiring that they 
fulfil particular ethical norms that reduce opportunism within this circle (ibid. p21, 
emphasis in original). 
  
Hence, ‘us’ is their family, friends and close associates in business (as 
long as you are not in direct competition) and they are not supposed to steal 
from them or behave opportunistically towards them. As for ‘them’, this 
basically refers to anyone who is not part of ‘us’; all of the above is 
permissible 
Most of the loan arrangements (as indeed most other contracts) are 
informal and interest free.  
 
‘… every ‘network’ lives according to norms that are accepted among ‘us’, according 
to the ‘understandings’ that are specific to it. (ibid. p24)  
 
 Anyone who ‘fouls his own nest’ by breaking those rules will trigger 
the demise of his own career as a businessman in that market place.  
The roots of such practices go back to the Soviet times when all kind of 
private trade was prohibited and existed only outside the law closely 
intertwined with the rest of the outlawed activities. Therefore, ‘Soviet 
period entrepreneurs’ and most of the Soviet enterprise directors, for that 
matter, had to rely on informal arrangements to enforce contractual 
pledges.  
Thus, contrary to the prevalent scholarly opinion in the West, the 
problem with the ‘Rule of Law’ in transition economies (especially in the 
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Former USSR) seems to be the existence of the ‘Rule of Alternative Laws’ 
rather than the lack of the ‘Rule of Law’. 
The members of each group operate within those unwritten set of rules, 
which Oleinik calls ‘understandings’.  While the masters of those 
‘Alternative Laws’ do not want the formal law enforcement authorities to 
prevail, they are very careful not to come into an open conflict with them 
and to maintain the fine balance of power. The high levels of corruption in 
most of the countries of the former Soviet Union make it easier to maintain 
that balance.  
In that sense, corruption facilitates the redistribution of wealth in favor 
of well connected and bigger firms. Safavian, Graham and Gonzalez–Vega 
(2001) found that smaller firms in Russia were more affected by corruption 
than the bigger firms.  
The combination of the ‘lack of legal property rights’, prevalence of 
informal institutions alongside formal ‘inefficient’ institutions, and 
widespread corruption of state officials and judiciary, has created a unique 
environment for the entrepreneurs to operate in.  
In order to succeed in that environment, an entrepreneur must affiliate 
with one of the interest groups and has to watch the balance of powers 
between the interest groups. He or she should be prepared to switch 
affiliations in case the group, which he or she is affiliated to, goes down.  
The leaders of the interest groups draw their strength from being able to 
tap into state owned resources, being closely related to the state officials or 
indeed being part of the government. In order to rise to the top in those 
circumstances, they must be up for anything, as adherence to strong moral 
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principles will not take anyone there. Indeed, the ‘bad characters’ have won 
the transition battle, because the relatively lawless years in the beginning 
afforded them to use any ‘dirty’ tricks they could manage (Ganev, 2001).   
The circumstances have made it difficult for genuine ‘productive 
entrepreneurs’ to prosper in transition countries. Scase (2003) observed that 
the big majority of small businesses were proprietorships rather than 
entrepreneurial companies. The main characteristic of proprietorships is 
subsistence level trading aimed at consumption of any surplus generated, 
instead of reinvesting in the company.  
Big companies, both state owned and private, are run by well connected 
elites and they still dominate the economies in the countries of the Former 
Soviet Union (See Guriev and Rachinsky, 2004) for example).  
Surveys on obstacles for business revealed the problems that the system 
generates for smaller businesses. Pfeffermann and Kisunko (1999) reported 
the results of a worldwide survey of small businesses on the obstacles they 
faced. The results for transition countries put tax regulations and high taxes 
at number one with corruption, unpredictability of the judiciary, policy 
instability, and crime and theft completing the rest of the top five.  
In the next section, we will discuss the entrepreneurial and business 
landscape in Uzbekistan focusing on the ‘Rules of the Game’. We will 
highlight the aspects of business environment that makes Uzbekistan 
different from the rest of the transition countries as well as its similarities.  
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 The State of Small Business in Uzbekistan  
As we discussed in the previous chapters, Uzbekistan’s approach to 
transition had been somewhat different to that of the other countries. One of 
the key aspects of that ‘different approach’ has been the government’s 
reluctance to let go of the control over the economy. This was reflected in 
the privatization process too. Unlike most other transition countries that 
undertook  wholesale privatization, Uzbekistan chose a ‘bottom up’ 
approach to privatization i.e. privatizing the smallest assets first and then 
moving to bigger ones gradually.  The housing stock was the first to be 
privatized. Then the small retail and catering outlets were all privatized. 
Although the agricultural sector was left relatively unreformed in a 
practical sense, the old kolkhozes (collective farms) have been abolished 
and their lands were given to private farmers on long term leases creating a 
large number of agricultural SMEs.  
The total number of registered SMEs 29 in Uzbekistan has almost 
reached the 300 - thousand mark in 2006 (Table 5.3.1), although only 
88.9% of them were actually functioning.  
Table 5.3.1 SME statistics in Uzbekistan 
 01.2005 01.2006 
Total Number of Registered SMEs (thousands) 245.3 295.9 
Percentage of registered SMEs operating % 83.4 88.9 
SMEs’ Share in Total Export % 4.6 6.7 
SMEs’ Share in Total Imports % 29.4 29.7 
Source: Uzbekistan National Statistics 
                                                  
29
 SMEs in Uzbekistan are defined by the number of employees as follows: Micro: up to 
10 in industry; 5 in trade, services and other non productive sectors Small: up to 40 in 
industry; 20 in construction, agriculture and other production sectors;10 in retail trade and 
other non-production sectors, Medium sized businesses have up to 300 employees. 
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The importance of the SME sector in Uzbekistan has been growing 
steadily during recent years. Their share in the Nominal GDP increased 
from 33.8% in 2001 to 38.2% in 2005 and their share in total employment 
increased from 53% to 66% in the same period30.  
 
Table 5.3.2. The importance of the SME sector in the Uzbek economy 
2001-2005.  
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Share in Nominal GDP % 33.8 34.6 35.0 35.6 38.2 
Share in Total Employment % 53 55 57 61 66 
No of operating legal entities (1000 
units) 
177.7 215.7 229.6 237.5 268.6 
Source: Annual Statistical Summary for 2005, Uzbek State Committee for Statistics 
 
Smaller firms make up the majority of the Uzbek SMEs as 93.5 % of 
the total SMEs in 2005 were micro firms.  
The following table (table 5.3.3) presents the allocation of SMEs in 
Uzbekistan across different sectors of the economy in 2005. As ever, 
agriculture dominates the scene, with 53.8% of SMEs operating in 
agriculture. This is the result of re-organizing the kolkhozes by giving out 
                                                  
30
 A quick look at the dynamics of those figures reveals an interesting picture. While the 
total number of SMEs has gone up by 51% during the period, the employment figure has 
only improved by 25% and the GDP contribution had even smaller change. This either 
implies that the Uzbek SMEs are getting smaller or they are not reporting part of their 
production and employment figures. The latter case is quite consistent with Schneider 
(2004), who estimated the sized Uzbekistan’s shadow economy at 34.1 % of GDP in 
1999/2000. Considering that the shadow economy mostly consists of smaller participants, 
the true contribution of SMEs in the economy is probably much bigger. Our own 
interviews revealed that as much as 75% of businesses conducted by the SMEs were 
unreported in some cases.  
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the land for long term leasing. 22.4% of the SMEs were operating in retail 
and catering, while a further 10% involved in industrial production. Apart 
from the construction sector, which is accounts for 5.4%, the remaining 
sectors of the Uzbek economy do not enjoy any significant proportion of 
SME participation.  
 
Table 5.3.3 Allocation of SMEs across the sectors of the economy (2005, 
%) 
Industry 10 
Construction 5.4 
Agriculture 53.8 
Transport and Communication 1 
Retail and Catering 22.4 
Other production 3 
Other Services 0.8 
Health and Sport 1.5 
Education 0.4 
Culture and Art 0.5 
Science 0.3 
Other 0.9 
Source: Annual Statistical Summary for 2005, Uzbek State Committee for Statistics  
 
This presents us with a general profile of an Uzbek SME, which is 
normally very small (less than 50 employees) and most likely to be 
operating in agriculture or retail and catering. This in itself supports Scase’s 
(2000) argument about SMEs in transition being small scale proprietorships 
operating at self – subsistence level. The implication of Scase’s (2000) 
argument would then be that there is not much of ‘truly entrepreneurial’ 
activity happening in Uzbekistan.  
However, based on the discussions of the allocation of entrepreneurial 
talent in the previous chapters, we assume that Uzbekistan, just like any 
other country, has a stock of such talent among its population of over 26 
million. In what follows, we will use Schumpeter’s line of reasoning to 
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identify existing entrepreneurial opportunities and entrepreneurs who were 
best placed to exploit those opportunities.    
But first we will take a general look at the ‘Rules of the Game’ in the 
independent Uzbekistan and the factors that shaped those rules i.e. the 
political system, cultural peculiarities and economic realities.  
 Assuming that the best of talent in Uzbekistan, just like in any other 
country, will strive to achieve the highest possible return on their talents, 
we will first identify the areas and occupations which would enable them to 
do so.  
 The literature classifies the top of the pile in every country, termed as 
the elite, as political, economic, administrative and intellectual elites31 
(Abdullaev, 2002).  
In Uzbekistan, the only elite that matters is the administrative elite, 
as there is no real political elite outside the administrative apparatus, and 
the economic elites are the extension of the administrative elites.    
Constitutionally, Uzbekistan is a democratic country with the 
President is elected as the head of the state by popular vote. The President 
is also the head of government.  
 The president has extensive powers including, but not by any means 
limited to appointing and dismissing the Prime Minister, his First Deputy, 
the Deputy Prime Ministers, the members of the Cabinet of Ministers of the 
Republic of Uzbekistan, the Procurator-General of the Republic of 
                                                  
31
 The elites are defined as follows: the political elites are the elected politicians and 
opposition, members of political parties, administrative elites are the members of the 
bureaucratic apparatus, economic elites in most countries consist of the rich entrepreneurs 
and other business leaders, while intellectual elites are those who are at the forefront of 
science, media, culture, art, and literature.  
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Uzbekistan and his Deputies, with subsequent confirmation by the 
Parliament; presenting to the Parliament his nominees for the posts of 
Chairman and members of the Constitutional, Supreme Courts and the 
Higher Economic Courts, as well as the Chairman of the Board of the 
Central Bank, and the Chairman of the State Nature Protection Committee; 
appointing and dismissing judges of regional, district, city and arbitration 
courts; appointing and dismissing hokims (heads of administrations) of 
regions and the city of Tashkent with subsequent confirmation by relevant 
Councils of People’s Deputies.  
 The current constitution allows the president to serve a maximum of 
two seven year terms. However, the current president has been in power 
since June 1989 when he was appointed by the then head of Soviet 
Communist Party, Gorbachev as the head of the Uzbek branch of the 
Communist Party. He was elected as the president by the parliament in 
March, 1990 and then by a popular vote in December, 1991 (the country’s 
only openly contested election so far). In 1995, a national referendum 
extended his term till 2000 when he was again re-elected for another seven 
years. The next elections are due to take place in December, 2007.  
 The parliament consists of two chambers: the upper house – the Senate 
and the lower house – the legislative chamber. The Senate has 100 
members and 84 of them are elected by the local councils with the rest 
being appointed by the President. The lower house has 120 members and 
all of them are elected by popular vote from constituencies across the 
country. Although there are five different political parties represented in the 
legislative chamber, they are all pro-government and the government’s 
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position is hardly ever questioned during the parliamentary sessions. The 
following table shows the composition of the Legislative chamber.  
 Table 5.3.4 the composition of the Uzbekistan’s Legislative chamber   
 
Party % Seats 
Uzbekistan Liberal Democratic 
Party (O'zbekiston Liberal 
Demokratik Partiyasi) 
34.2 41 
Uzbekistan People's Democratic32 
Party (O'zbekistan Xalq 
Demokratik Partiyasi) 
23.3 28 
Self-Sacrifice National Democratic 
Party (Fidokorlar Milliy Demokratik 
Partiyasi) 
15 18 
Uzbekistan National Revival 
Democratic Party (O'zbekistan 
Milliy Tiklanish Demokratik 
Partiyasi) 
9.2 11 
Justice Social Democratic Party 
(Adolat Sotsial Demokratik 
Partiyasi) 
8.3 10 
Non-partisans 11.7 14 
Total   120 
 Source: Uzbek Government website.  
 The government consists of the Prime Minister, his deputies, and other 
ministers. The prime minister has 6 deputies and each of them supervise 
one of the following six areas: 
1. Economy and Foreign Economic Relations Sector 
2. The construction sector, industry, construction materials, housing and 
municipal services and transport 
3. Machinery, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, oil and gas, geology, 
energy, chemical production, standardization and metrology, and state and 
mobilization of resources sectors 
4. The communication and Information Technologies sector 
                                                  
32
 Former Communist Party of UzSSR. 
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5. The Social Sector, Ministry of higher and secondary special education 
6. Women’s affairs, the deputy herself is the Chairwoman of the Women’s 
Committee of Uzbekistan 
The Prime minister personally supervises the so called ‘Agro-Industrial 
Complex’ i.e.  cotton production and everything else related to it.   
 Below the cabinet stand the state committees, agencies and 
associations. These are the former ministries or big industrial state owned 
enterprises that were nominally reorganized with the state still remaining as 
the major shareholder. Their management teams also are directly appointed 
and dismissed by the president.  
Administratively Uzbekistan is divided into 12 regions, called 
viloyats, one autonomous republic, and the capital city Tashkent which 
stands alone as an administrative unit. Such an administrative system was 
set up by the Soviet authorities when each region was run by the first 
secretary of the local branch of the respective communist party. 
Since independence Uzbekistan significantly modified the 
administrative system. The party secretaries were replaced with the newly 
created and significantly redefined positions of regional mayors called 
hokims.   
 
‘In the 1990s, Uzbekistan carried out a general decolonization – a phase common to 
all the former colonial states once they gained their independence. This period brought 
accelerated state-building: the growth of the administrative apparatus, the introduction of 
new symbols, a redistribution of power within the ruling elite, and a renewal of that elite 
through the infusion of a new generation of administrators. Finally, there has been – 
naturally, on a new level – a return of the administrative system to that model of 
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governance and practices that had existed in the pre-colonial period. (Abdullaev, 2002: 
221)  
 
At the centre of the new system was the ‘ideology of independence’, the 
concept which was created  
 
‘to advance a political logic whereby the nature of the political community, the 
purpose of the state, the unifying political telos and the present regime are fused into a 
single entity’ (March (2003).  
 
Hence, loyalty to the current regime is synonymous with loyalty to the 
national cause and vice versa i.e. any opposition to the current regime is 
seen as the opposition to ‘the constitution of the nation’. The utmost sacred 
symbol of the nation and the state is the president who ‘bravely led the 
country to its independence and acts as the guardian of that independence’ 
in a world where ‘everybody is envious of the achievements of the 
independent Uzbekistan and plotting against its people’.  Therefore, any 
action taken by the authorities is presented and justified in that context, 
however heavy-handed they may be.  
Just as it was during the Soviet period, an aspiring ‘wannabe member of 
the elites’ in Uzbekistan has to maintain the official line in any political 
discourse and zealously demonstrate his or her loyalty to the nation i.e. to 
the President.   
Regional administrations are run by hokims, the positions created in 
1992 to replace the one party administration. This type of regional 
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administration has its roots in the pre-colonial administration systems, and 
was established as a part of decolonization after the independence.  The 
hokims serve as heads of the region leading both the representative and 
executive authorities in their respective regions. They are accountable to 
the President and respective Councils of People’s Deputies.  
 
‘Each governor has considerable powers, but they are regularly reminded that these 
derive from the president. Mr Karimov dismisses several provincial governors every year, 
often humiliating them in televised sessions of the provincial assemblies. A total of six 
provincial governors were dismissed in 2004, on charges ranging from nepotism to the 
poor performance of the agricultural sector and failure to combat smuggling’ (EIU, 
2005:29).  
 
In reality, the regional mayors wield near absolute power within their 
realms and their main responsibility remains fulfilling the cotton production 
plan, the task which changed slightly with the privatization of farming.   
In addition, as we mentioned earlier, the former state owned companies 
were reorganized into listed companies with the state as the majority 
owner. The senior managers of those companies are also de facto 
government officials and an integral part of the administrative apparatus.   
 
‘During the Soviet era, the interests of solidarity groups were accommodated in 
designing the local nomenklatura elite, promoting personnel, and making appointments to 
leading posts. The intertwining of clannish interests and rivalry in the struggle for control 
over Uzbekistan’s financial, economic, and administrative resources (privatization, 
appointments to lucrative posts, career development, educational opportunities for 
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children, trips abroad, and other benefits) form the background against which the 
formation and evolution of Uzbek statehood are unfolding today.’ (Naumkin, 2006: 132) 
 
The ‘solidarity groups’ in Uzbekistan are the loosely defined interest 
groups which have been formed to help compete for economic and political 
power33.  
Inogambaev (2006) claimed that in Uzbekistan traditional business 
models involving the money–goods/markets-money cycle has been 
modified into a money-power/authority- money form.  
At the nucleus of the system is the President, his family and close 
associates. The economic and political standing of the rest is determined by 
their closeness to that nucleus and how effectively they exploit that 
closeness.  
A talented entrepreneur, who wants to maximize the return to his or her 
potential, has to join the administrative apparatus and make powerful allies 
as fast as he or she can.  
The members of the Uzbek administrative elite are allowed to fast-track 
the careers of their children in ways that the members of the nomenklatura 
were not allowed to during the soviet period. Not only can they afford to 
send them to the best educational institutions, but they can also get them 
lucrative appointments at important institutions.  
                                                  
33
 Some called them clans and others called them lobbyists, the interest groups in 
Uzbekistan seem to have regional roots rather than clannish per se. The reason for the 
formation of such interest groups,, in our opinion, is the fact that Uzbekistan had been 
formed in the territory of three different kingdoms which had slightly different cultural, 
lingual, and social peculiarities. The Soviets had chosen to preserve and use those 
differences in their divide and rule policy. As a result, there still exist some differences in 
culture and traditions across the regions and people from the same region tend to support 
each others in their bids to rise to the top.      
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For the less privileged ones, the career starts quite differently. The 
traditional institutions for youth political involvement disappeared with the 
Soviet Union. They can no longer join any youth party organization as none 
of the current parties have youth organizations.  
The attempt to revive the old Komsomol with an all new Kamolot youth 
movement did not prove as effective as the original youth movement was. 
This is partly because the lack of any clear career advantage from being 
involvement in the youth movement.  
The only option for aspiring young talent then is through the higher 
educational institutions. Educational institutions had played a very 
important role in the process of elite regeneration in Uzbekistan. As 
discussed earlier, religious schools had produced most of the pre-colonial 
elite, while Russian language schools took over the dominant role after the 
Russian invasion. During the Soviet time, the traditional route to the top 
was through institutions of higher education and then specialist Communist 
party schools.  
The collapse of the Communist regime brought down the whole party 
infrastructure with it and that included the party schools.  Hence, the old 
career trajectory was disturbed.  
The Uzbek authorities tried to establish replacement institutions by 
opening new universities and upgrading the status of the older ones.  
As we have mentioned in the earlier chapters, careers in diplomatic 
services and the foreign trade ministry were the preferred destinations for 
the children of Soviet nomenklatura members. After independence there 
were even more lucrative opportunities in those sectors in Uzbekistan.  
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An all new university, University of World Economy and Diplomacy, 
was established on the basis of the old party school in 1992 and 
immediately became one of the most prestigious educational institutions in 
the country.  
The total number of the institutions of higher education (IHE) increased 
from 57 in 1995 to 6434 in 2005.  
The IHE in Uzbekistan are classified into 4 general categories: 
academies, universities, institutes, and colleges. The academies have the 
highest status and mainly offer postgraduate and further education as well 
as spearheading scientific research in their respective subject areas.  The 
most prestigious one is the Academy for State and Social Construction 
under the President, set up to play the role of the old party schools i.e. 
selecting and training the potential leaders. Students are chosen from 
among the mid-level managers working at different parts of the 
administrative apparatus. The other academies are: the Academy of 
Banking and Finance, the Tax Academy, and the Medical Academy.  
Most of the universities are generic institutions of higher education, 
much like the universities in any other country, and offer both 
undergraduate and postgraduate degrees in various subjects. There are a 
number of them, however, that are specialized and the status of being a 
university gives them extra prestige and more funding.  
                                                  
34
 The number includes the branches of 3 foreign institutions, namely: Westminster 
University (UK), Plekhanov Academy of Economics (Russia), and Moscow State 
University (Russia). But it does not include the military colleges and the educational 
institutions affiliated to security services, police and the fire department. Those institutions 
have separate application and admissions procedures, different from the national unified 
system and there is very little information available about them.  
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There are 24 universities in Uzbekistan and only 6 of them are 
specialized. All of the 40 institutes in Uzbekistan are specialized in their 
respective subject areas and offer degree programs in different aspects of 
the field. Admission to the most IHEs (except for the branches of foreign 
ones, academies, and performance based ones like arts and sports) are 
centrally administered by the Republican Test Centre.  
Applicants are required to submit their applications to the desired IHE 
and will have to sit the national test which consists of 36 multiple choice 
questions in each of three subjects. The subjects vary depending on the 
degree for which the applicants are being tested, but the number of subjects 
and questions are the same for everyone. Subjects carry different weights 
for each specialization. For example, applicants for economics and business 
degrees are tested in mathematics, one foreign language, and the 
applicant’s native language (which can be Uzbek, Russian, or some of the 
minority languages) and each question in those subjects, carries 3.1, 2.1, 
1.1 points respectively for each correct answer giving the maximum 
achievable points of 237.6. For every degree program, the number of 
placements is fixed and the applicants are allowed to apply to only one 
program. So they all compete for those placements for the degree program 
they have chosen.  At the end, the applicants with highest total points 
scored are selected for admission.   Each degree program admits students 
on both grant and contract (i.e. payment) bases. Each year, the percentage 
of grant and non grant placements is announced for each degree program. 
The allocation of grants is based on the exam results. For example, if a 
degree program admits 100 students with 40% of them on a grant basis, 
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then the applicants within the top 40% scorers in the test are allowed the 
grants and the rest are required to pay their own fees. Thus, the applicants 
will not know whether they have to pay for their education until the exam 
results come out.  
The planned total number of placements for the 2006/7 academic year 
was 57,269 and for the total number of 186,154 applications were received 
i.e. 3.25 applications per placement.  
The test results for the 2006/2007 academic year admissions show some 
clear trends in both the number of applications and exam results. First, 
regional generic universities attract a lot of applications with the 
southernmost university attracting the highest number of applications per 
placement. This implies that most of the applicants have chosen to go to the 
closest university rather than going to the ones in the capital, possibly 
because of increasing living costs. The interesting fact is that, in spite of the 
high number of applicants, the regional universities have achieved much 
lower average points in the examinations, implying that the best of talent 
who are confident enough in their abilities are still choosing to go to the top 
IHE located in the capital.  
Another interesting trend is that degrees in science and engineering, and 
agriculture, traditionally popular during the Soviet times, have attracted the 
least number of applications and have achieved lower results in the test. 
Apart from medical degrees that have always been popular and have 
attracted a lot bright applicants, the leaders seem to choose the degrees in 
business, economics and finance, and law.  
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Figure 5.3.1 Number of applications per placement and passing grades 
at Uzbek IHEs  
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
80.00%
90.00%
100.00%
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
9.00
Application per placement Passing grade % of total
Medicine
Agriculture
Science and 
Engineering
Law
Regional generic
 universities
Finance and
Business 
 
Source: National Test Centre Annual Bulletin for 2005-2006 Academic 
Year 
   
 The top 4 IHEs (which all had a minimum admission levels well above 
the 70% of the maximum points) were the Tashkent State Institute of Law, 
Tashkent State University of Economics, University of World Economy 
and Diplomacy, and Tashkent Institute of Finance.  
These results are very much in line with the observations of 
Kryshtanovskaya and White (1996) who claim that the Moscow State 
Institute of International Relations, Moscow Financial Institute, Law and 
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Economics Faculties of the Moscow State Universities have become the 
cradles of elite regeneration in Russia during transition.   
Those top four IHEs not only provide good education, but also offer 
good networking opportunities as they keep close ties with the existing 
elite.  
The national testing system in Uzbekistan is highly organized and 
strictly monitored by the security services. Although there is nothing to 
stop the best and brightest to get into any IHE, there have been allegations 
of corruption allowing the rich to buy their children’s way into the 
institutions of their choice. The prices are alleged to be very high, as much 
as 20 times per capita GNP (ICG, 2003).  
Education is thus becoming increasingly expensive as the population is 
getting poorer. The aspiring young talents are often supported by the 
extended group of family and friends throughout the university years and 
the beginning of their careers. As one of the entrepreneurs we interviewed 
said:  
 
‘One does not become a government bureaucrat by himself. He must have the backing 
of his family and friends behind him and his family understandably expect to benefit from 
him too. If one of your family members becomes a hokim or a government minister, it is 
actually better than winning the lottery jackpot. So you have to stand behind them if they 
have what it takes to get to the top. (Interviewee N8). 
  
 As a result whenever a new mayor takes over in a region, the region’s 
business community will undergo a major shake-up. Some businesses (or at 
least control over the markets) will change hands, while others will change 
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their allegiance. Those who fail to win new mayor’s favour and do not want 
to sell their businesses to the people related to the mayor face going out of 
businesses due excessive interference from authorities. In addition, the 
mayor’s control (or influence significantly) the allocation of state contracts 
and purchase orders in the region, and this enables his people to make easy 
profits just by standing between the market and the state.  
At the national level, the high ranking officials and managers of the big 
state owned companies have even more lucrative opportunities. They 
benefit from controlling the purchases and sales of the state owned 
companies both domestically and internationally (Inogambaev, 2006), as 
illustrated in the following figure (Figure 5.3.2)  
 
Figure 5.3.2 Common rent seeking transactions involving insider 
firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The mayors do not, however, always have everything their way. Every 
region is a miniature version of Uzbekistan in the sense that, while the 
mayor is the President’s direct representative in the region, every other 
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State Owned 
Company 
 
Offshore Company 
Domestic Buyer / 
Supplier 
Insider Controlled 
Firms Overseas Buyer / 
Supplier 
 162 
office has branches in the same region. The heads of those offices also have 
various degrees of power and they duly seek to convert it into profits.  
Thus, the system does not allow for significant economic powers to 
exist outside the administrative apparatus.   
 
‘This system is self perpetuating. Bright young people, who may initially be interested 
in improving the situation in their country, gradually find themselves drawn into the same 
system of corruption and nepotism as their parents.’ (ICG 2003:13) 
 
 The choice in front of young talented people is quite clear. They have 
to choose between joining the administrative apparatus and hope to get high 
returns by capturing one of the important posts or loose out on their 
potential35.  
 Increasing numbers of people are competing for those administrative 
posts and as predicted by Baumol (1990), the expanding rent seeking sector 
squeezing the small private sector out. The results are evident in the 
obstacle reported by entrepreneurs in the business environment surveys 
which will discuss in the next section.  
 
 Obstacles to Entrepreneurship and Business.  
In the previous section we discussed the general state of 
entrepreneurship and SMEs in Uzbekistan, focusing on the factors that 
shaped the entrepreneurial landscape in the country.  
                                                  
35
 The third way seems to be leaving the country in search of employment opportunities 
abroad. Tens of thousands of young people leave Uzbekistan every year, mainly for Russia 
and Kazakhstan (Ilkhamov (2006).  
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The Rules of the Game that resulted in the independent Uzbekistan 
discourage traditional forms of entrepreneurship and business and 
encourage the best talent to seek a career in the administrative apparatus 
and the government.  
The increased expansion of the rent seeking sector is squeezing the 
traditional forms of entrepreneurial activities to the limits of existence.  
The Doing Business report, prepared by the World Bank group, puts 
Uzbekistan among the most difficult countries to do business in. The report 
ranks 175 countries in terms the ease of doing business in them. The 
countries are classified into three categories: easier (1-59), moderate (60-
117), difficult (118-175). Uzbekistan, with 151st and 147th places in 2006 
and 2007 respectively, is firmly located in the last group (See the table 
5.4.1 below). Having been rated lower than war torn countries like Iraq, 
West bank and Gaza, Uzbekistan is, by far, the lowest rated transition 
country in the world.   
As we can see from the table, the areas in which Uzbekistan was 
rated particularly low were related to the restrictive trade policies and 
excessive regulations in licensing, property registration, paying taxes, and 
obtaining external financing. The regulations governing export and import 
operations were rated particularly restrictive as Uzbekistan was declared 
the most restrictive country for foreign trade in 2006.  
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Table 5.4.1 Uzbekistan’s doing business rankings 
 
Ease of doing the 
following: 
2007 
(among 
175) 
2006 
(among 
155) 
Doing Business 147 151 
Starting a Business 70 57 
Dealing with Licenses 138 132 
Employing Workers 67 66 
Registering Property 165 166 
Getting Credit 159 160 
Protecting Investors 118 114 
Paying Taxes 155 154 
Trading Across Borders 169 175 
Enforcing Contracts 30 31 
Closing a Business 112 132 
   Source: Doing Business Report 2007 
 
The results of the report were supported by the annual surveys of local 
businesses conducted by International Finance Corporation (See the table 
5.4.2 below).  
Importing came at the top of the operations that the local business 
community found the most problematic in both 2004 and 2005. Apart from 
the obstacles, commonly reported worldwide, like taxation and lack of to 
external finance, SMEs in Uzbekistan continue to struggle with the 
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regulations and restrictions governing almost every aspect of their business  
starting from registration, licensing, permits all the way to the liquidation of 
insolvent ones.  
 
Table: 5.4.2 Top ten operations which the Uzbek SMEs found most 
problematic to complete during 2003-2005 (IFC Survey results).  
2003 2004 2005 
Taxation Importing Importing  
Bank account operations Obtaining Financing Liquidation 
Obtaining permits Exporting  Exporting 
Inspections Taxation Licensing 
Registration Licensing Standardization 
Export and Import 
operations 
Inspections Obtaining 
Financing 
Licensing Bank account operations Taxation 
Certification Standardization  Inspections 
Extra operations by banks Registration Registration 
Currency convertibility Permits Permits 
Source: IFC Surveys, various years 
  
 The problems related to bank account operations, like cash withdrawal 
restrictions, seem to have improved as they did not appear on the top the 
obstacles list in 2004 and 2005. We will discuss all these obstacles in 
greater detail in the next chapter.  
 
5.5 Conclusion  
 In this chapter we discussed entrepreneurship and small businesses in 
transition countries in general and in Uzbekistan in particular. 
Entrepreneurship was one of the most discussed and researched topics in 
the context of transition. Its importance to the transition economies goes 
well beyond the traditional characteristics of innovation and ‘creative 
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destruction’.  The entrepreneurial classes in transition were expected not 
only to initiate businesses and create jobs but also to spearhead the building 
process of the market economy.  
 Although the entrepreneurial class in transition got off to a flying start 
initially as thousands of new firms were established and thousands more 
were privatized, the overall performance of entrepreneurs and small 
businesses, especially in the Former Soviet Republics, was disappointing.  
 There seems to exist a general consensus in the literature that the one 
single reason behind such disappointing performance was the lack of 
clearly established property rights and the Rule of Law. Lack of property 
rights not only threatens the existing businesses but it also discourages new 
investment, encourages capital flight and most importantly discourages the 
brightest talent from getting involved in productive entrepreneurship.  
 Studies on the Former Soviet Republics have reported that alternatives 
to property rights and other missing institutions emerged to regulate the 
business community in those countries. Those alternative institutions and 
corrupt governments created a unique business environment in which bad 
characters thrived.  
 In Uzbekistan too, the Soviet system was modified into an 
authoritarian regime with strong leadership and a nationalistic ideology. As 
opposed to most of the other fellow former Soviet Republics, where state 
property was captured by a few members of the elite, the state in 
Uzbekistan kept a tight control over the economy while also allowing the 
private sector to grow alongside the little changed state sector. This in turn 
opened a whole lot of new opportunities for the few people in charge.  
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 The far reaching powers allotted to administrative bodies not only 
squeezed the independent private sector but also made administrative jobs 
the most attractive option for the most talented.  
 Following the logic used by Baumol (1990), and Murphy, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1991) we concluded that the misplaced incentives created an 
environment which is not very friendly for truly entrepreneurial activity.  
 Obstacles reported by the business community during various surveys 
reflected this. Uzbekistan was ranked among the world’s most hostile 
countries to do business in by the World Bank’s Doing Business report.  
 We will discuss those obstacles in even more detail in the next chapter 
looking at the factors behind them a little more closely.    
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Chapter Six 
Obstacles faced by SMEs and their roots   
6.1 Introduction  
 In this chapter we will discuss the obstacles faced by the SMEs in 
Uzbekistan in more detail. We specifically focus on the ones that 
persistently made into the top 10 problematic areas reported in IFC 
Business Climate Surveys during the last few years in Uzbekistan.  
 We first look at financing options and problems before discussing the 
taxation issues in more detail. We then will group the remaining areas of 
concern into one section under ‘Rules and Regulations.  
 While the IFC surveys have reported the obstacles and some of their 
ramifications for SMEs, they do not go far enough to explore the roots of 
them. In fact, some people may argue that the situation is much more 
serious than the IFC surveys suggest judging by a few popular unrests 
against government regulation in Uzbekistan since independence (ICG, 
2006).  
 We use the findings of those surveys and the findings of our own 
interviews, conducted during the summer of 2005, when we interviewed 10 
entrepreneurs and business managers in various regions of Uzbekistan.  
 The findings of our survey seem to support the hypothesis we put 
forward in the chapter two. The main feature of the obstacles encountered 
by the SMEs in Uzbekistan since independence has been of changing and 
resilient nature. The Central Government in Uzbekistan, supported by the 
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international organizations, has tried to address some of those serious 
problems faced by the SMEs. 
 However, due to the fact that local authorities depend heavily on rent 
seeking income to stay in power and progress along the administrative 
ladders, they have persisted in finding new, innovative ways preserving 
their power of rent seeking.  
 
  Finance 
 
 As we have discussed in the earlier chapters, the financial sector 
underwent substantial changes during the years immediately following 
independence. Along with the introduction of a new currency, two tier 
banking sector, and establishment of the stock market, the financial markets 
in Uzbekistan saw the emergence of a wide range of new financial 
institutions like insurance companies, credit unions, and microfinance 
institutions.  
 In 2006, the total number of commercial banks in Uzbekistan was 28. 
Of these, 3 were fully state owned banks, 12 were joint-stock commercial 
banks with majority of the shares owned by state owned enterprises, 9 were 
private banks and 4 were banks with foreign participation.  
 The following table shows the summary statistics of the banks in 
Uzbekistan at the beginning of the year 2006 (the specialization of the 
banks is given in parenthesis). The banking system in Uzbekistan is 
dominated by the top 6 banks shown on this table. They together hold 86% 
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of all banking assets. The biggest of them, the National Bank of Uzbekistan 
(NBU), which is a commercial bank, specializes in foreign trade operations. 
In practice, it mainly handles government guaranteed foreign debt which it 
lends on to the local firms.   
                      Table 6.2.1 Summary statistics of the Uzbek banks (as of 01.01.06, 000 UZS) 
Banks Assets 
Share in 
assets Capital 
National Bank Uzbekistan (Foreign loans) 2886260093 51.42%   448 305 048 
Asaka Bank (Car Industry) 599187537 10.67% 160 090 598 
Uzpromstroybank (Industry and Construction) 521529500 9.29% 34 715 145 
Pakhta bank (Cotton bank) 357314177 6.37% 63 296 627 
Ipoteka (Mortgage bank) 271998319 4.85% 29 795 120 
People's bank (Savings, former Sberbank) 191142094 3.41% 14 122 891 
ABN AMRO Uzbekistan 103911980 1.85% 12 122 140 
Silk Road (universal) 72042658 1.28% 6 196 629 
Gallabank (Wheat, agriculture) 71901614 1.28% 17 796 603 
Hamkor bank (private, universal commercial) 60876631 1.08% 12 384 175 
Uzdeawoo (foreign,commercial) 58214088 1.04% 13 327 629 
Microcredit bank (microfinance) 54579228 0.97% 6 184 666 
Capitalbank (private, universal commercial) 53382688 0.95% 5 659 975 
Savdogar (commercial,  foreign participation) 48704255 0.87% 7 168 254 
Turonbank (irrigation, commercial) 47257369 0.84% 4 418 449 
Credit-Standard (private, universal) 45508273 0.81% 7 614 543 
Aloqa bank (communication) 33620273 0.60% 4 794 671 
Trustbank (investment, commercial) 30424971 0.54% 3 093 443 
Alpjamol (private, universal commercial) 22050281 0.39% 2 637 341 
Ravnaq bank (private, universal commercial) 21257243 0.38% 1 371 983 
Parvinabank (private, universal commercial) 19549474 0.35% 2 262 892 
Uzbek-Turkish bank (JV, commercial) 16825657 0.30% 6 592 254 
Saderat (branch of an Iranian bank) 10605618 0.19% 8 594 174 
Universalbank (private, commercial) 5114028 0.09% 1 349 393 
Uktambank (private, commercial) 3561098 0.06% 1 850 090 
Davrbank (private, commercial) 3408713 0.06% 1 317 770 
Turkiston (private, commercial) 2226147 0.04% 325 820 
Samarkand (private, commercial) 1059417 0.02% 137 461 
Source: Annual reports of the banks, press releases, author’s calculations.  
 
The others, Asaka bank (automobil industry), Uzpromstroybank 
(industry, construction, oil and gaz), Pakhta (cotton), Ipoteka (mortgage), 
and People’s (savings) are all specialised (probably slightly less so than the 
banks were during the Soviet years). Three of those six are directly state-
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owned (National bank, Asaka, and Pakhta) and the other three are joint 
stock companies with state owned enterprises as major shareholders.   
 Four of them, NBU, Asaka bank, Pakhta bank, and Promstroybank 
also have 86% of the total deposits and 90% of the total loans (Lamberte 
and Cordero (2006). Funds for most of the loans come from the 
government and abroad as foreign credit for the local banks to lend them 
on. The total amount of loans funded by the banks’ own funds made up 
only 2% of the country’s GDP in 2004 (EIU 2005).  
 Financial intermediation remains very low and the total deposits of the 
population stood at 493 billion UZS or about 5% of GDP, in 2006. 
Although this implies an increase of about 50%, it still translates into an 
average of 19000 sum (approximately $15) per capita savings in the same 
year. The monetary policy still remains loose with the broad money 
growing at a much faster rate than the GDP (See table 6.2.2). 
 
Table 6.2.2 Money supply growth in Uzbeksitan 
Money supply (M2) growth (in %) 
2002 29.70 
2003 27.15 
2004 47.77 
2005 54.30 
2006 35.00 
Source: Asian Development Outlook 2007 
 
Central bank’s refinance rate was reduced 4 times over the period 
2000, to 2005, coming down to 16% p.a. in 2005 from 30% in 2000. The 
refinance rate has an added importance in Uzbekistan as the government 
links the rates charged on the directed loans to this rate. Hence, when the 
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refinancing rate comes down it will reduce the rates charged on directed 
loans and preferential loans to SMEs.  
 Of the biggest banks, Pakhta bank (cotton) is the one that makes most 
loans to SMEs. This is because of its role in financing cotton production 
which is primarily done by the private farms since the kolkhoz system, of 
the centralised plan period, was abolished. Although the farming 
enterprises that replaced the kolkhozes are private, the financing system (as 
well as the state procurement system) remained largely unchanged from 
those of the planning era. Hence, the agricultural SMEs (which made up 
53.8 % of all SMEs in Uzbekistan in 2005) still have more or less the same 
kind of soft budget constraint that the Soviet enterprises enjoyed.  
 The second state owned bank, dealing solely with the SMEs, is the 
Microcredit bank. Established in 2006, the bank is solely intended to 
finance small businesses and succeeded in that role Tadbirkor 
(entrepreneur) bank, inheriting all the assets and the liabilities of it.  
The May, 2006 presidential decree, ordering the establishment of  
Microcredit bank, also set the types, maturities, amounts of the loans as 
well as setting the maximum rates of interest charged on such loans36.  
 The decree also orders the Ministry of Finance to make annual loans of 
10 billion sums a year during the 2007–2010 periods, at 2% per annum, to 
finance those micro loans to SMEs. In addition, the special employment 
                                                  
36
 There are three types of loans: 1) privileged micro loan for entrepreneurship for up to 18 
months with the amounts not exceeding 200 times of minimum salary (which currently 
stands at 15525 sum or around $12) and the maximum rate of interest on this type of loan 
is 5% per annum. 2) Micro loan for expanding small business and for working capital for 
periods of up to 24 months. The amounts can be up to 500 times of minimum salary and 
the interest rate not exceeding the Central Bank’s refinancing rate (which currently is 
16%) 3) Micro leasing for terms up to 3 years with the amounts up to 2000 times of the 
minimum salary. The rate for such financing can not exceed 50% of the refinancing rate.  
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support fund of the Ministry for Social Security will also provide funds for 
the bank to make loans.  
 In addition, almost all of the country’s small private banks are mainly 
engaged in SME financing. However, their competitiveness in the market is 
weakened by the fact that these banks do not get cheap funds from the state 
and therefore have to mobilise their own financing. Apart from regular 
lending operations, the banks in Uzbekistan are required to set aside 25% of 
their profits for lending to SMEs at half the refinancing rate.  
 During the first half of the year 2007, loans extended to small business 
entities by commercial banks, funded from their own resources amounted 
to 374.2 billion sums.  The following table summarizes the credit line 
provided for the local banks by the international financial institutions.  
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Table 6.2.3 Foreign Credit Lines for SMEs in Uzbekistan  
Donor Name Local bank Year 
signed 
Amount (000) 
EBRD  NBU 1993 EUR 45565 
EBRD Asaka bank 1996 EUR 22745 
EBRD NBU 1996 EUR 41849 
EBRD  Uzpromstroybank 1999 EUR 6335 
EBRD Pakhta bank 2000 EUR 8844 
Japan-Uzbekistan Small 
Business Programme 
(EBRD) 
Pakhta bank 2002 EUR 1443 
Japan-Uzbekistan Small 
Business Programme 
(EBRD) 
Hamkor bank 2002 EUR 1519 
Japan-Uzbekistan Small 
Business Programme 
(EBRD) 
Ipoteka 2004 EUR 1519 
Japan-Uzbekistan Small 
Business Programme 
(EBRD) 
Hamkor bank 2004 EUR 2278 
Japan-Uzbekistan Small 
Business Programme 
(EBRD) 
Hamkor bank 2006 EUR 2278 
ADB NBU 1997 USD 50,000 
ADB Asaka bank 1997 USD 15,000 
ADB  Asaka bank 2003 USD 7500 
IFC  NBU 1999 USD 15,000 
IFC Asaka 1999 USD 10,000 
KfW NBU 1999 EUR 15,000 
Source: EBRD, Lamberte and Cordero (2006) 
 
 
Of the international organizations, the EBRD is the most actively 
involved in SMEs lending in Uzbekistan providing a total of EUR134, 
372,000 (27% of its total financial assistance in Uzbekistan) for the local 
banks to lend on. During the period between April, 2001 and June, 2004, 
EBRD extended 8092 loans in Uzbekistan amount to a total of $18,365,617 
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under the Japan –Uzbekistan Small Business Program (See the table 
below). 
 
Table 6.2.4 EBRD’s SME lending project (J-USBP) summary for April, 
2001 – June, 2004 
No. of 
loans 
granted 
US$ amount of 
loans granted   
US$ 
average 
loan 
amount 
US$ amount 
of loans 
outstanding   
No. of loans 
outstanding 
Arrears % 
 > 30 days 
No. 
of 
Banks 
8,092 18,365,617 2,270 4,755,037 3,385 0.60% 4 
Source: EBRD 
 
Those loans were made through four local banks: National Bank of 
Uzbekistan, Asaka Bank, UzPromstroyBank and Pakhta Bank. The SMEs 
first apply to their local banks and these banks then present the selected 
applications to the EBRD staff, which make the final decision. Given the 
notorious reputation of the Uzbek state banks for bureaucracy and poor 
service, the process is not always smooth and trouble free37.  
In addition to the EBRD, Asian Development Bank (ADB), the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), and Kreditandstalt fur 
Wiederaufbau (KfW) have all provided SME credit lines for the local 
banks.  
Another source of finance for SMEs in Uzbekistan is credit unions. 
Since the Law on Credit Unions was adopted in 2002, the credit unions in 
Uzbekistan developed fast. As of December 31, 2006 there are 35 credit 
unions licensed and registered by the Central Bank of Uzbekistan, which 
                                                  
37
 Since 2004, EBRD started working more closely with local private banks. However, the 
biggest private and a successful partner of EBRD, the Business Bank was closed in 2006 
after falling out of favour with the authorities. The biggest current credit line for a private 
bank was extended to Hamkorbank (EBRD Projects Summary, 2007). 
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are entitled to receive assistance through the Credit Union Association, 
which was set up in 2005. The unions have 51,532 members in total with 
female members making up almost 44 % of the total membership. Total 
assets of all credit unions taken together in 2006 was US$ 15.9 million, and 
for the capital of US$ 2.1 million. Total savings with the credit unions 
amounted to US$ 11.5 million and from which US$ 10.9 million worth of 
loans were made. The amount of loans has nearly doubled since 2006 to 
exceed the $20 million mark. The following table summarizes the state of 
the aggregate loan portfolio of the Credit Unions in Uzbekistan as at 
31.07.2007.  
 
S
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Source: World Council of Credit Unions.   
 
 The loan portfolio of credit unions reflects the reality of the Uzbek 
SME sector more accurately than the portfolios of other financial 
institutions, as the majority of their loans have been given to micro 
enterprises that make up the majority of SMEs in Uzbekistan.  
 In addition, there are microfinance NGOs that also offer micro loans 
for individuals and micro enterprises. There were about 64 of those NGOs 
(six of them international) in 2004, but only three of them accounted for 
91% of nearly 9000 active clients and 83% of outstanding loans of about 
$1.2 million as at end-January 2004 (Lambarte and Cordero, 2006).  
 Table 6.2.5 Breakdown of Credit unions’ total loan portfolio as of 31.07.07 
Loan Purpose # of Loans % of 
Number of 
Loans 
Volume of Loans % of Volume 
of Loans 
Agriculture 998 7.2% $1,672,964 8.1% 
Consumer/Personal 6,312 45.4% $6,082,469 29.6% 
Micro enterprises 6,580 47.4% $12,773,648 62.2% 
TOTAL 13,890 100% $20,529,081 100% 
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  Although still much smaller compared to the rest of the financial 
market, Uzbekistan’s leasing market has seen a considerable upturn since 
the ‘Law on leasing’ was adopted in 2002, giving the leasing activities 
similar privileges to those the other credit institutions enjoy. The total 
volume of leasing operations more than doubled since 2002 reaching 
$107.6 million in 2006 (See the table 6.2.5 below). 
 Banks’ direct involvements in the leasing activities have grown 
dramatically in recent years, up from $1.7 million in 2002 to $46.4 million 
in 2006. 
 Table 6.2.6. Leasing Market Players Breakdown, $ million 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Leasing companies 39.2 30.5 33.1 59.3 57.3 
Banks 1.7 6.7 10.2 19.2 46.4 
Others 0.5 0.7 0.1 3.0 3.9 
Total 41.4 37.9 43.4 81.5 107.6 
Source: Leasing in Uzbekistan, IFC 2006 
 The majority of the leasing operations served the agricultural sector as 
the agricultural machinery remains at the top of the list of the leased assets 
(Table 6.2.7).  
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Table 6.2.7 Leased Assets in Uzbekistan  
2004 2005 2006 Types of 
assets 
 
Number 
of 
leases 
Value, 
$ million 
Number 
of 
leases 
Value, 
$ million 
Number 
of leases 
Value, 
$ million 
Equipment for 
light industry 26 540 4 2,152 38 5,626 
Food processing 
equipment 46 3,438 34 4,003 27 2,624 
Printing  5 940 9 3,301 30 3,619 
Construction 16 1,178 62 10,596 49 5,924 
Other 
manufacturing 
equipment 
30 866 53 2,824 5 181 
Trade 22 27 125 169 10 575 
Medical 10 243 10 947 27 889 
Computers and 
office equipment 52 756 36 1,307 28 953 
Agricultural 
machinery 2,493 30,527 3,422 4,6157 5,022 61,337 
Trucks 2 221 10 888 24 1,700 
Passenger 
vehicles 80 1,552 242 5,489 274 7,019 
Real estate 16 2,702 38 2,352 49 8,917 
Other 12 426 33 1,356 47 8,222 
Total 2,810 43,416 4,078 81,541 5,630 107,587 
Source: Leasing in Uzbekistan, IFC 2006 
 
 
 The financing for most of the leasing operations come from the banks 
(4 of the 13 leasing companies in operation in 2006 were affiliated to 
banks), except for ‘Uzselkhozmashleasing’38, which is the biggest player in 
the market owning 38% of the leasing assets in 2006. 
Uzselkhozmashleasing is directly financed from a special Fund under the 
Ministry of Finance. The rest of the finance for the leasing companies 
comes from their shareholders’ loans and their own funds. 
                                                  
38
 The name of which, rather predictably, translates as the Uzbek Agricultural Machinery 
Leasing Company (Author’s translation).  
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 Although there is ‘substantial evidence of a vibrant informal sector’ in 
SME finance (according to Lamberte and Cordero, 2006), there is still no 
reliable data available on the size and dynamics of the informal lending 
market in Uzbekistan.  
 Kandiyoti (2003) reported on the stigma attached to being an informal 
money lender in rural Uzbekistan, as the money lenders earn a bad 
reputation by enforcing their loan repayment through unconventional 
means.  
 In addition to the private lenders who charge rates as high as 20% per 
month, entrepreneurs in Uzbekistan rely on interest free loans from family 
and friends (ibid.) 
Overall, the importance of informal financial sector still remains very small 
with only 2% of the SMEs surveyed by the IFC in 2002 used such form of 
finance and the number fell even lower to 0.13% in 2005. 
 On the demand side, the IFC surveys continue to show that Uzbek 
SMEs predominantly rely on their own savings and other internal sources 
for their investment projects (Table 6.2.7). Bank loans made up only 2.4% 
of all sources in 2005 (down from 5% in 2004).  
 
Table 6.2.8 Sources of finance for investment for Uzbek SMEs (%).  
 Personal savings Internal funds Non-bank loans Bank loans 
2004 59 36 11 5 
2005 64 23 10 2.4 
Source: Business Climate in Uzbekistan, IFC report 2005 
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 Only 36% of the firms surveyed by IFC said that they need external 
finance and 21% of those who needed external finance, applied for a bank 
loan and nearly half of them were successful in their application.  
 Surveys conducted by the World Bank in 2002 and 2005 also 
confirmed these observations (Table 6.2.8).  According to the 2005 survey, 
the share of the internal finance reached 95.21% (up from 86.23% in 2002), 
while the share of bank finance was estimated at 4.66 % in 2005. This 
figure for bank finance, although higher the figure in IFC survey for the 
same year, is much lower compared to both regional (region here is defined 
as the transition countries in Europe and Central Asia) and total sample 
averages.  
 
Table 6.2.9 Summary of the sources of finance used by SMEs in different 
countries in 2002 and 2005.  
 
Finance in 2002 Uzbekistan Region All countries 
Internal finance for investment (%) 86.23 70.6 65.87 
Bank finance for investment (%) 1.86 10.26 14.78 
Informal finance for investment (%) 2.09 4.74 4.79 
Supplier credit financing (%) 7.1 6.21 9.01 
Value of collateral needed for a loan (% of the 
loan amount) 115.11 146.62 140.85 
Loans requiring collateral (%) 81.37 82.98 80.58 
Finance in 2005 Uzbekistan Region All countries 
Internal finance for investment (%) 95.21 70.6 65.87 
Bank finance for investment (%) 4.66 10.26 14.78 
Informal finance for investment (%) 0.13 4.74 4.79 
Supplier credit financing (%) 0.67 6.21 9.01 
Value of collateral needed for a loan (% of the 
loan amount) 122.45 146.62 140.85 
Loans requiring collateral (%) 72.55 82.98 80.58 
Source: World Bank Investment Climate Surveys 2002 and 2005, the region is 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
                       
Such low share of bank finance is paradoxal considering the fact 
that bank financing in Uzbekistan has lower collateral requirements and is 
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cheaper rate of interest due to the large amount of subsidized finance 
available to the banks from government sources. 
    The answer lies in the unique monetary policy conducted by the 
Central Bank which maintained loose monetary policy based on offering 
subsidized loans to the economy while trying to limit the velocity of money 
by administrative methods. The decision to extend privileged loans comes 
from outside of the bank in the form of Presidential decree or the 
Resolution of Cabinet39. The banks are obliged to carry out the instruction. 
However, they try to mitigate the resulting inflationary pressures generated 
by the process.  The situation is further complicated by the fact that a large 
part of economic activities are carried out using cash, outside of the formal 
financial system, meaning that, once the cash is issued the Central Bank has 
very little control over it. Therefore the Central Bank keeps very tight 
control over the cash it puts out into the circulation using administrative 
controls similar to the ones used during the Soviet times.  
 These administrative controls include imposition of strict restrictions 
on cash withdrawals from both individual and corporate bank accounts as 
well as limiting the commercial banks’ access to their correspondent 
accounts, at the central bank40.   The restrictions give rise to various 
distortions that add to the already hostile business climate.  
                                                  
39
 For example Cabinet Resolution of February 10, 2006, signed by the President, ordered 
the Central Bank and Ministry of Finance to plan and organize the establishment of 
Microfinance bank, with branches in every region, offering a wide range of subsidized 
finance products and it was duly delivered with in the time frame.  
40
 Gemayel and Grigorian (2005) reported that 66% of the SMEs, surveyed in the capital 
city Tashkent, said they had limited or no access to their cash. The figure in the regions 
was between 80-85%.  
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 The most visible of these distortions probably is the existence of the 
difference, in value, between cash money and the money held in the current 
accounts. The difference arises from the willingness of desperate 
businesses to pay an extra premium for withdrawing their own money from 
the bank accounts. The premiums are reported to be in the region of 10-
15% and the operations are carried out by an increasing number of often 
closely connected bogus companies specifically set up for such illegal 
operations (ICG 2003). 
Paying an extra premium just to get hold of your own cash also 
increases the cost of borrowing from the formal financial institutions, 
where the loans are paid into the bank accounts of the borrowers.   
 Of the people we interviewed only three had borrowed from banks 
(excluding directed lending for agricultural SMEs). The first of them, a 
property developer in the capital, borrowed $4000 from the bank where his 
friend was a branch manager. He had to list his car as collateral and spent 
around $100 to prepare the necessary documents for the application. 
Although the interest rate charged on the loan was just under 10% (well 
below the inflation rate) the idea of obtaining a so called ‘privileged’ loan 
was counter productive for him.  
 ‘Although I had the full backing of the bank manager and went through the 
loan application process quite smoothly, the problems started after the funds 
appeared in my bank account. I never though that spending money would be so 
troublesome. The prices for everything are quoted 15-20% higher if you tell them 
you want to pay by bank transfer. When I eventually managed to buy some 
supplies through a firm, I was called to prosecutor’s office to answer questions 
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about ‘obnalichka’ (converting non-cash into cash through illegal schemes). In the 
end, the loan cost me a lot more than I expected’ (Interviewee N1). 
 The second borrower, a restaurant owner, had a lot more problems 
during the loan application process and had to spend a lot more money even 
before he obtained his loan.  
‘Literally every step of the application process was full of problems for 
me: the valuation of collateral, submitting my business plan, negotiating with the 
bank manager, everything. I even had to pay 10% in advance, in unofficial 
payments, and that is on top of the interest that I will have to pay on the loan. 
(Interviewee N3)’   
 The third borrower, a construction business owner, also had to pay 
those unofficial payments and went through the same to get his loan. But he 
was more positive about it. 
‘Yes, it cost me more to complete the application process than the interest 
payment on the loan. However, I think it is meant to work that way by the 
authorities. The overall cost of the loan for me was about 30% of which less than 
10% was official interest and the rest went to the officials involved in the process. 
That is still around the rate of inflation in my estimates. I know the guys at the 
bank quite well and I know how much they get in salaries and how much they 
have to spend to keep their positions. So as I said overall it is just about fair. My 
real complaint, however, is the amount of time it takes to do it all and the 
restriction on spending the money you borrow. I only borrowed once from the 
bank, but I regularly have to borrow from informal lender just because of the 
speed of the process. Although the interest rates are really high, the way things 
change in my line of business, sometimes you are desperate for quick cash and 
there is no alternative to the informal lenders in that respect.(Interviewee N2)’ 
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 The bank manager we interviewed also echoed some of these views.  
 
‘People talk about the difficulties faced by small businesses and individual 
entrepreneurs and tend to portray banks as villains that make life difficult for 
them. The reality is that the difficulties faced by SMEs are nothing compared to 
the interferences into the day to day running of a bank by various authorities. I 
would not be exaggerating if I say that nearly 90-95% of the bank managers’ time 
is spent dealing with outside interventions. In fact the main function of the banks 
in Uzbekistan is to act as an intermediary between the government and the 
customers, not the intermediary between the savers and borrowers. We collect 
taxes for the government and lend on the money where they want us to, we control 
the cash circulation for the central bank, collect information for various other 
government bodies. 
The rules and regulations are so complex and intrusive that you cannot go 
a single day without breaking or bending some of them. Therefore, as a bank 
manager, I have to keep good relationships not only with the head office but also 
with the local mayor, prosecutor’s office, police and other security services, tax 
officials etc. Because, I know they can always find something on me or on one of 
my staff whenever they want to. I have seen a few bank managers jailed for the 
things that most of us do to some extent. A friend of mine, also a fellow branch 
manager, had a heart attack before the age of 30, all because of the pressures of 
the job.  
In Uzbekistan, the boundaries between the legal, quasi legal and 
downright illegal are blurred and we, the banks, are at the centre of it all because 
of what we are required to do by the government.  
Every year before major public holidays, the mayor calls for a meeting 
and tells the bank managers to present the list of corporate customers together with 
the bank balance. He then tells the managers of those companies how much to 
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donate for the celebrations and similar events. In addition, if the mayor (or any of 
the heads of major state offices for that matter) tells to give a loan to somebody 
you will have to arrange it no matter what the applicant’s papers look like. Some 
customers complain that we give their confidential information to various 
authorities. Well, you try to stand up against the system as a bank manager. You 
may not only loose your job but even head to jail.’ (Interviewee N5) 
 
 
 
  Taxation  
The tax system in Uzbekistan, like in most of the other 
transition countries, was established for the first time after independence. 
The system was initially administered by a special department under the 
Cabinet of Ministers. The main law ‘On the State Tax Service’ was adopted 
on August 29, 1997 and a new, separate Tax Committee was established 
later that year. In January, 1998, a new tax code came into force. Along 
with the law and tax code, decrees of President, resolutions of the Cabinet 
of Ministers and various normative acts of the Tax Committee govern the 
tax system.  
The initial tax arrangements included different tax rates for 
companies in different sectors, as well as offering many tax holidays and 
exemptions for new start ups and foreign companies. Later the tax rates 
were unified and reduced to make it simpler and many of the tax 
exemptions were abolished to broaden the tax base (Stepanyan, 2003).  
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The main types of taxes are the same as in other countries, although the 
relative importance of each type and their contribution to the budget may 
be different. The unique characteristic of the system, however, is the 
existence of various tax privileges given to certain sectors at certain times 
and the confiscator nature of its collection processes.   
The following table (Table 6.3.1) shows the composition of the Central 
budget revenues as a percentage of GDP. 
 
Table 6.3.1 Central Government revenues (as a percentage of GDP) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Revenues:  28.5 26.0 25.2 24.2 22.5 22.6 
a) Direct taxes: 7.5 7.4 6.8 6.4 6.0 6.1 
1) Enterprise income tax 3.7 2.9 2.3 2.2 1.8 1.9 
2) Fixed entrepreneur tax 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 
b) Indirect taxes: 16.0 13.5 13.8 14.0 12.6 10.5 
1) VAT 7.6 6.6 6.1 5.5 5.4 5.4 
2) Excise 7.7 6.3 6.7 7.2 6.1 4.0 
Source: CEEP 2006  
 
The overall tax burden, measured as a percentage of GDP, has come 
down from 28.5% in 2000 to 22.6% 2005. This is not very high by 
international standards, considering the fact that the tax burden for the 25 
members of the European Union ranged from 29% Latvia to 51% in 
Sweden in 2003.  
Indirect taxes make up most of the budget revenues in Uzbekistan, 
while the direct taxes have consistently provided just over a quarter of the 
budget revenues.  
Most of the indirect tax revenues come from Value Added Tax 
(VAT) and Excise taxes.   VAT was introduced in Uzbekistan in 1992 at 
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25% (except for essential food items) but it was later reduced to 20% (this 
time it was extended to the food items too at 15%). The excise taxes are 
levied on a number of items and range between 20-35% and the Cabinet of 
Ministers periodically updates the list of goods subject to excise tax and the 
rates of them.  
Corporate Income Tax was initially set at 35% in the 1990s. 
However, the rate has been reduced dramatically since then and in 2006, it 
stood at a mere 12% which is one of the lowest in the region.  
One of the most troublesome taxes for SMEs in Uzbekistan 
probably is the payroll tax, which was instituted in 1994 at 40% and was 
later reduced to 35%. However, since it is calculated as a percentage of the 
total wage bill and paid by employers, it constitutes a major burden on 
smaller companies and causing many companies to conceal the amount of 
money they pay to their employees.  
   In addition, there are a number of taxes that are levied on the 
turnover. The Road Fund tax at 1.5%, while the Pension Fund receives a 
further 0.7% and the School Development Fund another 1%. After that 
there is the Infrastructure Development Tax, levied at 8% of the net 
income.  
SMEs in Uzbekistan have an option to use the general tax system as 
described above or use a special unified tax system where they would have 
to pay only 10% of their revenues (or 25% of the mark up for trading 
companies).  Certain small companies and all of the individual 
entrepreneurs qualify to pay a fixed tax (set as a multiple of monthly 
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minimum wage). Enterprises using this system are also exempt from the 
VAT.  
Although the tax burden in Uzbekistan appears to be not very heavy 
by international standards, various surveys have continuously put taxation 
among the top problems41. Part of the problem seems to be the frequency of 
the changes in the tax legislation as in 2003 alone there over 40 normative 
acts adopted introducing over 90 changes to the tax legislation (IFC, 2004).  
Rosenberg at el (1999) also pointed out that it was the ‘confiscatory 
nature’ of Uzbekistan’s tax system that was causing much of the 
problems42.  
The World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ Report in 2006 put Uzbekistan 
at 155 among 169 countries in terms of the difficulties related to taxation. 
They counted a total of 130 different payments which companies have to 
pay during the year and that would have cost them 122.3% of their profits.   
 Most of the entrepreneurs we spoke to found taxation problematic. 
They complained both about the rate of the taxes and the procedures. For 
example, the owner of an IT company, complained about the payroll tax.  
‘If you pay UZS100 in wages, you will have to pay UZS35 in payroll tax. 
Then say if they pay another 40% in income tax he will end up with only UZS60. 
In other words, if my employee asks for UZS60 salary, I will have to pay UZS135 
of which UZS75 will go to the state. That is why almost every business that I 
                                                  
41
 IFC Business Climate Surveys put taxation at the top of the problematic areas list in 
2001, 2002, 2003. They also claimed that the current tax system was driving businesses 
underground as the businesses try to avoid prohibitive tax by underreporting their 
activities.   
42
 Uzbekistan still uses the Soviet style kartoteka system where any claims by the state are 
filed into the company information held by the banks and as soon as the funds come in the 
account will be automatically debited for the amount owed to the state budget without the 
permission of the account holders.  
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know around here pays their employees off the books. They only show minimum 
amount of people on payroll and pay them minimum amounts to minimize tax bill’ 
(Interviewee N4).    
The construction company is paying the unified tax and still finding 
it too much at times. 
 ‘I am paying the unified rate which is around 13% of the revenues. The 
trouble with it is that it does not matter how profitable your business is. For 
example, if your profit margin is 26% of your revenues then your will be paying 
half of your profits in corporate profit tax (Interviewee N2) ’. 
 The shopkeeper we interviewed said he had trouble to keep up with the 
changes in the tax legislation.  
‘The tax legislation changes so often that it is virtually impossible to keep 
up. As a result, when you face the tax men you are never 100% sure that you have 
done your taxes right (Interviewee N6)’.  
While the restaurant owner complained about the costs of the 
official interventions. 
‘Official taxes do not bother me much, to be perfectly honest I do not even 
know exactly how much I am paying in official taxes. That is something my 
accountant takes care of. But the problem is the unofficial payments that I have to 
make nearly at every step of the projects I am doing. We are already used to the 
mayor’s requests to pay all sorts of donation and all sorts of favors for free. Last 
month my accountant was called to the National Security Service (successor to the 
KGB) office and was told to pay the officer’s mobile phone bill. What can you do 
about that?’ (Interviewee N3). 
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  Regulations and Licensing  
 
 
Following Baumol’s (1990) logic we should expect to observe some 
obstacles resulting from the actions of expanding bureaucracy which 
attracted the best of talent in the country.  
Some of the most obvious means of bureaucratic interventions in 
business activities are licensing, issuing permits and certificates, 
inspections to ensure compliance. In addition, the procedures during the 
registration and closing of enterprises are subject to significant bureaucratic 
influences.  
The list of the major obstacles reported in the IFC business 
Climate Surveys is dominated by the problems related to the rules and 
regulations (Table 6.4.1). (Indeed, the only other obstacles included in the 
list each year from 2001 to 2005 were financing and taxation).   
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relating to starting an enterprise, like registration and obtaining permits to 
start operations were perceived most problematic initially. However, a 
series of reforms and the introduction of ‘one window’ registration system 
in 2001 started to finally work as those obstacles slipped down the list.  
The World Bank Doing Business report (2007) also reported a slight 
improvement in the registration process as the number of procedures 
decline from 9 to 8 and the number of days to start a business was reduced 
from 35 to 29 in 2007 (Table 6.4.2). The costs, however, increased from 
20.2 % of the per capita income in 2006, to 24.7% in 2007.  
 
 
 
Table 6.4.1 Top 10 obstacles reported in the IFC business climate surveys 
in Uzbekistan (2002-2005) 
2002 2003 2004 2005 
Permits Taxation Importing Importing  
Taxation Bank account 
operations 
Obtaining 
Financing 
Liquidation 
Registration Obtaining 
permits 
Exporting  Exporting 
Inspections Inspections Taxation Licensing 
Bank account 
operations 
Registration Licensing Standardization 
Convertibility Export and 
Import 
operations 
Inspections Obtaining 
Financing 
Financing Licensing Bank account 
operations 
Taxation 
Licensing Certification Standardization  Inspections 
Certification 
and 
Standardization 
Extra operations 
by banks 
Registration Registration 
Export – Import 
operations 
Currency 
convertibility 
Permits Permits 
Source: IFC Business Climate Surveys, various years.  
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Table 6.4.2 Summary Starting Business figures of WB Doing 
Business report. 
Starting Business 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Number of Procedures 9 9 9 8 
Time (days) 33 35 35 29 
Cost (% of per capita income) 64.3 21.9 20.2 24.7 
Source: World Bank Doing Business Reports, various years.  
 
 In 2001 and 2002, obtaining permits were reported among the top 
obstacles. The reforms in 2001, however, made the starting up procedures 
easier, abolishing a number of permits required upon registration. Those 
permits still remerged or were replaced by similar ones but they were now 
required later on in the life of the enterprise. The percentage of surveyed 
enterprises requiring additional permits after registration has grown from 
81% in 2002 to 86.6% in 2003 and on to 97% in 2004. There were 130 
different types of permits in all in the country in 2004. The main problem 
with the permits is the fact that they are not subject to any specific laws and 
wide range of organizations can issue new permits. While, unlike the 
permits, licenses are regulated by the law ‘On Licensing of Selected 
Activities’ and certain Resolutions of the Cabinet of Ministers, and various 
other normative acts. 
 Gafurov et al (2002) found that the problem with the licensing 
system was the fact that the licenses were used as a source of revenue with 
the price of licenses exceeding the costs associated with running of the 
system that is managed by the monopolistic state bodies that often do not 
have offices in the applicants’ regions making it a very cumbersome and 
expensive process for the regional SMEs to obtain the required licenses. 
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They also found at least 14 licenses which can be abolished without any 
significant consequences to the national interests. 
IFC’s Surveys revealed that the most obtained licenses in 2005 were 
related to medical activities (see the table below).  
 
Table 6.4.3: Most frequently obtained licenses in 2005 
Activities Percentage of total licenses 
reportedly obtained in 2005 (%) 
Medical and Pharmaceutical related 85 
Fuel sales and related 17 
Tourism and hotels 8 
Education 8 
Examination of contract and pre-
shipment goods 
7 
Wholesale trade in machines 5 
Examination of construction 
projects 
5 
Audit services 5 
Source: IFC 2006 
 
 Those activities include rendering private medical services ranging 
from diagnostics and treatment to alternative medicines. The category also 
covers pharmacies and pharmaceutical companies. Given the fact that 
access to medical drugs (except for intoxicating ones and those that can be 
used to make explosives) is not strictly regulated, it is a thriving business to 
be involved in. Private fuel vendors have also mushroomed after 
government closed down the state fuel distributing body in 2005.  
The interesting part of Uzbek licensing is the requirement for 
licensing in examination of contract and pre-shipment goods (7%), whole 
trade in machine (5%) and examination of construction projects (5%).  
Those license requirements are part of the trade restrictions which put 
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Uzbekistan at the bottom of the World Bank ranking in the ease of 
importing (169th among 169 countries ranked in 2007). The amount of 
restrictions imposed on import and export operations as well as on the trade 
inside the country open lucrative opportunities. Hence there emerged 
special companies dealing with import-export contracts and goods prepared 
for shipment. Those companies as well as those trading in machines are 
usually well connected.   
The situation with the permits and the licenses improved with the 
Decree of the President ‘On Reducing the Types of and Simplifying the 
Permit Issuing Procedures for Conducting Business’ issued on September 
21, 2005. The Decree reduced the number of permits issued and established 
the minimum term for license validity of five years, and approving the list 
of 13 types of activities licensed for indefinite term.  
The new trend in the regulations is the increasing importance of 
obtaining government standards and certificate of compliance43.  
The most commonly obtained certificates were the certificates of 
compliance for goods produced and services rendered (Table 6.4.4.) 
 
Table 6.4.4: Percentage of respondents obtaining the given certificate in 
2004-05(%) 
 2004 2005 
Certificate of compliance for goods produced 92 90 
Certificate of compliance for services rendered 4 3 
Certificate of quality compliance for medical supplies 2 2 
Certificate of compliance for imported goods 3 4 
 
Source: IFC Surveys Figures do not add up to 100% due to rounding up  
                                                  
43
 It climbed up along the top obstacles list from 9th top obstacle in 2001 to 5th in 2005 
(Table 6.4.1.)  
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According to the law on certification in Uzbekistan there are over 
2500 products subject to mandatory certification ‘to ensure product quality 
to protect the health and safety of the public’. The average number of 
standards obtained per respondent increased from 1.5 in 2003 to 2.5 in 
2005.  The Government body in charge of standardization and certification 
is Uzgosstandard, an agency under the Cabinet of Ministers.  
 
‘The Government exercises obligatory state standardization compliance 
control. Such compliance controls are conducted by Uzgosstandard inspectors 
over all commodity and consumer products, including certified consumer goods 
and commodities that are processed, manufactured, stored, transported, and 
utilized by all businesses, including individual entrepreneurs. All applicable 
standards are subject to mandatory compliance requirements by all state 
authorities, government agencies, and businesses of all forms of ownership’ (IFC 
2001:85). 
 
In terms of time spent on application procedures, the most 
troublesome are the licenses taking on average 15 days to obtain in 2005 
(Table 6.4.5), followed by standards at 10, certificates at 6, and permits at 
5.7 business days in the same year. In addition, SMEs in Uzbekistan spent 
on average 2.6 days dealing with inspections. 
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Table 6.4.5: Time spent on dealing with the following 
(business days) 
 2003 2004 2005 
Obtaining a License 14 17 15 
Obtaining a Standard  9 13 10 
Obtaining a Certificate 7 6 6 
Obtaining a Permit 5.4 5.6 5.7 
Dealing with Inspections 4.7 1.7 2.6 
Source: IFC 2005 
 
Another marked trend in the lists of obstacles was the fall reduction 
of the number of days spent in inspections in the ranks since 2003. This 
was because of the Government’s efforts to limit the number of inspections 
by various agencies, due to the fact that certain government agencies 
imposed fines during inspections as a source of funds. However, as a result 
the proportion of the inspections resulting in fines as well as the amounts of 
fines increased dramatically following reductions in the number of 
inspections (See Figure 6.4.1 below). 
 
Figure 6.4.1 Percentage of respondents that were inspected in each year (Source IFC 
Surveys) 
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Source: Business Climate in Uzbekistan (IFC Surveys various 
years) 
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Tax Inspectorate and Inspectorates for Energy usage are allowed to 
retain 10% of the fines collected while the Inspectorate for Sanitary-
Epidemiological surveillance is allowed to keep all of its revenues from 
fines; 15% of which is used as staff bonuses.   
  The most problematic inspections were the tax inspections with 
50% of the SMEs surveyed in 2004 found them to be very difficult to deal 
with, next were the inspections on energy use and on sanitary and 
epidemiological conditions at 48% and 41% respectively.  The inspections 
from fire department and commercial banks were equally bad for SMEs as 
37% of them found those inspections very problematic in 2004.  
Of those that were inspected in 2004, 55% had to pay either official 
or unofficial (sometimes a bit of both) fines. A quarter of those fined only 
paid the official fines and another quarter paid both official and unofficial 
fines while the remaining quarter only paid unofficial fines (IFC 2005).  
Another ‘side effect’ of the Central Government’s efforts to reduce 
inspections was the tendency for various agencies to demand that SMEs 
submit an increasing range of reports. The following table summarizes the 
number of reports that SMEs are required to submit during a typical year.  
 
Table 6.4.6 Number of reports submitted by SMEs to authorities during a year.  
Reporting frequency Number of reports can be up to Total reports submitted per year  
Monthly  11 132 
Quarterly 8 32 
Annual 10 10 
Total 29 174 
Source:IFC 2005 
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As the numbers we have seen above suggested the SMEs in 
Uzbekistan do not see registration as a big problem any more. Our 
interviews also supported those findings. 
‘Registration is not a big deal anymore. If you make a decent effort it 
takes about 14-15 days to register’ (Interviewee N4).  
What we found interesting from our interviews was the fact that 
while, as a result of concentrated efforts (and in part because of the 
pressure from international organizations like EBRD and IFC), the 
interferences into SME activities by some government agencies have been 
reduced, other agencies have gradually became more intrusive, increasing 
overall burden on the SMEs.    
‘When I started in business during the years immediately after the 
independence, tax office used to be the most feared of the government offices by 
the independent business community. But lately other parts of the state apparatus 
have increased their involvement in the affairs of businesses. The latest menace is 
the Department for fighting against Currency and Tax Crimes, under the general 
prosecutor’s office. In the last year and half, 5-6 businesses that I personally knew 
closed down after inspections by that department staff (Interviewee N2).’  
Another important finding was the importance of power relations, 
which quite often prevail over the existing laws and regulations.  
‘Laws and regulations in Uzbekistan do not matter as much as personal 
relations. That is why you don’t see firms looking for good lawyers. In fact, most 
of the firms do not use lawyers at all. But everybody would love to employ people 
with important connections (Interviewee N1).’  
The implication of this goes far beyond the apparent limited role 
that lawyers play in the business community. The power relations also 
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determine who is allowed to function without much interference as 
described in the following quote.   
‘The number of inspections you get depends on how well related you are 
to the authorities. For example, nobody would dare to inspect businesses owned 
the mayor’s family members as long as he remains strong in office (Interviewee 
N3).’ 
They also have enabled the authorities to apply seemingly unlimited 
discretion when enforcing the laws and regulations.  
‘Ever changing, complex legislation plays into the hands of the 
authorities. For every given offence the authorities have various options ranging 
from completely ignoring to closing your business down altogether’ (Interview 
N6).  
Such level inconsistencies nurtured a culture of distrust by SMEs in 
the legal system to solve their disputes with the authorities. 
 ‘You can forget about taking the authorities to court. In all those years in 
business, I have never seen a single court decision against the authorities 
(Interviewee N8).’  
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter we have discussed the main obstacles reported by the 
Uzbek SMEs in surveys conducted by IFC annually since 2001. We also 
made use of the findings from our own detailed interviews, conducted in 
Uzbekistan during the summer of 2005, with a number of entrepreneurs and 
SME owners. 
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The story with obstacles reflects the talent allocation and rent 
seeking activities in a way that no matter how many laws and decrees the 
government introduces to curb the rent seeking behaviour of the 
bureaucrats, they have found new and innovative ways to continue to create 
alternative rent seeking opportunities.  
This manifested itself in the fact that in spite of the government 
efforts in reducing the specific obstacles, new ones have come to 
prominence as the bureaucrats seek to find new sources of income.  
Therefore the business community in Uzbekistan is more concerned 
in personnel changes in the government offices than in the changes in the 
legislation. In the opinion of the local SME community, the best way of 
securing the future for your business is not to follow the rules and 
regulation and do everything legally, but to forge very close relationships 
with the top administrative bodies in the region they work in.  
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Chapter Seven  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
Experts have listed a large catalogue of factors that are important 
for the successful transition of a former command economy into a market 
based one. Entrepreneurship and small business development have 
consistently figured near the top of the list.  
Almost all governments in transition countries have made 
entrepreneurship a priority in its transition policy. They have poured huge 
amounts of money into financing, education, and other formers of 
assistance for the entrepreneurs and small businesses.  
Uzbekistan’s record on entrepreneurship development has been very 
disappointing even compared to other fellow transition countries.  
At the beginning of this research we had set out to identify the 
factors that hindered the development of entrepreneurship in Uzbekistan. 
We looked at the results of the surveys conducted by the IFC and World 
Bank over the last few years and discussed the main obstacles reported in 
them. We also conducted our own interviews with owners and managers of 
the SMES operating in various sectors of the economy.  
 The IFC surveys have found a wide range of obstacles that most of the 
Uzbek small business managers and entrepreneurs found problematic. 
Since 2001 the IFC conducts annual surveys, identify the problem areas 
and offer recommendations that might help to fix them. Other international 
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organizations, represented in Uzbekistan have also produced topical 
research papers to advice the government in improving business climate.  
 However, their research and subsequent recommendations tend to be 
very superficial. They seem to highlight symptoms of the problems rather 
than uncovering the true underlining reasons.  
 This is partly because their researchers are constrained by the 
organizations’ official policy lines and priorities as well political 
considerations.  
 While their surveys and recommendations offer a useful guidance for 
introducing new legislation or perfecting the existing ones, they do not go 
far enough to tackle more fundamental issues.   
 We turned to the academic literature to find the clues for successful 
entrepreneurship policies and to find explanations for the obstacles so 
persistently reported by the entrepreneurs in Central Asian countries in 
general and those in Uzbekistan in particular. As discussed in Chapter Two, 
entrepreneurship theories, from Schumpeter to more recent contributors, 
have assumed that all entrepreneurial activities are productive and have 
looked at creative activities as a positive, driving force moving the 
economies forward.  
 Therefore, scholars and policy advisors expected the former 
communist countries to develop fast once the private entrepreneurship was 
legalised given the high levels educational and scientific achievements 
under the command economies.  
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 However, their highly diverse development experiences since the start 
of transitions in late 1980s and early 1990s have shown that not all creative, 
entrepreneurial activities necessarily find their way into productive sectors.  
   We found Baumol’s theory on unproductive entrepreneurship 
and the talent allocation model proposed by Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 
to be most relevant in explaining the development pattern of 
entrepreneurial sectors in some of the slower progressing transition 
countries44.  
Based on the Baumol’s theory of unproductive entrepreneurship and 
the allocation of entrepreneurial resources, we developed the following 
three propositions in Chapter Two, as the main hypothesis for our study.  
The First Proposition: Rules of the Game both in the Former 
USSR and Uzbekistan encouraged rent seeking activities rather than 
productive entrepreneurship. 
The Second Proposition: The best of entrepreneurial talent in the 
former USSR and Uzbekistan chose to enter the rent seeking sector rather 
than productive sector. 
The Third Proposition: The resulting system in Uzbekistan 
resembled the ‘grabbing hand’ model and therefore most of the problems 
faced by the entrepreneurs in the country spring from the nature of the 
system.  
                                                  
44
 Choi and Zhou (2001) also explored the connection between rent seeking and private 
entrepreneurs focusing on the bureaucrats’ tendency to ‘cash in’ on their official status. 
Their offers an intriguing insight into the workings of China’s administrative apparatus.   
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 In order to test the validity of our hypotheses, we tried to map out the 
economic and political landscape in Uzbekistan highlighting the ‘Rules of 
the Game’, the main driving force in the allocation of entrepreneurial talent.  
 Uzbekistan’s complex social, political, and cultural traditions could 
not be adequately explained without looking back through the last century 
and a half when the Uzbek society went through four distinctly different 
systems. Being a loosely associated group of backward feudal, agricultural 
kingdoms, the Uzbek society fell under the occupation of the Russian 
Empire and underwent a colonial experience very much similar to that of 
the colonies of the major European powers. Then the October Revolution 
brought a completely new, experimental system that the world had never 
seen before. Having lived under the communist regime for over 70 years, 
the now independent Uzbekistan is now trying to build a fully functioning 
market economy with democratic institutions.  
 Some of the questions we tried to find answers for were: how much of 
the current system did the Uzbek society inherit from the Soviet system and 
how much of it was down to the uniqueness of the Uzbek society running 
from the times before the Russian Invasion. 
 Even more important for the purposes of our study, were the reactions 
of the entrepreneurial talents to the events during each of those different 
systems.  
  The territory, where the current Uzbekistan is, was home to three 
different kingdoms before the Russian Invasion. Political scene was 
volatile, built around the monarchs, feudal lords, and the clergy. There was 
very little upward social mobility if any at all. The economy was 
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predominantly agricultural with cotton as the main crop. Very little of 
cotton was actually processed and consumed inside the country and most of 
it was transported by slow and inefficient means.  
 Cross country trading was also a major part of the economy because of 
the region’s historic role as a Silk Road trading hub. Cities like Samarqand, 
Khokand and Bukhara serving the meeting points for merchants from 
China, India, and Iran with the European traders coming through Russia.  
 The Russian Invasion in late 19th century changed the situation 
dramatically. The Russians closed all the trading ties that the regions had 
with the east by closing the borders and improving the transportation 
facilities to the region from Russia. Thus the region became dependent 
from Russia for both exports of cotton and imports of manufactured goods 
and food.  
 The occupation also opened new opportunities for the talented locals 
who were not fortunate enough to be born into aristocratic families. They 
could now learn Russian and cooperate with the occupiers gaining thereby 
higher status and influence that the people who they were inferior to by 
birth under the previous system. Some ethnic minorities were also given 
better opportunities under the occupying regime with the exceptions of the 
Indian traders most of whom were subjects of the British Empire and 
therefore treated with suspicion by the Russians.  
 Old elite were also joining in, by sending their children into the 
Russian educational institutions as they did not expect their social and 
economic status to last long under the new regime. A lot of the children of 
the aristocrats and clergy were educated in Russia and subsequently joined 
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the Central Asian enlightenment movements and some of them even joined 
the Communist Party later on.  
 For the population in general the colonial rule brought mixed joy. On 
the one hand, for the population that was tired of small inter regional 
conflicts and political instability, the Russians brought political stability 
and the newly built railways made cotton exports easier as well as bringing 
in cheap grain from Russia. On the other hand, the Russians’ attempt to 
enlist the locals into the army and worker battalions caused some popular 
unrest in the years preceding the October revolution.  
  In spite of the efforts from the local nationalistic minded intelligentsia 
and clergy with religious propaganda, and the exiled communist activists 
with the Marxist ideology, the local population remained virtually oblivious 
to the big political events happening around them. As a result the fate of the 
local population was decided by a small group of people with major outside 
support. Shortly after the October Revolution the Communists took control 
of Central Asia too.  
 Lenin’s short rein in the beginning of the Soviet experiment was very 
beneficial for Central Asia. His relatively tolerant attitude to the local 
intelligentsia brought most of the members of the Jadid into the party 
structure and the open platform for political discussion encouraged the 
bright and best to participate in the political process.  
 The emergence of Stalin, however, was another revolution altogether. 
He initiated a major reorganization of the region, drawing up border lines 
between the newly established socialist republics. He also ordered a 
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wholesale collectivization of the region and eliminated everyone who did 
not agree with him.  
 Under his rule, a whole new generation of leaders emerged. This 
generation of leaders, the so called class of 1938, were drawn from poorer 
classes and were educated only in the Soviet schools. Thus Stalin created 
the backbone of the Soviet system of recruitment and promotion. Although 
the system as a whole did not change much almost until the demise of the 
USSR, the officials were much less corrupt during the years when Stalin 
was in power due to the fear of severe punishments.   
 The system was highly organized, like the rest of the Soviet economy, 
and straightforward with clear criteria for selection and promotion as well 
as punishments for failure. The selection procedure for the Uzbek party 
members were much stricter as the Soviet authorities embarked on an 
enormous project of social engineering trying to change the local culture 
and traditions.  Anyone hoping for a successful career in the party ranks 
had to demonstrate his or her commitment to the communist cause and 
refrain from showing any signs of localism.  
 As for the rewards, the members of the official administrative and 
party apparatus were paid, high salaries, discounted housing, holiday 
facilities, and other consumer goods. However, those rewards were all 
linked to the positions they held and would be lost with the position. 
Therefore, the Soviet officials had very strong incentives to use any means, 
including illegal ones, to fulfil the plan targets to stay in their jobs. Highly 
ambitious plan targets coupled with an inefficient supply system made their 
task virtually impossible without resorting to illegal measures. Even the 
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risk of prosecution and imprisonment did not stop the widespread illegal 
operations ranging from falsification of the reports to running hidden 
production facilities, all in order to keep up with plan targets and stay in 
favour of the party bosses. When the Soviet economy dramatically 
collapsed causing the Union to dissolve, the newly formed independent 
republics inherited most of those traditions.  
 Post independence Uzbekistan preserved the main characteristics of 
the Soviet system unchanged. The economy is still predominantly 
agriculture based with cotton remaining as the main crop. Big state owned 
industries have still not been privatised. Although the old one party rule has 
been abolished, the command nature of the system has not changed. The 
new ‘Hokim’ (mayor) system is even more authoritative than the party 
system, giving the regional mayors near absolute power over every aspect 
of economic, social, and political life.  
 Just like the Soviet officials, the Uzbek officials do not have high 
official salaries and their performances are still measured by the fulfilment 
of the plan targets, mainly for the production of raw cotton. However, they 
are allowed (unofficially) to get rich and accumulate wealth. Therefore, 
they have an even better quality of life covered in luxury, by the local 
standards, than the Soviet officials ever had. On the other hand, they have 
even lower job security than the Soviet predecessors had. Although there is 
no comprehensive data available on the tenures of the officials, Economic 
Intelligence Unit’s 2005 country report estimated the tenures at 2-3 years 
on average.  
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  In order, to make the best of the positions that they hold, they have to 
extract as much rent as they can get away with, within a short period of 
time while making sure that the plan targets are met. At the same time they 
have to build good relationships with the central government officials in the 
hope that when they leave current positions they leave them for better ones.  
 
 Implications of this system of economic management by 
administrative officials for the development of entrepreneurship and 
consequently, economic development go far beyond the obvious obstacles 
seen by the ‘naked eye’ i.e. those reported in the IFC surveys.  
 First of all, the official administrative apparatus competes for human 
resources with the other sectors of the economy and we have seen, in 
Chapter Five, the evidence of the best young talent trying to get admitted 
into the degree course leading towards the careers in administrative 
apparatus. The admission examination results for 2005-2006 academic year 
showed that the applicants admitted into the selected IHE located in the 
capital achieved total points as much as 50% above the national average. 
Attracting talented into the system makes it self – perpetuating with the 
new comers who have spent so much time and money to get to the top and 
do not want to change the system when they finally get there.   
 Furthermore, due to the way extended families support the rise of 
every top official in the Uzbek society, when an official takes the top job in 
any given region his or her extended family come to dominate the region 
during the tenure of that official. They will want to control most of the 
lucrative business interests in the region, squeezing the rest of the business 
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community to the margins. It will also make the business climate very 
volatile given the short tenures of the top officials.  
 In addition, because the administrative officials of all levels depend on 
rent seeking activities for their personal incomes, they will use innovative 
ways to protect their powers to extract rents in spite of the changes in the 
legislation against their favour.  
 Cumulatively, the effect of the administrative system in Uzbekistan is 
on productive entrepreneurship and small businesses, has been highly 
negative. The obstacles, which are often reported and acted upon by 
creating numerous new legislations and initiatives, are the symptoms of a 
much more fundamental problem.  
 If the current system continues unchanged, it will probably result in 
one of the scenarios listed below:  
1) In an optimistic scenario a critical mass of reasonably rich people will 
emerge and will push for change of the administrative system. The country 
will gradually move into a normal path of development with open market 
and efficient institutions.  
2) Current system will spiral on with increasing income inequality. A small 
number of super rich will run the country and it will be increasingly 
difficult for others to break into. The situation will continue to deteriorate 
until the country will plunge into an economic and political crisis.  
On the evidence of the events of the recent years, the latter scenario is 
looking more likely barring any major external shocks that might bring 
sweeping changes to the system.  
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The main recommendation coming out of our research is that in order 
for productive entrepreneurship to flourish in Uzbekistan, there needs to be 
a fundamental change of the way the economy is administered. Like in any 
other country, there is enough creative, talented people in Uzbekistan and 
they will only choose to channel their talent, energy and resources into 
productive entrepreneurship when there is a freedom to engage in business 
and there is a potential for substantial material reward for success in 
business with firm, proven guarantees fort the security of the private 
property. All of those things are virtually impossible to achieve as long as 
the administrative apparatus has the power over the allocation decision, and 
has a freedom and motivation to interfere into the economic activity.  
The main contribution of this study, in our opinion, has been the fact 
that this study is the first one to combine the theory of talent allocation and 
unproductive entrepreneurship with the empirical studies of the small 
entrepreneurship and businesses. It is also the first study of 
entrepreneurship in Uzbekistan looking at the evolution of the economy 
and talent allocation from a historical perspective. During the period of this 
study we realised that there was no comprehensive work in the economic 
history of Uzbekistan.  
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Limitations of the Study 
 
This study does not do proper justice to the novelty of the main idea 
behind it due to the limitation from which it suffered during the data 
collection and subsequent presentation of the results45.  
The main challenge during this study has been the lack of publicly 
available data on Uzbekistan due to the restrictive nature of regulations 
governing the statistical organizations in Uzbekistan. The small amount of 
data that is available is of not of good quality and collected by 
methodologically questionably means.  
Therefore, we had to conduct our own in depth interviews in order to 
get reliable, first hand knowledge of the problems faced by entrepreneurs. 
Understandably, given the limitation of resources we could not have a large 
sample. 
There are still a lot of opportunities for future studies in this area not 
only in Uzbekistan but also in the wider Central Asian and Eastern 
European regions where the similar systems, inherited from the Soviet era, 
are still in place.   
The conclusions of this study have to be taken with certain degree of 
caution due to the limitations with the data collection and sample selection. 
The secretive nature of the Uzbek public bodies and restrictions on 
independent researchers within the country severely limited the possibility 
                                                  
45
 The field trip, planned to collect data in Uzbekistan unfortunately coincided with the 
infamous ‘Andijan event’ where according to International Crisis Group a large number of 
people were killed during the protesters, protesting against the arrest of 23 local 
entrepreneurs, clashed with security forces (ICG Report 2005).  
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of obtaining a truly representative sample for our study.  This study is an 
exploratory attempt to understand the nature and causes of the main 
obstacles to entrepreneurial by analysing the ‘Rules of the Game’ in the 
context of a transition economy. Further studies are therefore needed to 
establish the true extent of the relationship between these ‘Rules’ and the 
entrepreneurial development.  
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Appendix 1: the study, data collection, and the transcripts of the 
interviews  
 
By far the most challenging aspect of our research has been the 
availability and quality of data. At the beginning of our study we had 
intended to request firm level data from the Uzbek authorities dealing with 
statistics with the aim of conducting a quantitative analysis. However, as 
we went through the available scholarly literature, we grew ever less 
optimistic about the prospects of succeeding in getting the official firm 
level data which no researcher had been able to obtain. The reason for that 
is the fact that Uzbekistan has inherited the secretive nature of government 
agencies from the old Soviet period and the only publicly available 
statistical data on the Uzbek economy are aggregate economic indicators 
the accuracy of which had been questioned by a number of international 
organizations.  
Therefore, when we planned our field trip to Uzbekistan during the 
summer of 2005, we kept our options open and prepared survey 
questionnaires as well as making arrangements to meet the officials from 
the State Committee for Statistics, Tax Office, The Chamber of 
Entrepreneurs and Producers and commercial banks. During these meetings 
with the officials, who only agreed to meet unofficially and off-the-record, 
we were advised not to push too far with the official data requests and also 
not to go around trying to survey entrepreneurs ourselves given the political 
situation46. As a result, we were left with the only option of face-to-face 
                                                  
46
  Unfortunately, our visit to Uzbekistan coincided with the tense political standoff with 
the Western countries and Uzbekistan in the aftermath of the Andijan events where a large 
number of people died during the popular uprising against the arrest of 21 local 
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interviews with the few local entrepreneurs who agreed to speak to us on 
the condition of full confidentiality without any audio or video recording. 
We could only take notes of the answers and had to reconstruct the full 
scripts afterwards. We managed to interview 10 people representing 
different sectors and regions including one bank manager, one manager of a 
multinational logistics company. The transcripts of the interviews are 
presented below.  
• Interviewee N1: a property developer in Tashkent 
Question: Could you tell us about your educational background?   
Answer: I graduated the Tashkent State University with a degree in 
Mathematics during the Soviet times and worked as a teacher at a high 
school, until it became impossible to live on a school teacher’s salary.  
Question: So you did not have any experience in this business before? 
Answer: No, not much actually. I started with a friend of mine on a part 
time basis in the beginning. He had a lot of experience in building and 
construction. When we started making some money I decided to go full 
time and quit the school. 
Question: Did you have any business management training?  
Answer: No, I had to learn by doing in this business. As I said the only 
education I ever had was the degree in mathematics and that has been good 
enough for me so far. 
Question: How big is your business now? 
                                                                                                                                                          
entrepreneurs. The government blamed the Western countries for the uprising and started a 
massive campaign against the representatives of foreign NGOs and research organizations. 
The officials we met warned us about the suspicion that an independent survey of 
entrepreneurs might raise under the circumstances.   
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Answer: We are now employing 5 people from outside in addition to me 
and my partner. In terms of the turnover, we are looking to reach $20,000 
within the next 6 months.  
Question: Have you ever borrowed from any external sources? If you have, 
who did you borrow from?  
Answer: I had to borrow from my family and friends to start up initially and 
I have already paid that off. In addition, we took a bank loan last year from 
a local bank.  
Question: Could you tell me more about the details of the loan?  
Answer: It was a loan of about $4000 in local currency at an official interest 
rate of 8%, I think. It was an interesting experience, though not a very 
enjoyable one I must admit. Because we have always kept our business 
unofficial, so-to-speak, and only dealt in cash when buying and selling the 
properties and buying the supplies for construction. Last year, I spoke to 
my friend, who is a bank manager and he told me that I could increase my 
earnings by selling my cash money for non-cash money which I could still 
use for buying supplies. But for that my business had to be registered. He 
also told me about cheap loans that were going at a much lower rate of 
interest than the inflation rate. So, we decided to try it. We got ourselves 
registered as a small business and applied for a loan.  The loan was cheap, 
interest-wise, but the other costs added up. I mean the costs like registering 
the collateral and the like. Although I had the full backing of the bank 
manager and went through the loan application process quite smoothly, the 
problems started after the funds appeared in my bank account. I never 
though that spending money would be so troublesome. The prices for 
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everything are quoted 15-20% higher if you tell the suppliers that you want 
to pay by bank transfer. When I eventually managed to buy some supplies 
through a firm, I was called to the prosecutor’s office to answer questions 
about ‘obnalichka’ (converting non-cash into cash through illegal 
schemes). In the end, the loan cost me a lot more than I expected. I was 
lucky that I knew the bank manager. Otherwise I do not think that anyone 
can get any benefit from bank loans if they have to pay the bank officials as 
well.   
Question: You mentioned the problems with the bank account regulations, what 
other obstacles are the most serious for your business at the moment?  
Answer: For my business, the main problems are related to the paperwork during 
buying and selling properties. There are so many documents are involved and we 
have to make a lot of unofficial payments to get the paperwork done. We used to 
have less trouble before we registered officially. We still do not report most of our 
dealings but for any bit of business we report we get our fair share of intervention 
from the authorities.  
Question: How about the taxation, are you happy with the amount of taxes you are 
paying? 
Answer: To be really honest, I do not exactly know how much tax my business is 
paying officially. It is not a very big amount anyway. I have an accountant who 
takes care of that side of things. My real problem is the amount of unofficial 
payments.  
Question: Uzbekistan’s business legislation has a lot of provisions against 
corruption and unofficial payments. Have you ever complained against the 
unofficial payments?  
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Answer: I know we have the perfect laws on paper. But I also know that you can 
never win any legal disputes against the authorities. Laws and regulations in 
Uzbekistan do not matter as much as personal relations. That is why you don’t see 
firms looking for good lawyers. In fact, most of the firms do not use lawyers at all. 
But everybody would love to employ people with important connections. I would 
not risk damaging my relationship with the authorities by blowing a whistle on 
things which everybody knows about anyway.  
Question: Do you agree with the notion that the smaller businesses need 
outside protection to operate in a post communist country? If so who do 
think can offer the best protection in your environment?  
Answer: I do not think the situation is too bad for small businesses. The 
problems get much more serious as the business grows bigger. The really 
small ones can survive by paying the bribes when needed. Protection would 
certainly be a very big help. In Uzbekistan, the best protection could be 
only provided by the top officials. Because most of the problems come 
from the officials, only the top officials can make them go away 
completely.  
Question: How optimistic are you about the future of your business and the 
future of the entrepreneurial sector in Uzbekistan? 
 
 
Answer: The future of my business is looking stable. I do not think I will be 
expanding my business very much in the near future though. I am far less 
optimistic for the future of the business sector in general. The business 
environment is getting very tough.  
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• Interviewee N2: a construction business owner in Tashkent 
Question: Can you tell us about your educational and professional 
background?  
Answer: I have a degree in architecture and worked at a state construction 
company for many years before independence.  
Question: When and how did you start up in business?  
Answer: I started my own company when a part of the assets of the 
company I was working for, was privatized in 1991. Since then we have 
been doing various construction projects for both state and private clients. 
We do road works, building repairs, and renovations.  
Question: How big is your business at the moment?  
Answer: We employ up to 20 people depending on the time of the year. The 
summer is the peak time of our season and at the moment we have 18 
people on our books. They are working on two different sites. One is the 
refurbishment of a school building and the other one is the road resurfacing 
project. The projects are worth about 18 million UZS (about $17000) 
together.  
Question: What are the main obstacles to your business in your opinion? 
Answer: For my business, the main problem is the lack of opportunities. 
There are not many construction projects in progress except for the state 
orders. The state orders take a lot of time to materialise because of the 
bureaucracy involved and the payments take even longer to arrive. We have 
to spend a lot of time and money to speed up the whole process.  
Question: The surveys have reported the tax system as one of the main 
obstacles. How big a problem is it for you?  
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Answer: I am paying the unified rate which is around 13% of the revenues. The 
trouble with it is that it does not matter how profitable your business is. For 
example, if your profit margin is 26% of your revenues then your will be paying 
half of your profits in corporate profit tax. Another problem for us is that we can 
not hide much of our profits, because a large part of our revenues are coming from 
the organizations financed from state budget and we are therefore under a lot more 
scrutiny compared to other similar businesses. However, the amount of taxes we 
are paying is very small compared to the unofficial payments we have to make 
during the course of our business. As a result we have to inflate our other costs to 
recover some of those costs.  
Question: Have you ever borrowed from external sources? If you have, who 
did you borrow from?  
Answer: Yes. We have taken out one bank loan and we have borrowed from 
informal sources a few times before.  
Question: Could you give us a few more details about your borrowings?  
Answer: I borrowed from a bank a few years ago. The amount was UZS 10 
million at a very low nominal rate but the paper work cost me even more. 
Question: Really, did the application process cost you more than the interest you 
paid on the loan?  
Answer: Yes, it cost me more to complete the application process than the interest 
payment on the loan. However, I think it is meant to work that way by the 
authorities. The overall cost of the loan for me was about 30% of which less than 
10% was official interest and the rest went to the officials involved in the process. 
That makes the final overall rate of interest still within the rate of inflation in my 
estimates. I know the guys at the bank quite well and I know how much they get in 
salaries and how much they have to spend to keep their positions. So as I said 
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overall it is just about fair. My real complaint, however, is the amount of time it 
takes to do it all and the restriction on spending the money you borrow. 
Question: How about the informal loans? You said you used informal loans too?  
Answer: I did borrow from some informal sector lenders a couple of times. 
It spite of the fact that the informal sector loans are prohibitively expensive 
with the monthly rates as high as 20% if you need quick liquidity informal 
finance is the source to go for. I have to borrow from informal lenders just 
because of the speed of the process. Although the interest rates are really 
high, the way things change in my line of business, sometimes you are 
desperate for quick cash and there is no alternative to the informal lenders 
in that respect. 
 Question: How do you see the role of the authorities in the development of 
the small businesses in Uzbekistan? Are the official interventions 
decreasing as a result of new legislations supporting entrepreneurship?  
Answer: The role of the authorities in general has not changed much but the 
relative importance of different organizations has changed overtime. When 
I started in business during the years immediately after the independence, 
tax office used to be the most feared of the government offices by the 
independent business community. But lately other parts of the state 
apparatus have increased their involvement in the affairs of businesses. The 
latest menace is the Department for fighting against Currency and Tax 
Crimes, under the general prosecutor’s office. In the last year and half, 
about 5 or 6 businesses that I personally knew closed down after 
inspections by that department staff.  
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Question: How optimistic are you in the future of your business and the 
future of entrepreneurship in general? 
Answer: Not very much, to be honest with you. Things are very uncertain 
in our country right now. We do not know who is going to be running this 
country in, say 5 years time and how will the structure of the administration 
look like than. As you probably know as well as I do, the changes in 
personnel at the top is more important here than any changes in the 
legislation.  
 
• Interviewee N3: a restaurant owner in Tashkent  
Question: Can you tell us about your educational and professional 
background?  
Answer: My education did not go any further after high school. I could not 
get into the university and had to start working as an assistant to a chef. I 
worked my way up to the position of a head chef at a big restaurant within 
6 years and finally had a chance to open my own restaurant with the help of 
my family and friends. I have been running my own business for the last 5 
years.  
Question: How has your business progressed in this period?  
Answer: We have done quite well. Customer numbers have steadily 
increased over the last few years and we also have nearly finished an 
extension to the restaurant. We are currently employing over 10 people, 
including serving staff.  
Question: What are the main problems for your business at the moment?  
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Answer: If I tell you about all the problems we have, we will be sitting here 
forever. Such is the restaurant business in this country. Unlike other 
businesses, our business happens out in the open and everybody can see 
how well you are doing, how busy you are. Therefore, they all want to get a 
slice of it. I mean, everybody who can make life difficult for us tries to get 
something off us. Working in cash, we have to hand in a certain amount of 
cash every period and if you don’t you will be called to tax office, 
prosecutor’s office etc.   
Question: How do you deal with all of them and run your business 
at the same time? 
Answer: We can’t deal with all of them, so we don’t. We keep good 
relationship with one or two top people around here and they help out when 
things get really tough. This is important in our line of business. Every 
restaurant or a retail outlet has to have the support one or two important 
people, ideally top official or a high level law enforcement officer. The 
number of inspections you get depends on how well related you are to the 
authorities. For example, nobody would dare to inspect businesses owned 
by a very important official’s family members as long as he remains in 
office. 
Question: Have you ever used external finance? 
Answer: Yes, I borrowed from family and friends in the beginning and I 
took a bank loan last year to build an extension to the restaurant.  
Question: Can you tell us about your experience of applying and obtaining 
the bank loan?   
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Answer: It was not a very pleasant experience unfortunately. Literally every 
step of the application process was full of problems for me: the valuation of 
collateral, submitting my business plan, negotiating with the bank manager, 
everything. I even had to pay 10% in advance, in unofficial payments, and 
that is on top of the interest charges. 
Question: Have you ever used any informal sources of finance apart from 
your family and friends? 
Answer: No, I do not use informal money lenders if that’s what you mean. 
The reason is simply because they charge very high interest rates.  
Question: You mentioned about the banking related problems and 
interventions into your business, what about the taxation?  
Answer: Official taxes do not bother me much, to be perfectly honest I do 
not even know exactly how much I am paying in official taxes. That is 
something my accountant takes care of. But the problem is the unofficial 
payments that I have to make nearly at every step of the projects I am 
doing. We are already used to the mayor’s requests to pay all sorts of 
donation and all sorts of favours for free. Last month my accountant was 
called to the National Security Service (successor to the KGB) office and 
was told to pay the officer’s mobile phone bill. What can you do about 
that? 
 
 
• Interviewee N4: owner of an IT company in an eastern region 
 
Question: Can you tell me about your educational and professional 
background? 
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Answer: I studied Information Technologies at a local college and worked 
at a small, private company as a computer technician for 3 years. Then I 
left the company and decided to open my own computer games and internet 
club. I have expanded the business over the last 2.5 years to cover a wide 
range of computing, internet and information management services.  
Question: What are the main problems which your business is facing? 
Answer:  The problems are changing all the time. When I started my 
business, the registration process used to be quite long and problematic. 
Registration is not a big deal anymore. If you make a decent effort it takes 
about 14-15 days to register.  
Some of the other things remained as difficult as they have always been. 
Things like taxation, dealing with the banks, and other officials.  
Question: What is exactly the problem for you as far as, for example 
taxation, is concerned? Is it the system itself or the rate of the taxes?  
Answer:  I will give you an example. The biggest tax I have to pay, 
percentage-wise, is the payroll tax, which is 35% at the moment. If you pay 
UZS100 in wages, you will have to pay UZS35 in payroll tax. Then say if 
they pay another 40% in income tax he will end up with only UZS60. In 
other words, if my employee asks for UZS60 salary, I will have to pay 
UZS135 of which UZS75 will go to the state. That is why almost every 
business that I know around here pays their employees off the books. They 
only show minimum amount of people on payroll and pay them minimum 
amounts to minimize tax bill.    
Question: What about the problem of dealing with the officials and the 
banks?  
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Answers: The problem with the banks has always been the same, the lack 
of cash money. I do not understand why they still cannot solve this simple 
problem even though the Central Bank can print as much cash money as it 
wants. It has been a consistent problem for us the smaller businesses. We 
have to hand in the cash money we receive from our customers and when 
we I ask to withdraw from our accounts they put a lot of restrictions on us.  
The other recent problem for us has been the intervention from the 
security services. They have increased the pressure on the firms providing 
internet access like us, putting restriction on what websites our customers 
can visit, what kind of information they download and send etc.  
Question: Have you ever borrowed from any external sources of finance? 
Answer: No, I have never borrowed from outside sources. When I started, I 
started with a partner who provided the money for the business and I put all 
the effort. So that was the agreement, we still own 50% of the business 
each. We have expanded slowly without much financial investment and 
therefore did not need to borrow anything.  
Question: How optimistic are about the future of your business in particular 
and about the future of the Uzbek entrepreneurship in general?  
Answer: I am quite optimistic about my own business. Because this is a 
relatively new sector in this country and has a lot of potential. We are 
moving into web designing and hosting markets and exploring the 
prospects of online shopping and the like. So there are many opportunities 
for us to exploit.  
I am not very optimistic about the business sector in this country in general. 
I have seen a lot of business going bankrupt due to the things that are 
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outside their control. Especially the shops selling imported things are 
having a hard time. People are not confident enough to make big 
investments with longer term business plans. The businesses are very 
vulnerable to the interferences from the authorities and the officials change 
very often. So the entrepreneurs do not know who is going to be in charge 
of the government offices in the medium to longer term and therefore go 
for quick profit making opportunities instead of longer term investments.  
 
• Interviewee N5: a bank manager in Tashkent  
Question: Can you tell us about your educational and professional 
background?  
Answer: I graduated from Tashkent Institute of Finance and joined one the 
biggest commercial banks in Tashkent. I have been working in the banking 
sector for more than 10 years and the last 3 years as a branch manager. 
Question: What is your assessment of the state of the entrepreneurial sector 
in Uzbekistan and the role of the banking sector in the development of this 
sector?  
Answer: People talk about the difficulties faced by small businesses and 
individual entrepreneurs and tend to portray banks as villains that make life 
difficult for them. 
The reality is that the difficulties faced by the SMEs are nothing 
compared to the interferences into the day to day running of a bank by 
various authorities. I would not be exaggerating if I say that nearly 90-95% 
of bank manager’s time is spent dealing with outside interventions. In fact 
the main function of the banks in Uzbekistan is to act as an intermediary 
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between the government and the customers, not the intermediary between 
the savers and borrowers. We collect taxes for the government and lend on 
the money where they want us to, we control the cash circulation for the 
central bank, collect information for various other government bodies. 
Question: What do you think is the main obstacle preventing the 
banks from providing good services to the businesses? 
Answers: The rules and regulations are so complex and intrusive 
that you cannot go a single day without breaking or bending some of them. 
Therefore, as a bank manager, I have to keep good relationships not only 
with the head office but also with the local mayor, prosecutor’s office, 
police and other security services, tax officials etc. Because, I know they 
can always find something on me or on one of my staff whenever they want 
to. I have seen a few bank managers being jailed for the things that most of 
us do to some extent. A friend of mine, also a fellow branch manager, had a 
heart attack before the age of 30, all because of the pressures of the job.  
Question: Do you think there are a lot of illegal interventions into the 
activities of the commercial banks by the authorities?  
Answer: In Uzbekistan, the boundaries between the legal, quasi legal and 
downright illegal are blurred and we, the banks, are at the centre of it all 
because of what we are required to do by the government. Every year 
before the major public holidays, the mayor calls for a meeting and tells the 
bank managers to present the list of corporate customers together with their 
respective bank balances. He then tells the managers of those companies 
how much to donate for the celebrations and similar events.  
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In addition, if the mayor (or any of the heads of major state offices for that 
matter) tells to give a loan to somebody you will have to arrange it no 
matter what the applicant’s paper works look like.  
A client says to me: You’re my bank. You have to keep all my banking 
operations secret. Then how do the tax authorities, the khokimiyat, and 
public prosecutor know about them? So what am I supposed to say in 
reply? I have my instructions and if I don’t provide all the information on 
time, they cannot only fire me; they can bring charges against me too. If a 
large sum of money appears in your account, you can rest assured that 
they’ll be coming to check up, and you’ll be called into the khokimiyat and 
be made to finance some public construction project or something or other 
of that. 
 
• Interviewee N6 a shopkeeper  
Question: Can you tell you us about your educational and professional 
background?  
Answer: I have a degree in education and worked at school for over 10 
years teaching the Uzbek language and literature. I started in business with 
importing clothing and footwear in small amounts from Turkey and 
Emirates and selling them in the bazaars. Later I saved up enough money to 
buy this place for my shop. I have been increasing my turnover gradually 
but there is only so much you can do with one shop.  
Question: Do you have plans to open new shops in the future then?  
Answer: No, I do not think I will open any new shops in the near future. It 
is too risky to put all your investment in one business in Uzbekistan at the 
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moment. I might look for other opportunities in other sectors, possibly in 
property development or something like that.  
Question: Why do you think it is riskier to expand within the same sector 
compared to expanding across sectors? 
Answer: Simply because, with our authorities you never know when they 
are going to decided to put restrictions on certain sectors. If one sector goes 
down you will not go down with it. That is what everybody is doing. We 
have seen that within the retail sector a few times already. The government 
closed markets, borders, introduced prohibitive restrictions that put a lot of 
people out of business overnight.  
Question: What are the main problems for the businesses like yours at the 
moment in Uzbekistan?  
Answer: There are plenty of problems. The most important probably is the 
unpredictability of the legislation. The tax legislation for example, changes 
so often that it is virtually impossible to keep up. As a result, when you face 
the tax men you are never 100% sure that you have done your taxes right. 
Ever changing, complex legislation plays into the hands of the authorities. 
For every given offence the authorities have various options ranging from 
completely ignoring to closing your business down altogether. Ever 
changing, complex legislation plays into the hands of the authorities. For 
every given offence the authorities have various options ranging from 
completely ignoring to closing your business down altogether.  
Question: What other problems you face apart from the changeable 
legislation and tax rules?  
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Answer: Well, there is the ongoing problem with banks and cash plans. We 
have grown tired talking about those problems. We try to minimize our 
dealings with the banks but you cannot really avoid them.  
Question: What kind of reforms would make real difference in improving 
the business environment for smaller businesses like yours, in your 
opinion? 
Answers: This may sound very pessimistic, but I do not think any reform 
kind make much difference under current circumstances. I have seen a few 
initiatives and reforms in my time so far but almost every one of them 
made the situation worse. I am sceptical of any new reforms now. I think 
the officials use the reforms to increase their power and influence and 
therefore we end up being the main losers after every wave of reforms.  
Question: How optimistic are you about the future of your business and the 
entrepreneurial sector in general?  
Answer: I do not know. I have mixed feeling about the future prospects for 
my business or for the future of the private business community in general. 
A lot of things depend on the things that we have no control over: things 
like foreign relations, politics etc. The recent improvements in the 
relationships with Russia and other close neighbours are encouraging, 
because those the important markets for us. On the other hand, I am not 
sure what is our political environment is going to be like in say 10 years 
time. I think therefore most of the people in this country are working with 
shorter term outlook.  
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• Interviewee N7 a farmer in a southern region  
Question: Can you tell us about your educational and professional 
background?  
Answer: I had graduated from the institute of agriculture before the 
independence and started my career at a sovkhoz (state farm) as an 
agronomist. I worked there right until the state farm was abolished and its 
lands were allowed to be given to private farmers for long term lease. Then 
I established my own farm. That is what I have been doing ever since. 
Question: How big is your business now and what kind of crop do you 
specialize in?  
Answer: The land I am currently leasing is nearly 20 hectares. We also have 
some cattle too but that is not the major part of the business. The major 
crop has always been the cotton, because it is compulsory. Although cotton 
is not very profitable, we need to do it in order to keep the land. The other 
major crops are wheat and vegetables.  
Question: What are the main problems for your business? 
 Answer: My main problem is the cotton. It occupies most of the land, 
requires a lot more work than our other crops and costs more to grow. 
However, the profits from it are much less compared to other crops. We 
have to buy the seeds, the fertilisers, and the fuel at market prices but get 
paid for our cotton at state prices. We have plan targets for wheat too but 
those are much more realistic and so are the prices for wheat. Besides we 
can sell the remaining part of the wheat crop in the open market quite 
easily, unlike cotton.  
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Question: Is it just the pricing of cotton the main problem or are any other 
issues about it? 
Answer: The pricing is at the centre of it. We would not complain if we 
were paid well, would we? Since we are not paid well for cotton, we do not 
want to do it. So they have to make it compulsory to grow cotton. Initially 
they only imposed the plan targets i.e. the amount of cotton we had to 
deliver. But private farmers would rather bribe the officials at the collection 
point rather than growing the required amount. Then they introduced the 
quotas for land saying that certain proportion of your land had to be sown 
under cotton. But we still do not strictly follow those requirements, simply 
because you can always negotiate with the people who come to inspect 
your land. It just increased our costs further.  
Question: What kind of reforms would you like to see introduced in order 
to solve your problems? 
Answer: I would like to see our authorities to acknowledge the problems 
openly and admit that the current system is not working first of all. Then 
introduce a system which increases the accountability of our local 
authorities. Because we have some very good laws on paper but the local 
authorities often ignore them.  
Question: How optimistic are you about the future of your business and 
about the future of the entrepreneurship in general? 
Answer: To be honest, I am quite optimistic about the future in spite of 
these problems. I think with the energy and mineral prices going up our 
government may find itself less and less dependent on tax income and 
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might even give us more freedom and support. Hopefully, that will give us 
a big push towards achieving a vibrant private sector.   
• Interviewee N8 a farmer in a central region 
Question: Can you tell us about your educational and professional 
background? 
Answer: I grew up in village working in the cotton fields and looking after 
cattle and sheep. I only finished high school and served in the army. After 
coming back from the army I was not sure what to do and decided to apply 
to become a private farmer. But unfortunately my application was turned 
down as I did not have the support of the local officials. Then I decided to 
write to the top officials in the capital and complain about it. After a few 
months there was an inspection into the land allocation in the region and 
the inspection team asked to meet me to find out about the details of my 
complaint. As a result I was allocated 3 hectares of land to start my private 
farm. I have later managed to increase it to over 10 hectares.  
Question: What are the main problems for your business? 
Answer: The main problem is the lack of freedom in terms of what to do 
with the land we are using. We have an agreement with the government and 
we pay the taxes but still cannot choose what we want to grow. For 
example, if growing wheat is the most profitable for me than growing 
cotton I should be able to grow cotton as long as I pay my fair share of the 
taxes. But we do not have that freedom. We do not even have freedom to 
spend our own money in our bank accounts; they tell us what we can spend 
it on.  
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Question:  What kind of reforms would you like to see introduced in order 
to solve your problems? 
Answer: I do not know which reform would do it, but I would like to see 
the state order system abolished and more freedom given to us to grow 
what we want and to sell them to whoever we want to sell them.  
Question: How optimistic are you about the future of your business and 
about the future of the entrepreneurship in general? 
Answer: As you might guess, I am not very optimistic about the current 
system. I think we will keep going down the same road until there is a big 
crisis happens. I hope I am wrong but I do not see any positive changes 
happening in the near future.  
 
• Interviewee N9 a farmer in an eastern region  
Question: Can you tell us about your educational and professional 
background? 
Answer: I only graduated from high school and worked for the local 
kolkhoz all my life. I applied to become a farmer about 7 years ago and 
since then I have been running my own private farm.  
Question: What are your main crops and how big is your business now? 
Answer: The main crop is cotton. We also grow wheat, carrots, onions and 
some other vegetables for the markets of the nearby towns. Last year, we 
had a large order from a ketchup making company for tomatoes, so we 
grew a lot of tomatoes. The land, we are currently using, is just over 13 
hectares with well over half of which is under cotton.   
Question: What are the main problems for your business? 
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Answer: We have many problems around here. But the main ones would be 
the amount of intervention in our businesses. It is getting worse every year. 
The problems with the cotton are well known. They tell us what to plant, 
when to plant, and when to harvest. They have now started sending the 
police to monitor the harvesting of wheat to make sure that we are not 
concealing any of the harvest.  
Question: There are a lot of laws and regulations in Uzbekistan to protect 
entrepreneurs like you? Have you ever considered complaining about the 
interventions or taking the officials to court?  
Answer: I have heard about a few farms who failed to deliver according to 
the plans and protested about the system. They had their lease agreements 
terminated and the lands taken away. You can forget about taking the 
authorities to court. In all these years in business, I have never seen a single 
court decision against the authorities.  
Question: What kind of reforms would you like to see introduced in order 
to solve your problems? 
Answer: I would like us the farmers to have access to the outside markets 
more easily, so we could get fairer prices for our products. I also would like 
see the powers of the local authorities limited so they do not interfere with 
the businesses too often. 
Question: How optimistic are you about the future of your business and 
about the future of the entrepreneurship in general? 
Answer: I do not know. I hope things will get better. We have a very patient 
nation which endured some very tough time in the past. I believe that our 
nation is capable of achieving great economic prosperity and I hope our 
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government will also start believing and give us a little more freedom to 
achieve that.  
 
 
• Interviewee N10: the regional manager (for Central Asia) of an 
international transport company47 
 
  
  
Question: What are the main destinations of goods that you handle for the 
Uzbek companies? (In and out of Uzbekistan) 
Answer: Our main transit region in/out of Uzbekistan is the Middle East, 
Turkey and the European ports. We do transportation to and from places all 
over the world, mainly working via Bandar Abbas, Mersin, Poti, 
Novorssiysk, Riga, Klaypeda ports as transit points. As you know our 
country is double land locked and for any export or import of goods we 
need to pass through these ports. Additionally there are Ukrainian ports that 
we use rarely due to high cost of rail way to reach ports of Odessa and 
Illichevsk from Uzbekistan. 
 Question: Who are the main players in you line of business (i.e. main 
players in the transportation business in Uzbekistan, is it dominated by big 
state owned companies)? 
Answer: The main operators on rail way you mean? Rail ways belong to the 
government as it is normal for whole of the CIS and same is in the EU. The 
operators are various, our Uzbek rail way has own daughter companies 
such as Uzzheldorexpediciya and Uzzheldorcontainer. However, we don’t 
                                                  
47
  This interview was done over email and the interviewee answered the question in English. Therefore, we 
presented the answers word for word, without editing.  
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work with them. Our company is working with the Russian rail way 
operators due to low charges and very good service. For the road 
transportation - there is no monopoly. Central Asia Trans by being a State 
Company is handling mostly government orders. We use our own our 
partners' vehicles and so far no problem. 
 Question: How much does it cost to transport a single container (for 
example to Moscow and to a Western European city like Paris or London)? 
What are the standard sizes of containers? Do the sending or receiving 
parties have to buy the containers?  
Answer: The freight cost from FOR Chukursay (Tashkent), (definition Free 
on Rail means cleared and loaded on rail way station and none of those 
charges are included) to FOR Novorossiysk (Russia) is USD 2000/40' 
container. To Paris it can be EUR 5600 per 40' container. From Paris to 
Tashkent EUR 10,000 per container.  
From Uzbekistan to Europe we deliver mostly by carrier's own container 
that means no need for Consignee to purchase. But Uzbek carrier needs to 
sell container in Europe as 2nd hand. Hence, there is also margin for 
Transport Company. However from Europe to Uzbekistan comes mostly by 
Shipper's own container and the price of container is already included in 
cost of goods basis CIP Tashkent. The Consignee/importer is selling 
container at double less price. Here is loss. 
 Question: What is the main mean transportation for your company (by 
road, sea &rail, Sea road, or a combination of them)?  
Answer: Mostly by railway, as rail way is more convenient and organized. 
There is no winter season or holiday for rail ways and you don't need to go 
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after driver's visa and pay extra charges for demurrage. However (it) 
depends on (customer’s) wish and situation. If cargo delayed then client 
(may) order by road. 
 Question: Do prices differ for different kind of goods? Is the delivery time 
same for all goods?   
Answer: Of course, (the timing) is various and depends on goods 
description. Rail way tariff is depending on goods and distance. The 
separate issue is dangerous goods and oversized/ heavy lift cargoes. In road 
transportation dangerous goods and high valued (expensive) goods are 
charged more, because all is coming from expenses on routes for escort, 
etc. Same is for airfreight. For the regular and big volume every transport 
company gives special tariff to secure the shipment. Transit time is for all 
cargoes the same, excluding oversized and heavy lift cargoes. Because such 
a special project cargoes are transported by low speed and special 
instructions. See attached file how to know that cargo is oversized for CIS 
rail ways. 
 Question: Do any of the Uzbek Companies have special discounts (i.e. 
priority export goods producers, like cotton industry, gold, other precious 
metals, minerals for agriculture, or Neftegaz, NGMK etc)? 
Answer: For the prestige you can give special tariff for UN or Government 
organization, however usually all these clients are paying more then any 
other client but your service should be high level. We never worked for 
Gold or cotton in Uzbekistan. However Uzselkhozmash Holding and all 
companies in this holding are our clients (TTZ, Uzcasemash, Tashselmash, 
etc). 
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 Question: What are the main components of your cost per delivery?  
Answer: The cost of transportation is consists from different charges: fuel, 
border charges, documentation fee, customs fee for transit, visa for drivers, 
etc. 
 
Appendix 2 
• Questionnaire  
 
Section One: General Information  
1.1 Educational background of the interviewee:   
 High School 
 College 
 Undergraduate degree 
 Postgraduate degree  
 
1.2 Did you have a prior experience in the sector that your business is operating 
in?  
 Yes 
 No 
 If yes, in what capacity: 
 Professional 
 Managerial  
And how long: 
 Less that a year 
 1-5 years 
 More than 5 years 
 
1.3 Have you been a member of the nomenclature (i.e. were you a member of 
the Communist party or did you hold any administrative/managerial 
position during the Soviet years)? 
 Yes  
 No 
1.4 Have you had any training in business management? 
 Yes   
 No 
If yes to which level:  
 Short courses 
 College degree 
 University degree 
 Postgraduate level 
1.5 What was the main reason that made you start your own business? 
 Recognized a great business opportunity 
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 Lost employment 
  Needed an extra source of income 
 Other (Please specify  ________________ ) 
1.6 General info about your business: 
Industry: 
 Agriculture 
 Manufacturing 
 Services 
 Other 
Number of employees: 
 Less than 50 
 50-250 
 More than 250 
Age: 
 Less than a year 
 1-5 years 
 5-15 years 
 More than 15 years 
Ownership structure: 
 Joint venture 
 Privately owned  
 Limited Liability Company (LLC) 
 LLC with government share 
 Other (please specify ________________________________) 
 
Section Two 
 
This section will deal with general obstacles faced by the Businesses. The 
issues that are covered in the section include the nature of obstacles, their 
relative importance etc.  
 
2.1 What is the biggest obstacle that your business is facing? (Please grade the 
following perceived obstacles in order of importance to your businesses 
with 1 being the biggest problem) 
 Excessive regulations 
 High taxes 
 Financing 
 Corruption 
 Street crime 
 Other (please specify ________________________________) 
2.2 Does the local government hinder, have no influence on, or help small 
business? 
 Hinder 
 Has no influence  
 Helps 
2.3 Who do you trust to resolve a business related dispute? 
 Government agencies 
 Courts 
 Private mediators 
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 Other 
2.4 Do you think one needs a ‘roof’ to operate a business in Uzbekistan? 
 Yes 
 No 
2.5 What is an estimated cost of unofficial payments to keep your business 
running (as a percentage of total costs) 
 None 
 Less than 10% 
 10-25% 
 25-50% 
 More than 50% 
2.6 What percentage of business activity in a typical company in your industry 
goes unregistered? 
 None 
 Up to 25%  
 25-50% 
 50-75% 
 More than 75% 
 
Section Three 
 
This section is about the obstacles related to financial services and 
financing. The main purpose of this section is to find out the importance of 
financial institutions to small businesses. 
 
3.1 Do you have a bank account? 
 Yes 
 No 
3.2 How long have you had your account at your current bank? 
 Less than a year 
 1-5 years 
 More than 5 years 
 
3.3 Have ever applied for a loan from a financial institution? 
 Yes 
 No 
3.4 (If you said yes to 3.3) Which institution(s) did you apply to? 
 The same institution where I keep my bank account 
 Different commercial bank 
 Government agency 
 International Financial Institution ( ___________________________) 
 Credit Bureau  
 Other (_____________________________) 
3.5 Was your application successful?  
 Yes  
 No 
3.6 (If yes to 3.5) What was the term of the loan?  
 Short (less than a year long 
 Medium (1-3 years) 
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 Long (longer than 3 years) 
3.7 (If no to 3.5) Why was your application rejected?  
 Lack of collateral 
 Lack of track record 
 Did not want to pay the informal fees 
 My business plan was not convincing 
 Other 
3.8 (If said no to 3.3) Why not?  
 No need for external finance 
 High interest rates 
 High collateral requirements 
 high informal payments 
 Other (___________________________) 
3.9 What is your preferred source of finance?  
 Own savings 
 Friends and family 
 Banks 
 Government SME funds 
 IFIs 
 Informal loans 
 Other (__________________________________) 
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